The effect of share issue privatisation (or initial public offering) on firm performance in China by Rosner, Wei Angela
The Effect of Share Issue Privatisation (or Initial Public
Offering) on Firm Performance in China
By
Wei Angela Rosner
Thesis Presented for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy
(Business Studies)
The University of Edinburgh
2003
Abstract
This thesis examines the effect of partial share issue privatisation (or Initial
Public Offering - IPO) on financial performance of Chinese state-owned
enterprises (SOEs hereafter). Theoretically, studies of privatisation suggest
that private firms perform better than comparable SOEs do, or privatisation
improves financial performance of SOEs privatised through public share
offering, and full privatisation has been widely advocated. Prior to going
public, Chinese SOEs stand at very different starting points compared to their
counterparts in the West in that sound corporate management systems,
corporate governance mechanisms and an efficient capital market are either
not in place or underdeveloped. As a result of going public, new corporate
management styles and corporate governance mechanisms are introduced
into newly privatised firms. Therefore the performance of Chinese SOEs after
IPO might not be merely the result of privatisation or ownership change as
elsewhere, but also be the result of effect of IPO on corporate management
and corporate governance.
There are several empirical and conceptual gaps in understanding Chinese
SOEs' financial performance after going public. Firstly, the results of
performance changes of an early study on Chinese share issue privatisation
may not be accurate due to poor data quality before the introduction of the
new accounting regulation based on International Accounting Standards.
Secondly, there is a need to clarify the causes of firms' performance changes
between three years post-privatisation (or post-IPO) and three years pre-
privatisation (or pre-lPO) periods. Finally, there is a need to investigate the
effect of IPO on corporate management and corporate governance practice
that may contribute directly towards firms' financial performance after going
public in the Chinese context.
A methodology developed by Megginson et al (1994) in their study of global
share issue privatisation through comparing firms' post-privatisation versus
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pre-privatisation performance proxies is employed in this thesis. Empirical
research includes examination of accounting data over 6 years (3 years post-
IPO versus 3 years pre-lPO) of 127 firms going public in 1997 and 1998 at
the Shanghai Stock Exchange; three years post-IPO share price return of the
above firms; one survey of 238 listed firms and 16 case studies of listed
firms.
Findings show that in terms of accounting performance, firms experience
significant performance deterioration in profitability and efficiency, but
significant reduction in leverage and improvement in liquidity and output after
going public. The fact that deterioration of all profitability and efficiency
performance measures may indicate that share issue privatisation or IPO has
not worked properly to improve firm performance, and financial market is
weak in monitoring firms since share price return reflects real sales and
short-term liquidity instead of profitability measures. Further findings show
that key determinants in firms' performance changes are pronounced by
private ownership, the presence of employee ownership, share issue size,
board size and asset size of the firms. Evidence from 16 listed firms confirms
that key factors in firms' financial performance changes include not only
ownership change, but also poor corporate management and corporate
governance practice. After going public, firms' poor strategic, financial and
human resource management is accompanied by poor corporate governance
and legal enforcement mechanisms. The results suggest that IPO cannot be
expected to solve all aspects of corporate issues, and it may be difficult to
achieve performance improvement if corporate infrastructures have not been
well developed in the first place. Furthermore, current Chinese corporate
governance mechanisms are insufficient and inefficient to monitor firms, and
this thesis recommends reforming legal systems, building sound corporate
governance mechanisms and promoting institutional investors through
various proposed means (e.g. setting up tribunals, introducing strategic
foreign investors and specifying governance mechanisms etc.) are
prerequisites to performance improvement after privatisation.
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Chapter 1 Introduction
As economic policies, privatisation and nationalisation have been widely debated.
This thesis focuses on privatisation of profit-organisations; privatisation of non-profit
organisations and nationalisation of public sector are not within the scope of this
thesis. Specifically, the effect of share issue privatisation (or initial public offering -
IPO hereafter) on firms' financial and operating performance is the main focus, and
the effect of IPO on capital market is not investigated in this thesis.
1.1 Privatisation & Firm Performance
Privatisation is a highly political and economic process. A privatisation is a sale of
state-owned enterprises (SOEs hereafter) to private investors and the basic goal of
the privatisation is to promote efficiency and profitability of former SOEs. In
developed countries, privatisation methods are mainly asset sales and share issue
privatisation by government in which SOEs are sold to investors through a public
share offering. In the last two decades, share issue privatisation has been one of the
most important elements of the continuing global phenomenon of the increasing use
of financial markets to allocate resources. China has been using share issue
privatisation as its major privatisation strategy, and this thesis mainly investigates the
effect of share issue privatisation or initial public offering (IPO) on firm
performance in China.
Studies of privatisation suggest that in theory private firms perform better than
comparable SOEs do, or privatisation improves financial performance of SOEs
privatised through public share offering, and full privatisation has been widely
advocated. Theoretically, privatisation is expected to improve operating and financial
performance of newly privatised firms, and to promote more efficient use of resource
and growth for firms and industries, as well as to increase the role of the private
sector in the economy. For instance, the exposure to new competition in the product
market, threat of bankruptcy and changes in firms' objectives from government goals
to profit maximisation as public companies after privatisation should promote firms'
profitability and efficiency. Empirically, the role of privatisation in improving firm
performance has been well documented in both developed and developing countries.
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Researchers have found privatisation improve firms' performance in profitability,
efficiency, real output and leverage etc. Furthermore, firms in developed countries
generate larger performance gains than do firms in developing countries. Generally,
full privatisation instead of partial privatisation is widely advocated to improve firm
performance.
1.2 Research Objectives
SOEs have been the dominant economic entities in China and modern organisation
systems and corporate governance mechanisms have just been built up from scratch
at the time of IPO. Therefore share issue privatisation (or IPO) is supposed to have
impact on corporate management and corporate governance after IPO, and firm
performance will change subsequently. In other words, corporate management and
corporate governance might contribute to the financial and operating performance of
newly privatised firms. The above arguments build the foundation for analysis of this
thesis, and the effect of IPO on financial performance, and corporate management
and corporate governance of newly privatised firms are examined accordingly. This
thesis narrows the focus on post-IPO versus pre-IPO (namely post-privatisation
versus pre-privatisation) performance changes and the determinants of these
performance changes. In addition, it also examines the effect of IPO on corporate
management and corporate governance so as to explain the performance changes
after IPO.
Chinese SOEs stand at very different starting points compared to their counterparts
in the West in that a sound corporate management systems, corporate governance
mechanisms and an efficient capital markets are either not in place or
underdeveloped. Therefore the performance of Chinese SOEs after going public
might not be merely the result of privatisation or ownership change as elsewhere.
There are several empirical and conceptual gaps in understanding Chinese SOEs'
financial performance changes after going public and causes of these changes.
Firstly, the results of firm performance of an early study of Chinese share issue
privatisation may not be accurate due to poor data quality before the introduction of
the new accounting regulations based on International Accounting Standards.
Secondly, there is a need to clarify the causes of firms' post-IPO versus pre-IPO
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performance changes. Finally, there is a need to investigate current corporate
management and corporate governance practice that may contribute directly to firms'
post-privatisation financial performance in the Chinese context.
1.3 Research Contributions
This thesis expects to contribute to privatisation study on China in the following
three areas:
■ The Effect of IPO on Performance in Newly Privatised Firms
This thesis examines the firms' performance changes after IPO. Due to different
methodologies employed, privatisation studies on China document different results,
in which most studies document improved financial performance in terms of both
accounting performance and firms' market value, though one study documents some
deteriorated performance after going public. This thesis analyses firms' performance
changes based on a carefully-chosen MNR methodology1 and more reliable data, and
meanwhile identifies methodological problems which lead to controversial
performance results of newly privatised firms in other studies on China. This thesis
finds that all profitability and efficiency performance measures deteriorate after IPO,
in which return on sales, return on assets, return on equity, sales to assets turnover
decline after IPO, with significant improvement in liquidity and reduction in
leverage. The results might suggest that share issue privatisation or IPO does not
work properly to improve firm performance in China.
■ The Determinants of Performance Changes
Further regression results suggest that the most important performance drivers are
private ownership, the presence of employee ownership, share issue size, board size
and asset size of the firms. It is found that state and legal person ownership do not
have significant impact on firm performance, while private and employee ownership
impose pressure on firms to improve profitability and output. Meanwhile private
1
Megginson, Nash and Van Randenborgh (1994) first employed MNR methodology in their
international empirical analysis of performance of newly privatised firms. The comparisons are made
between pre- and post-privatisation financial performance of the same group of firms and only one
(matched) sample has to be selected.
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shareholders favour less borrowing and employee shareholders encourage borrowing.
As firms raise more funds through IPO, the potential for misuse of the funds is
higher with a subsequent deterioration in performance, but share issue proceeds also
help to pay back firms' debts. Larger board size help to improve firms' real sales, but
also contribute to higher borrowing. Larger firms might realise economies of scale
better than smaller firms might in improving profitability. In addition, through
examining firms' post IPO market and accounting performance, it is also found that
firms' share price returns only reflect real sales and short-term liquidity measures
instead of profitability measures, which suggests that firms' market performance
does not fully reflect their accounting performance.
■ The Effect of IPO on Corporate Management & Corporate Governance
It is found that corporate management and corporate governance practice after IPO
might contribute to firm performance. The effect of EPO on firm performance in
China might includes other factors such as corporate management and corporate
governance practices in explaining firms' performance changes after IPO, not just
ownership changes. It is recognised that there is a possible causal relationship in
which firm performance might also affect corporate governance as corporate
governance does on firm performance. For Chinese listed firms, coiporate
governance mechanisms are introduced into the newly privatised firms at the time of
IPO, hence the coiporate governance tends to have impact on firm performance, not
the other way around. Corporate governance practice in newly privatised firms in
China has never been studied through case study before. In fact the available
arguments about current corporate governance are not based on firm-level research
evidence, but common assumption of the disadvantages of state ownership in
transition economies. This thesis investigates the current corporate management and
corporate governance practices in newly privatised firms through case studies of 16
listed firms. It tries to identify the role of corporate management and corporate
governance in firms' performance changes after IPO. The evidence further suggests
that firms experience various changes in corporate management and corporate
governance practice, in which the poor strategic, financial and human resource
management are accompanied by weak legal, internal and external governance
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mechanisms. Therefore the evidence confirms the earlier findings that firms perform
worse after IPO and corporate management and corporate governance also contribute
to that. The insights regarding the effect of IPO (partial share issue privatisation)
should provide valuable guidance to government officials, domestic and foreign
investors, SOE managers and financial economists or researchers.
1.4 Structure of the Thesis
This thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 1 is the introduction. Chapter 2 presents
a review of the empirical literature on corporate governance. Chapter 3 presents a
review of the theoretical and empirical literature on privatisation in non-transition
economies. Chapter 4 presents a review of the empirical literature on privatisation in
China. In conclusion it identifies the current gaps in the privatisation literature which
this thesis addresses. Chapter 5 discusses the issues regarding methods, sampling and
data collection. Chapter 6 outlines the empirical research methodology that underpins
this thesis. Chapter 7 explores the data used in performance change analysis. Chapter
8 presents the empirical study in which the financial performance of the sample firms
is analysed so as to identify the effect of share issue privatisation or IPO on firm
performance. Chapter 9 presents the regression analysis to identify the determinants
of performance changes after privatisation or IPO. Chapter 10 presents the post-IPO
performance analysis, in which the relationship between firms' post-IPO market
performance and post-IPO accounting performance is further explored. Chapter 11
presents the evidence of the effect of IPO on constitution, financing and corporate
management based on the evidence from 16 listed firms. Chapter 12 presents the
effect of IPO on corporate governance practice of listed firms based on the evidence
from 16 listed firms. Chapter 13 summarises the findings of all the empirical work;
limitations of the study and issues for future research; and further proposes
recommendations to improve firm performance.
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Chapter 2 Literature Survey - Corporate Governance
Privatisation is a means to better corporate governance. In the developed markets
where corporate governance mechanisms are well established, the ownership
changes after privatisation could lead to improvement in corporate governance and
subsequent improvement in firm performance. Therefore ownership structures tend
to be the key determinants in firm performance, which is an implicit assumption in
privatisation studies in non-transitional economies. In China's transitional context,
firms' financial performance after privatisation might be not only determined by
ownership changes but also by newly introduced corporate governance practice.
Therefore understanding corporate governance mechanisms and corporate
governance practice is crucial to understand the financial and operating performance
of newly privatised firms in China. In later regression analysis of determinants of
firms' performance changes2, corporate governance variables such as board size and
human capital etc. are hypothesised as driving forces in performance changes. This
chapter surveys basic corporate governance mechanisms in developed markets so as
to get some understanding of the complexity of available systems and to build further
foundation in case study analysis of corporate governance practice in newly
privatised firms in China.
2.1 Agency Theory
2.1.1 Organisation and Contracts
Fama and Jensen (1983) regard an organisation as the nexus of contracts specifying
the rights of each agent in the organisation, and writing contracts is not costless.
Therefore the key to understand the complexity of the modern corporation is to
understand it as a network of many implicit as well as explicit contractual
relationships. Hart (1995b) suggests that contracting costs may be large because of
the cost of thinking about all the different eventualities that can occur during the
course of the contractual relationship. Because of the existence of costs and
contingency in a contract, the parties involved can only write a contract that is
incomplete or implicit - the contract will have gaps and missing provisions.
2 This is further demonstrated and discussed in Chapter 9 (ppl70) - performance change regression
analysis.
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2.1.2 Agency Problem - Separation of Ownership & Control
In a free market economy, essential attributes of a public corporation include
separate identity from its shareholders, limited liability for shareholders, centralised
management and transferability of shares. In a public corporation, decisions are made
by some individuals and carried out by others, which is an essential part of the
mechanism by which corporations function (Arrow 1974). One complexity that then
emerges from modem organisation is the agency problem, or principal-agent
problem. Berle and Means (1932) suggest that the agency problem arises when there
is a separation of management and control. Specifically, Shleifer et al (1997) argue
that the essence of the agency problem is the separation of management and finance,
or of ownership and control because of the existence of asymmetric information
between themselves and external investors. Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that if
agency problems occur because of asymmetric information, then there would be no
agency problem if the monitoring were perfect. Because there is no perfect
monitoring and monitoring or governance is always needed, and because not all
agents will take self-interested actions at the principal's costs, spending too much on
monitoring agent behaviour is wasteful. Therefore there is a trade-off between the
resources spent on monitoring and the possibility of agent misbehaviour.
2.1.3 Agency Problem, Agency Cost & Agency Contract
The amount of monitoring is important with respect to efficient resource allocation
and the more monitoring there is, the harder it is for an agent to misbehave - but the
extra monitoring costs money, and these are so called agency costs. Jensen and
Meckling (1976) define agency costs as reductions in value resulting from the
separation of ownership from control in public corporations. Emery and Finnerty
(1997) suggest that agency costs are the extra costs of having an agent act for a
principal - those in excess of what it would cost the principals to do it themselves,
such as direct contracting costs, including the transaction cost of setting up the
contract and the cost to the principal of monitoring the agent and the financial costs
the principal suffers as a result of misbehaviour in spite of monitoring. In dealing
with agency costs, Fama and Jensen (1983) suggest that agency contracts are
designed to eliminate agency costs, which include the costs of designing and
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implementing monitoring, constraints, incentives and punishments and bonding a set
of contracts among agents with conflicting interests.
Hart (1995a) argues that agency problems alone do not provide a rationale for
corporate governance or monitoring. If the contracts between the principal and the
agent are optimal in the sense that it specifies all parties' obligations and there is no
'residual' decision, then it is hard to find a role for corporate governance. But
because of unforeseeable future contingencies, complete contracts are
technologically not feasible and the manager and the financier have to allocate
residual control rights - the rights to make decisions in circumstances not fully
foreseen by the contract. Therefore he concludes that governance structure does
matter if two conditions are met: agency problems are present and agency contracts
are incomplete. In a similar vein, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) suggest that governance
matters when some actions have to be decided in the future that have not been
specified in an initial contract between agent and principal and governance structure
provides a way or mechanisms for deciding these actions.
2.1.4 Defining Corporate Governance
From a management perspective, Tricker (1984) suggests that corporate governance
is concerned with the processes by which corporate entities, particularly limited
liability companies, are governed. He further distinguishes the management role as to
focus on managing the business efficiently and effectively - the product designs
procurement, personnel, management, production, and marketing and finance
functions. In contrast, he regards governance role as to give overall direction to the
company, overseeing actions of management with legitimate accountability. In other
words, if management is about running business, governance is about seeing whether
it is run properly. Fama and Jesen (1983) define the corporate decision process as
four steps: initiation, ratification, implementation and monitoring, in which decision
management includes initiation and implementation of decisions, and decision
control includes ratification and monitoring of decisions. They suggest that controls
agency problems that result from separation of ownership and control is to separate
management (initiation and implementation) and control (ratification and
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monitoring) of decisions, in other words, to separate management and governance
functions. From a financing perspective, Shileifer and Vishny (1997) suggest that
corporate governance deals with the ways in which suppliers of finance to
corporations assure themselves of getting return on their investment. They raise three
key questions of how do suppliers of finance get managers to return some of the
profits to them; how do they make sure that managers do not steal the capital they
supply or invest in bad projects and how do suppliers of finance control managers.
From an internal governance perspective, Brealey and Myers (2000) argue that
corporate governance refers to the role of the board of directors, shareholder voting
and proxy fights and other actions taken by shareholders to influence corporate
decisions. They suggest that how to make the corporate board of directors
accountable to shareholders is a fundamental question in any market economy. In
short, as suggested by Tricker (1984), the role of corporate governance is to prevent
abuses of corporate power without necessarily inhibiting flexibility, innovation and
entrepreneurial risk taking as well as improving the quality of board activities with
higher effectiveness and efficiency.
2.2 Corporate Governance Mechanisms
Without monitoring, there is a danger that the managers of a public company will
pursue their own goals at the expense of those of shareholders (or stakeholders)
hence well designed checks and balances on managerial behaviour to reduce agency
costs should be in place. Klipper (1998) suggests that corporate control mechanisms
include efficient capital market, sophisticated professional accountants applying
internationally recognised accounting standards, full financial disclosure and reliable
information service, sophisticated courts and administrative agencies. Similarly,
Jensen (1993) argues there are four control forces to resolve agency problems -
capital markets, legal / political / regulatory system, product and factor markets and
internal control system headed by the board of directors. He suggests that agency
problems created by separation of ownership and control are offset by the right
incentive for management, particularly compensation to managers tied to changes in
earnings and shares prices; the legal duty of managers and directors to act in
shareholders' interest, backed up by monitoring by auditors, lenders, security
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analysts, and large institutional investors; and the threat of a take-over. As suggested
by Gilson (2000), in publicly held corporations misuse of free cash flow is policed
internally by the board of directors, and externally through shareholder action either
through voting or through market control through share prices.
Corporate systems in different areas of the capitalist world differ with respect to their
historical, political and culture origins. There are two corporate governance systems
predominant in developed economies. One is the Anglo-American "market-based"
model with widely dispersed shareholders and more emphasis on external control
mechanisms in terms of market for corporate control. The other is the German-
Japanese "bank-based" (or relationship-based) model with the large banks and
interfirm holdings playing a key governance function. Each model represents each
society's response to concerns about the principal-agent problem as well as efficient
organisation for production and performance monitoring. There is a great deal of
disagreement on how good or bad these existing governance mechanisms are. But in
general, these developed economies have solved the problem of corporate
governance reasonably well in that they have assured the flows of capital to firms,
and actual repatriation of profits to the financiers (Shleifer and Vishny 1997). The
remaining chapter further details the corporate governance mechanisms that are
functioning in above-mentioned two dominant corporate governance models.
2.2.1 Legal Device
Lin (2000) suggests that legal device includes statutory provisions and monitoring,
compliance and enforceability of these legal and other statutory requirements.
Statutory provisions are those relating to the definition and exercise of shareholders'
rights, oversight mechanisms and disclosure, contained in the legal and other
(financial and securities) regulatory framework of the country, and further developed
in the charter of the company. Most important legal requirements include company
law, securities law, bankruptcy law, insider trading and disclosure rules and other
rules regulating banks' and funds' involvement in the equity market. Black et al
(2000) suggest that legal devices are directly affecting corporate governance, such as
company and securities laws and minimum norms and standards for managers
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aiming at protecting shareholders' rights. For instance, as argued by Maher and
Andersson (2000), bankruptcy legislation, by influencing the claims and control of
different investors in the event of insolvency, plays an important role in corporate
governance. Black (1992) suggests that legal rules could also help shareholders
overcome collective action problems, such as reducing monitoring costs, shifting
some costs to the firm where they will be borne pro rata by all shareholders, limiting
managers to use corporate funds to oppose monitoring efforts etc. Meyer (2000)
argues that developing an effective method of protecting the rights of outside
investors - especially shareholders - is a prerequisite for developing a modern
financial system that can provide external capital for growing firms. Since the
establishment of the two stock exchanges, Chinese government has introduced
various laws and rules, such as Company Law, Securities Laws to improve corporate
governance in newly privatised firms.
2.2.1.1 Shareholders & General Shareholder Meeting
The most important legal right shareholders have is the right to vote in important
corporate matters at a shareholders' meeting. Tricker (1984) suggests that the power
to govern the company is derived from ownership and ownership and control
structures are at the heart of the corporate governance issue. Ownership can be either
dispersed or concentrated.
(1) Dispersed Ownership
As argued by Kaplan (1995), diffuse ownership structures are necessary in that the
market for corporate control can then act as effective disciplining device. Stern et al
(1997) also suggest that one of the main advantages of dispersed ownership is its
efficiency in spreading risk among well-diversified investors. But Hart (1995b)
argues that when ownership is dispersed, the free-rider problem emerges, in which
shareholders have less incentive to monitor an incompetent management team since
the benefits from monitoring are shared with all shareholders while costs are incurred
by those who monitor. Shareholders may free ride in the hope that other shareholders
will do the monitoring job. Dispersed shareholders have little or no incentive to
monitor management and the result is the reduced effectiveness of market for
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corporate control. Therefore Prahalad (1993) argues that for very large firms, widely
distributed ownership leads to powerless shareholders. Furthermore, Greenspan
(2002) points out as ownership becomes more dispersed, few shareholders have
sufficient stakes to individually influence the choice of boards of directors or chief
executive officers, and the vast majority of corporate share ownership is for
investment, not to achieve operating control of a company.
(2) Concentrated Ownership
Demsetz et al (1985) argue that the more concentrated is ownership, the greater the
degree to which benefits and costs are borne by the same owner. In other words,
concentration of ownership means concentration of risk-bearing. Hart (1995b)
suggests that the free-rider problem is reduced to the extent that a firm has one or
more large shareholders and a large shareholder has incentives to monitor because of
sizeable faction of the gains and has incentives to vote because his vote may be
pivotal. Therefore Black (1992) argues that legal rules that prevent shareholders from
owning large stakes prevent shareholders from acting jointly, or increase monitoring
costs all reduce oversight. Conversely, rules that reduce costs or facilitate cost-
sharing among shareholders would encourage oversight. Shleifer and Vishny (1997)
suggest that the principal advantage of large investors (except in takeovers) is that
they rely on relatively simple legal interventions, which are suitable for even poorly
informed and motivated courts. In other words, large investors put a lighter burden
on the legal system than the small investors might if they tried to enforce their rights.
But Coffee (1999) poses a crucial question of whether concentrated ownership will
be more efficient than one characterised by dispersed ownership - at least in
transitional economies. He argues that even if concentrated ownership implies
superior monitoring of management, the benefits have to be balanced against the
enhanced risk of expropriation by controlling shareholders. Maher and Andersson
(2000) argue that one of the consequences of rent extraction by controlling
shareholders is that it raises the cost of equity capital, as minority shareholders
demand a premium on shares issued. This problem may become particularly serious
in an illiquid equity market where small investors lack opportunities for risk
diversification. When ownership is concentrated in hands of institutional investors,
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as argued by Porter (1992), the performance of money managers is typically
evaluated based on quarterly or annual appreciation relative to share indices, which
encourages them to seek short-term share price appreciation. Charkman (1994)
suggests there seem to be two main choices for institutional investors in terms of
active investing and active trading, and the characteristics of these two can be
summarised as follows:
Active Investing
- Concentration of the portfolio on fewer shares;
- Large stakes in individual firms;
- Close (and often direct) communication with
firms in which such investments are held;
and the exercise of influence where appropriate;
- High loyalty factor to the firm;
- Few dealings in those shares and less freedom to
deal with whole stakes because of the effect on
the market;
- General interest in corporate governance matters.
Passive Investing (Active trading)
- Wide diversification - many different
shares and small stakes in each firm;
- Communication, if any, with firms mainly
about matters which will have a short-term
effect on price;
- Low loyalty factor;
- Frequent dealing;
- Interest in corporate governance virtually
non-existent.
Black (1992) argues that institutional shareholders are imperfect monitors, but the
question is whether oversight by institutional shareholders is better than no
shareholder oversight at all. In China, the ownership is concentrated in hands of
either state or legal person shareholders in the form of non-tradable shares . In regard
to the institutional investors, they are currently not sophisticated enough to exercise a
monitoring function and still in their infancy. The de facto state-controlled Chinese
investment funds and investment companies have been actively trading instead of
monitoring firms.
2.2.1.2 Creditors
Corporate control may not only be exercised by equity holders, but also by other
stakeholders such as creditors. For large creditors, Saba (1997) argues that if a firm's
main debt holder is its bank, this may reduce the degree of information asymmetry,
as banks are likely to have better access to firm information together with a more
detailed knowledge of the firm. For dispersed creditors, Shleifer and Vishny (1997)
suggest that corporate control exercised by dispersed creditors is likely to be more
3 A legal person in China is defined as a non-individual legal entity or institution. See appendix 2.2
(pp291) for the definition of different types of Shares.
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powerful than that of dispersed equity holders. As argued by Gertner and Scharfstein
(1991), if a borrower defaults on debt held by a large number of creditors,
renegotiating with these creditors may be extremely difficult, and the debtor firm
might be forced into bankruptcy. In contrast, it may be easier for the debtor firm to
renegotiate with just a few creditors, e.g. a bank. There are also some costs
associated with creditors. If a large investor is an equity holder, he may have
incentives to take risk; if a large investor is a creditor, such as a bank, he may be
risk-averse and cause the firm to forego good investments projects. Generally,
Chinese banks are state-owned and suffer from large non-performing loans from
SOEs, and banks have not solved their own corporate governance problems hence
they lack expertise to monitor firms as creditors do in the developed countries.
2.2.1.3 Financial Reporting & Auditing
Financial reporting is an important element of the system of corporate governance,
and inadequate or false financial reports may cause some failures in corporate
governance. Shareholders and providers of finance who are external to the firm need
information to monitor directors who have access to management information.
Whittington (1993) suggests that financial accounts are a means of relieving this
asymmetry by providing reports from the directors to providers of finance, and the
external audit process provides an independent check on the quality of these reports.
Bensen (1982) provides a very challenging view of the role of accounting standards
for enhancing corporate governance and social responsibility. He argues that for
accounting standards to be useful tools to enhance corporate governance and
responsibility, two criteria must be met:
■ A standard providing a generally understood and accepted measure of the
phenomenon of concern and auditable or verifiable reported numbers;
■ A standard significantly reducing the amount of manipulation of the reported
numbers likely to occur in the absence of the standard.
In practice, the application of accounting standards is more challenging than these
two criteria. For example, historical cost is often a poor measurement of economic
values and accounting standards might require corporate reporting of the economic
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cost measured with respect to the opportunity benefits and costs. In practice it is
either unknown what the best decision might have been or whether an accountant
would have the skills to make these measurements. On the other hand, measurement
affects motivation and managers are likely to be inappropriately motivated if the
measurement is inappropriate. Furthermore, because no standard can apply with
equal relevance to all coiporations and situations, standards must impose costs in the
form of useless or dysfunctional reporting. For instance, the US GAAP and the UK
GAAP have both similarities and differences in terms of accounting frameworks,
financial statement rules etc. Practically, the US GAAP is rule-based in which
greater emphasis is on the consistency of financial information4. Meanwhile the UK
GAAP is principle-based and puts greater emphasis on true and fair value of
financial information. Soros (2002) suggests that different practice in the US and
Europe has great implications on corporate accounting practice (e.g. Enron scandals)
in the US, and he argues that rules are not enough and principles are needed as well.
Whittington (1993) argues that improvements in financial reporting may be a
necessary condition for improved corporate governance, but they may not be
sufficient. Improvements in financial reporting are likely to be facilitated by some
form of regulation - self-regulation by professional bodies. If the professional body
has monopoly power there will be pressure for private sector regulation in order to
prevent abuse of monopoly power in favour of the profession. On the other hand, if
the professional body lacks monopoly power, the self-regulation will have
inadequate enforcement power and this will lead to calls for legal backing from the
state in terms of a degree of public regulation.
China has been improving its accounting regulation in recent years, and based on
International Accounting Standard, the Stock Company Accounting Regulation
introduced in 1997 and subsequently revised in 2001 requires listed firms to provide
4 See PricewaterhouseCoopers 2001.
5 Stock company refers to those companies with limited liabilities, no matter they are listed at stock
exchanges or not.
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standard financial statements6, including balance sheet, profit and loss account, cash
flow statement etc.
2.2.2 External Governance Mechanisms
In addition to legal devices, external mechanisms that are outside the direct control
of the firms play a critical role in monitoring, directing, and disciplining
management.
2.2.2.1 Product Market
Product market competition forces managers to adopt the most efficient methods to
maximise profits through market share and competition. Jesen (1986) suggests that
competition in the product and factor markets tends to drive managers to increase
efficiency of the firms and to enhance the probability of survival. Product market
competition can also to some extent act to reduce the scope for managerial
inefficiency and opportunism because there are fewer rents to be expropriated when
markets are competitive. For instance, Prahalad (1993) argues that consumers
constitute a distinct market and they impose their own kind of discipline on firms
through the operation of a product market - one that operates even in the absence of
capital market pressures. Meanwhile, the intensity of global competition has elevated
the importance of technological capability and the central challenge in accessing
technology is not just in building effective internal R&D capabilities, but also in
establishing access to a supplier network around the world. As a result, there is
intense corporate competition to gain access to supplier networks. But whatever the
effects of product market, competition is slow to act towards management failure
(Maher and Andersson 2000).
2.2.2.2 Capital Market
Corporate control means the power to make investment and financing decisions and
who controls the firm and how it is governed could lead to extraordinary
6 The new accounting regulation is based on International Accounting Standard (IAS) convention.
This is the first time it was introduced in A share (domestic) market, while in B share (foreign) market
it was introduced in 1993, according to Financial Times International Accounting Survey 1999 (David
Cairns, LSE London).
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consequence (Myers 2000). Fama and Jesen (1983) suggest that equity and debt
markets impose substantial constraints on managers in exercising their financing
power. Lin (2000) suggests that efficient and competitive financial markets can
provide financial discipline and incentives, especially equity markets where
shareholders can exercise their "vote" in governance through "entry" and "exit". The
external monitoring from a takeover market is unique to the open corporation and is
attributable to the unrestricted nature of its residual claims. Franks and Mayer (1990)
argue that in principle, ownership change through the capital market is an effective
and efficient method of correcting managerial failure and they ensure that only those
who are able to achieve the highest level of productivity and lowest costs of
production remain in control and thereby encourage 'productive efficiency'. They
suggest that takeovers, management buyouts and management buy-ins7 permit those
who attribute the highest value to running a corporation to take control.
Manne (1965) suggests that a fundamental premise underlying the market for
corporate control is the existence of a high positive correlation between corporate
managerial efficiency and firms' share prices. There are several mechanisms for
taking over the control of corporations - proxy fight, direct purchase of shares and
mergers, and the costs, practical difficulties and legal consequences of these
approaches vary widely. Proxy fight appears to be inexpensive since one does not
have to own a large number of shares in order to wage a fight but its uncertainty is
high and it is relatively more common when there is widespread distribution of the
firm's shares than when there are relatively large holdings. Direct purchase of shares
is outright purchase on the open market of the requisite percentage of shares. In a
merger, the acquiring firm uses its share to buy control of the acquired firm rather
than cash. One major difference between the merger and the take-over device is that
a merger requires the explicit approval of management of the acquired firm. Merger
has several advantages over the other two control mechanisms. Mergers may be more
desirable than proxy fights or takeover bids as a way of operating in the corporate
7 Takeover is a transfer of ownership from acquired to acquiring shareholders. A management buy-out
involves the purchase of a firm in whole or in part by the incumbent management, which is typically
the case in the US. A management buy-in is the purchase of a firm by a new incoming management,
which is more common in the UK (Frank and Mayer 1990).
17
control market in which reliable information about valuable opportunities is not
known to outsiders. Unlike individuals, managers of a competing firm almost
automatically know a great deal of the information crucial to a take-over decision. In
addition, merger leads to less wasteful bankruptcy proceedings and increased
mobility of capital.
Franks and Mayer (1990) point out that the advantage of takeovers is that they assist
in the correction of certain classes of managerial failure that are otherwise difficult to
rectify, but takeovers also undermine contractual relations between investors,
managers and employees. Similarly, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) also have some
concerns about takeovers. For instance, some takeovers have potential to reduce
competition and raise prices, they may represent a breach of employees' trust and
transfer wealth from employees to shareholders through wage reductions and
employment cuts and the greatest concern is takeovers reduce investment in physical
capital and particularly in R&D. Therefore Franks and Mayer (1990) argue that
financial markets in which takeovers are prevalent may suffer from 'short-termism'
in that takeovers may result in a higher level of managerial correction but at the
expense of long-term investment. They argue that there is a trade-off between
different methods of correcting managerial failure. Maher and Andersson (2000)
argue that with legal, advisory, and financing costs constituting on average 4% of the
purchase price, this is a particularly expensive way of aligning the interests of
management with those of shareholders. On the other hand, the takeover market does
not only act as a means of correcting managerial failure as indicated in theory, but
also targets well-managed firms. In a market for corporate control, a large
unprofitable firm has much higher chance of survival than a small relatively much
more profitable firm. Charkman (1994) suggests that because of the dual nature of
the takeover market, there is generally a premium for control over the share trading
price and shareholders' (of acquired firms) attention might be focused on the
premium instead of on the quality of the management they abandon by tendering
their shares. But he also admits that more competitive markets for finance and
corporate control can lead to tighter monitoring of research activities by managers,
with a more careful selection of projects and strengthened cost control. Prahalad
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(1993) suggests that this investor control-oriented solution to the corporate
governance problem are in effect crisis-driven - they are a means of dealing with
crises in profitability that have already happened. On the other hand, the principal
problem with such a control orientation is that it discourages managers from sharing
information with investors. This control orientation must give way to more
constructive, value adding relationship between management and investors. He
suggests that a better approach would aim for crisis-prevention through more open
and regular communication among managers, boards and major investors. In China,
because of the dominance of the state and legal person shareholders and non-tradable
nature of these shares, the takeover market in effect does not exist.
2.2.2.3 Managerial Market
Corporations compete not only on product and capital markets, but also on the labour
market for specialised talent. The outside managerial labour market exerts many
direct pressures on a firm to sort and compensate managers according to performance
so as to align their interests with the investors. Given a competitive managerial
labour market, when a firm's reward system is not responsive to performance the
firm loses managers; and when managers perform badly the market will depreciate
them. As indicated by Fama (1980), managerial labour markets appropriately use
current and past information to revise future wages and understand any enforcement
power inherent in the wage revision process, similar to the capital market that
generally makes rational assessments of the value of the firm in the face of imprecise
and uncertain information. Lin (2000) argues that competitive managerial job
markets make managerial jobs "contestable" and thereby elicit managerial effort.
Prahalad (1993) summarises that creating wealth for investors through efficient use
of capital raised on the capital market depends critically on management's ability to
manage the disciplines of the product market (imposed by sophisticated customers
and suppliers) and the labour market (specialised talent). The challenge in China is
that there are not enough talented managers in the managerial labour market to meet
the demand from newly privatised firms or firms in private sectors, hence managerial
market is less competitive than that in the developed countries.
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On the other hand, how to measure company or managerial (company) performance
is also debatable. Stern et al (1997) argue that the earnings per share-based model
that has long dominated corporate America is becoming obsolete. Greenspan (2002)
also suggests that cash dividends are unambiguous whereas there is no
unambiguously correct value of earnings. Stern et al (1997) propose that EVA8 -
"Economic Value Added" - is the centerpiece of an integrated financial management
system that encompasses the full range of corporate financial decision-making. As
they suggested, in the end management must be held accountable for delivering
value, not improving metrics. Furthermore, Aoi (1993) argues that the view of the
corporation as accountable to a broad range of social interests also leads to a
different way of evaluating corporate performance. In addition to profits earned by a
particular company, there is another measure of corporate success that may be more
relevant, in which the total social benefits derived from a corporation's activity
should be based on social cost-benefit analysis (for instance, training, software and
R&D as internal measures of performance, and environmental investment as external
measures of performance).
2.2.3 Internal Governance Mechanisms
Jensen (1986) suggests that product and factor markets are often weaker in new
activities and activities that involve substantial economic rents or quasi rents9. In
these cases, monitoring by the firm's internal control system and the market for
corporate control are more important. Given the fact that corporate control market is
in effect ex post response to mismanagement, Jensen (1993) argues the very purpose
of the internal control mechanism is to provide an early warning system to put the
organisation back on track before difficulties reach a crisis stage.
2.2.3.1 Board of Directors
Internal control in public firms is delegated by shareholders to a board of directors
and corporate boards are seen as providing the necessary checks and balances to
8 In the simplest form, EVA is net operating profit after taxes less a charge for the capital employed to
produce those profits. They develop "EVA Drivers" to enable management to trace EVA through the
income statement and balance sheet.
9 Rents are returns in excess of the opportunity cost of the resources to the activity. Quasi rents are
returns in excess of the short-run opportunity cost of the resources to the activity.
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make the system work. Fama (1980) regards the board as a market-induced
institution, whose most important role is to scrutinise the highest decision-makers
within the firm. The board then delegates most decision management and many
decision control functions to internal agents, but it retains ultimate control over
internal agents (e.g. chief executive officer) - including the rights to ratify and
monitor major policy initiatives and to hire, fire, and set the compensation of top
level decision makers. Board attributes, such as the composition, representativeness,
independence and qualification of board members, as well as the existence of sub¬
committees (headed by non-executive or independent directors) on audit, nomination
and remuneration are to ensure that the board can be an effective overseeing body on
behalf of stakeholders. Tricker (1984) defines board functions as following four
principal activities - direction, executive action, supervision and accountability, in
which the board formulates the long run strategic direction, be involved in critical
executive decisions, monitor and oversee management performance and recognise
responsibilities of those making a legitimate demand for accountability. In similar
vein, Jensen (1993) believes the board has the final responsibility for the functioning
of the firm, and it sets the rules of the game for the CEO, the board is to hire, fire,
and compensate the CEO, and to provide high-level counsel. Overall, the board plays
a major role in the corporate governance system and is responsible for monitoring
managerial performance and achieving an adequate return for shareholders, while
preventing conflicts of interest and balancing competing demands on the corporation.
(1) CEO & Chairman
Jensen (1993) suggests the function of the chairman is to run board meetings and
oversee the process of hiring, firing, evaluating, and compensating the CEO. For the
board to be effective to perform its critical function, it is important to separate the
CEO and chairman positions. Furthermore, the independent chairman should be
given the rights to initiate board appointments, board committee assignments, and
(with CEO) setting of the board's agenda. As suggested by Pettigrew et al (1995), if
it is the chairman's de facto role to run the board, it is by custom and practice the
executives (including the CEO) to run the company by carrying out the board's
decisions.
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(2) Independent (Non-Executive) Directors
The notion of an independent (non-executive) director is reasonably straightforward,
but it is a more difficult matter to categorise directors as independent. Maher and
Andersson (2000) suggest that in order for board directors to effectively fulfil their
monitoring role they must have some degree of independence from management.
Effective separation of top-level decision management and control means that
independent directors have incentives to carry out their tasks and do not collude with
managers to expropriate residual claimants. In the US and the UK, various board
committees dominated by independent directors have been set up, such as
nomination committees, remuneration committees and audit committees, to improve
governance at the highest coiporate management level. Fama and Jesen (1983)
hypothesise that independent directors have incentives to develop reputations as
experts in decision control and the value of their human capital depends primarily on
their performance as either managers or executives in other organisations. They use
their directorships to signal to internal and external markets for decision agents that
they are decision experts, they understand the importance of diffuse and separate
decision control and they can work with such decision control systems. Fama (1980)
suggests that the independent directors might best be regarded as professional
referees whose task is to stimulate and oversee the firm's top managers and they are
in their turn disciplined by the market for their services which prices them according
to their performance as referees. In addition, Fama and Jesen (1983) also suggest that
the independent directors act as arbiters in disagreements among internal managers
and residual claimants.
Pettigrew et al (1995) further point out that knowledge and background appear to be
crucial in shaping the character and credibility of independent directors'
contributions. They identify two power sources in terms of external stature and
prestige and internally generated power sources. The former is drawing on the
external legitimacy of groups such as shareholders and regulators, knowledge of the
host sector and/or business, the quality and extent of personal networks in and
outside the board, residual power to reward and sanction and the threat of public or
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private resignation. The latter is the power derived from a good quality relationship
with the chairman or the chief executive, matching external expertise with company
context, network building in the firm, power derived from the audit, nomination, or
remuneration committees. As suggested by Main (1994), it is necessary to select
non-executives who can be critical of the executive actions of a firm's management,
which requires certain combination of character and technical competence to be
brought to the board by the non-executives. In other words, non-executive
representation on the board is not by itself enough to avert disappointing firm
performance.
(3) Insider Board Director
Jensen (1993) suggests that since the possibility for animosity and retribution from
the CEO is too great, it is almost impossible for those who report directly to the CEO
to participate openly and critically in effective evaluation and monitoring of the
CEO. Therefore, the only inside board member should be the CEO. Meanwhile, the
practice of including inside directors on the board seems inconsistent with the need
to separate decision management from decision control. Baysinger et al (1990) argue
that outside directors may prefer to maintain an open relationship with top
management, but they may simply lack the amount and quality of information upon
which such relationships must be based. Including insiders on the board appears to
represent an attempt to overcome problems of information processing and hence to
improve the effectiveness of decision control.
(4) Board Size and Board Culture
Jesen (1993) suggests that keeping boards small can improve their performance and
when boards get beyond seven or eight people they are less likely to function
effectively, which means the better the information flow the better the dynamics. He
also suggests that board culture is an important component of board failure.
Pettigrew et al (1995) argue the key in shaping the board culture is the chairman and
the significance of the attitudes and behaviours of the chairman and chief executive
officer set the behavioural tone of a board. For instance, the great emphasis on
politeness and courtesy at the expense of truth and frankness in boardrooms is both a
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symptom and cause of failure resulting from a continuing cycle of ineffectiveness by
rewarding consent and discouraging conflicts. On the other hand, CEOs have the
same insecurities and defence mechanisms as other human beings and few will
accept the monitoring and criticism of active and attentive board. They suggest that if
CEOs have the power to control the boards, which in turn ultimately reduces the
CEOs' and the firms' performance.
2.2.3.2 Incentive Contracts
As argued by Shleifer and Vishny (1997), when contracts are incomplete and
managers possess more expertise than shareholders, management typically end up
with the residual rights of control, giving them enormous latitude for self-interested
behaviour. On the other hand, with dispersed ownership, managers end up with
considerable discretion and the possibility to extract private benefits. Jensen (1993)
suggests that managers may use their discretion to maximise firm size rather than
profits; to hoard cash flow rather than pay out dividends; to pay themselves excessive
salaries; or to entrench and protect themselves from indirect means of corporate
control. A better solution is to grant a manager a highly contingent, long term
incentive contract ex ante to align his interests with those of investors. Especially,
Jensen (1993) proposes that encouraging independent directors to hold substantial
equity interests would provide better incentives. Baker et al (1988) argue that while
financial incentive schemes improve productivity in principle, in practice they induce
significant adverse side effects that are costly to employee morale and productivity,
in other words, monetary rewards might be counter-productive. They argue that
monetary pay-for-performance systems are not ineffective but rather too effective in
that strong pay-for-performance motivates people to do exactly what they are told to
do. For instance, the common observation is that CEOs can increase their pay by
increasing firm size or empire building even if they reduce the firm's market value.
They suggest that management compensation should therefore be based on
performance measured relative to the performance of all firms or firms in the same
industry, rather than on absolute measures of firm performance. Furthermore, Stern
et al (1997) argue that in practice too much emphasis gets placed on compensation
and not enough on incentive schemes. They suggest that the proper objective is to
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make managers behave as if they were owners in that owners manage with a sense of
urgency in the short term but pursue a vision for the long term. In place of the
traditional short-term bonus and ordinary stock option grants, they propose an
Economic Value Added ownership plan that employs two simple and distinct
elements. For instance, the EVA Bonus Plan stimulates ownership by tying bonuses
to improvements in EVA over time, rather that the absolute value of EVA.
In addition, Main and Johnston (1992) argue that remuneration depends much on the
quantity and quality of non-executive directors on the board from whom the
remuneration committee is drawn. Their conclusion is that 'Simply grafting on an
additional board sub-committee will of itself do little either for the disciplines of top
executive pay or for corporate governance in general'. Greenspan (2002) also
suggests that companies run by people with high ethical standards arguably do not
need detailed rules to act in the long-run interests of shareholders and themselves. As
argued by Skapinker (2001), how companies pay their top executives is less
important than whom they are. Companies need to set up a remuneration system that
works, but also need to find the right people first.
"Ifyou have the right executives, they will do everything within
their power to build a great company, not because ofwhat they
will 'get' for it, but because they simply cannot imagine settling
for anything less."
2.2.3.3 Financing Structures
Institutional arrangements such as tax and bankruptcy legislation may influence the
extent to which firms are willing to tap the debt markets. By issuing debt a firm is
able to shield profits from tax, while strict bankruptcy legislation and higher costs
associated with the bankruptcy process would be expected to discourage firms from
overborrowing and burdening themselves with debt obligations. Firms tend to issue
equity rather than debt when their share price is high, but without a strong equity
market, the debt market has to be the option. Jensen (1986) specifically discusses
benefits of debt in motivating managers and firms to be more efficient. Debt can be
an effective substitute for dividends because by issuing debt, managers are bonding
their promise to pay out future cash flows and thus debt reduces the agency cost of
free cash flow by reducing the cash flow available for spending at the discretion of
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managers. But increased debts also increase costs because as leverage increases, the
usual agency costs of debt in terms of bankruptcy costs increase. The bottom line is
that firms should have optimal debt-equity ratio at which firm value is maximised
and the marginal costs of debt just offset the marginal benefits. Stern et al (1997)
suggest that heavy use of debt financing (such as in Leveraged Buyout - LBO)
provides an automatic internal monitoring and control system, in which top
management of LBO firms would be forced by the pressure of debt obligations to
intervene quickly and decisively when problems emerge. By contrast, in a largely-
equity-financed firm, management could allow much of the equity cushion to be
eaten away before taking the necessary corrective action partially because operating
managers tend to treat investor capital as a "free" good.
2.3 Discussion
This chapter reviews corporate governance mechanisms in terms of legal devices,
internal mechanisms and external mechanisms, and these mechanisms are relatively
functioning well in developed markets. The finance literature assumes that discipline
on top managers comes from the capital market. As providers of equity capital,
shareholders are the residual claimants who bear most the risk and the primary
objective of management is to maximise shareholder value and the ultimate
scorecard for managers becomes the current share price. Prahalad (1993) argues that
the above view may no longer be appropriate and corporate governance is not simply
a matter of giving investors more control over top management. To add value, top
managers must consistently balance the demands of and be subject to the disciplines
of four distinct markets - product markets (consumers), labour markets (specialised
talent), the market for technology (suppliers) and capital markets (investors).
Therefore stakeholder groups such as consumers, employees and suppliers now each
deserves to be regarded as trading in a separate market in its own right. As suggested
by Blair (1995), corporate governance should be regarded as the set of institutional
arrangements for governing the relationships among all stakeholders that contribute
firm specific assets. The above view of recognising non-shareholders is to clarify that
key stakeholders, like capital markets, also impose unique set of disciplines on firms
through the product market, managerial and labour markets etc. and consequently
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firms must compete effectively in all of these markets to create value, not only in
capital market. Despite important differences, corporations around the globe are all
being forced to respond to the demands from all markets. Abegglen and Stalk (1985)
suggest it is essential to appreciate that any company anywhere touches society at
many points because it has stakeholders like customers, employees, supplier,
creditors and shareholders, and it affects the environment in which it is located and
shareholders are not the only investors.
China has been struggling to catch up with Western corporate governance practice by
introducing governance legislation, rules and mechanisms from developed countries.
Corporate governance mechanisms have been set up from scratch in listed firms at
the time of going public. Prior to IPO, SOEs were owned by the government and
there seemed little challenge to management running of the firms, and there was no
demand for independent supervision or information disclosure, no intervention in
matters of accountability, no questioning of corporate power and legitimacy. The
concept of shareholder or owner is introduced and the new owner or shareholder has
to learn how to exercise his power and concerns towards matters of corporate
accountability and development of enterprise culture. The newly privatised firms are
created in the absence of many control mechanisms that operate in the West in terms
of legal devices, external and internal governance mechanisms discussed in this
chapter. In addition, market forces such as product market competition and
competitive financial intermediates shaping corporate governance in a market
economy are still weak or developing. Thus the newly privatised firms often have
neither the internal mechanisms nor the external forces to support their transition and
economic growth.
For China, the road to a sound corporate governance system is characterised by not
only economic, but also social and legal challenges. A sound governance system
should be established in accordance with a country's specific social, political,
economical and historical factors, not simply be imported without any justification.
As argued by Coffee (1999), the puzzle of when law matters may lie in the
hypothesis that what really counts is not the content of the substantive law, but the
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adequacy of the enforcement mechanisms that underlie it. The concept of
enforcement mechanism needs to be understood in a broader sense than simply the
availability of specific legal remedies. In this sense, the willingness of law
enforcement from the highest political level is crucial, especially in China. In chapter
8, the corporate governance mechanisms and practice in newly privatised firms in
China are further investigated through case study analysis, and the reasons hindering
performance improvement are identified and further governance reforms in China are
proposed.
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Chapter 3 Literature Survey - Privatisation in
Non-Transition Economies
3.1 Privatisation Overview
As mentioned earlier, the privatisation of profit-organisations is the focus of this
thesis and the privatisation of non-profit organisations and nationalisation of public
sector are beyond the scope of this study, therefore this chapter only reviews
privatisation literature in corporate sector or profit-organisations.
A privatisation is a sale of a government-owned company to private investors (Mayer
2000). In some privatisations the state disposes of all its ownership interest, while in
others the state retains a minority or even majority ownership stake. When the state
retains some ownership, the process may be termed partial privatisation (Chen et al
2000). Boycko et al (1996) suggest that theoretically privatisation means a
combination of two changes undertaken by a reformer. The first is turnover of
control from spending politicians to managers, often referred to as corporatisation.
The second, which is usually part of most privatisation, is the reduction of the cash
flow ownership by Treasury and the increase of cash flow ownership to managers
and outside shareholders. Therefore they propose privatisation works in the sense
that it widens the separation between the manager and the politician, and in this way
stimulates restructuring.
Starr (1988) suggests that the meaning of privatisation depends in practice on a
nation's position in the world economy. In wealthier countries it is easy to treat
privatisation purely as a question of domestic policy and economically strong nations
know that they can privatise without jeopardising their sovereignty. But where the
likely buyers are foreign, as in the Third World, privatisation of state-owned
enterprises often means denationalisation - a transfer of control to foreign investors
or managers. Generally, the more dependent a nation is on foreign investment, the
greater the likelihood that privatisation will raise the prospect of diminished
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sovereignty and excite the passions of nationalism10. Therefore, the conflict between
privatisation and national interests depends on the relative power of the given state in
the world system - the weaker the state, the more likely the conflict. On the other
hand, as a domestic issue, when a country's bureaucratic and entrepreneurial classes
differ in ethnic composition, privatisation may be understood as a transfer of wealth
and power from one group to another and be politically resisted for that reason.
Therefore, privatisation needs to be understood as a fundamental reordering of
claims in a society.
In the context of transition economies11, privatisation become attractive as a quick
and easy path to achieve economic and political objectives. Politically, Vickers and
Yarrow (1991) suggest that privatisation presents significant opportunities for
redistribution of income and wealth within a country. Economically, privatisation is
regarded as a mechanism that would encourage effective corporate governance and
restructuring in that private ownership and market forces are expected to force
corporate restructuring and efficient production. Importantly, with regard to the
economic and political importance of the government in privatisation, Starr (1988)
points out that in the liberal world the terms "public" and "private" sum up a whole
structure of rules and expectations about the proper conduct and limits of the state.
3.1.1 Purpose of Privatisation
As described in PricewaterhouseCoopers (1989, page 10), the purpose of
privatisation is to raise revenue for the state; to promote increased efficiency; to
reduce government interference in the economy; to promote wider share
ownership;12 to provide the opportunity to introduce competition; and to expose
10
Despite its commitment to free markets, the Reagan Administration intervened in 1987 to prevent
the sale to a Japanese corporation of a private American semiconductor company with important
defence contracts (Starr 1989).
11 Transition economies refer to those countries with non-free market economy in former socialist
countries such as Central and Eastern Europe, Russia, former Soviet Union Republics and China etc.
12
Megginson et al (1994) suggest that the desire to promote wider share ownership typically has both
a financial and political component. Financially, increasing the number of investors willing to
purchase corporate equities increases the absorptive capacity of the nation's capital market, thereby
either lowering the cost of capital for firms or increasing the number of companies able to raise capital
at prevailing rates, or both. Politically, broadening share ownership is perceived to increase public
willingness to back market-oriented economic policies and also tends to make it very difficult for
subsequent governments to attempt to renationalise divested companies.
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SOEs to market discipline.
The International Finance Corporation (1995) states:
" Privatisation can deliver a wide range ofeconomic benefits... include improving
enterprise efficiency and performance, developing competitive industry which serves
consumers well, assessing the capital know-how and markets which permits growth,
achieving effective corporate governance, and, of course, getting the best price for
the sale. There are wider economic benefits which spill over to the rest of the
economy...(such as) developing capital markets...governments also have more
overtly political aims. In the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, the swift
transfer ofassets to private hands was an overridingly political aim: it was
understood that economic benefits might not be immediate. Other political objectives
include achieving a wide shareholder distribution, targeting certain classes of buyers
(and excluding others, particularly foreigners), ensuring that enterprises do not
close, reducing budget deficits/raising money and maintaining employment and other
social obligations." (pp7)
In practice, the basic goal of privatisation is to increase the role of the private sector
in the economy thereby promoting more efficient use of resources as well as
efficiency and growth of industries. Megginson et al (1994) and Shleifer and Vishny
(1997) suggest that generally the most important objective of privatisation is to
improve the operating and financial performance of the former SOE by exposing it to
the market forces. They argue that almost all governments expect that privatisation
will increase the firm's profitability; increase its operating efficiency; cause the firm
to increase its capital investment spending; increase its output without lowering
employment levels, but most governments expect employment to fall. Meyer (1996)
summaries the two main incentives for privatisation: efficiency and wider share
ownership. He argues that on the one hand, privatised firms are exposed to the
discipline of competition and insulated from political influence on investment and
operating decisions, and managers and employees can be given stronger incentives to
cut costs and add economic value. On the other hand, privatisation encourages share
ownership by giving special terms or allotments to employees or small investors.
Boubakri and Cosset (1998) argue that in addition to general goals, under the
pressure of international agencies such as the World Bank and the IMF, privatisation
in developing countries is generally implemented as an integral part of a structural
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adjustment programme, which includes measures such as liberalisation of trade and
payment systems.
3.1.2 Privatisation Methods
Megginson and Netter (2000) suggest that the factors that influence the privatisation
method include the history of the asset's ownership; the financial and competitive
position of the SOE; the government's ideological view of market and regulation; the
past, present and potential future regulatory structure in the country; the need to pay
off important interest groups in the privatisation; the government's ability to credibly
commit itself to respect investors' property rights after divestiture; the capital market
conditions and existing institutional framework for corporate governance in the
country; the sophistication of potential investors and the government's willingness to
let foreigners own divested assets. In addition, the choice is influenced by capital
market, political and firm-specific factors, and they report that share issue
privatisations are more likely to be used when capital markets are less developed,
presumably as a way to develop capital markets.
Gibbon (1997) discusses the steps that a government must take in developing a
divestment program, which include setting up a structure for privatisation (including
legislation, if necessary), providing adequate performance records for SOEs being
sold (generating believable accounting data), developing necessary new regulatory
structures, and determining the appropriate post-sale relationship between the firm
and the government. Megginson and Netter (2000) point out that more complex
issues in this area involves the interrelated questions of when to privatise, whether to
privatise rapidly or slowly, whether to sell a SOE at once or in stages (staging),
whether to restructure a SOE prior to sale (or to just restructure the SOE, e.g. lay off
redundant workers prior to selling or leave this to the new owners), and the role of
macroeconomic reform in privatisation.
In non-transition economies, especially in developed countries, privatisation methods
are mainly asset sales and share issue privatisation and the latter has been the major
strategy for governments to privatise large SOEs. In transition economies, especially
32
Eastern Europe and Russia, countries employed varying methods of privatising
SOEs, including asset sales, liquidation, management-buyout, voucher privatisation,
"spontaneous privatisation" (mass privatisation programme - MPP), share offerings
or a combination of above techniques. Like most of the non-transition economies,
China mainly employs share issue privatisation to partially privatise its large SOEs.
Globally, share issue privatisation has been the dominant privatisation method in
privatising large state-owned enterprises, which may be part of the reason why it has
caused huge academic research interests.
3.1.3 Share Issue Privatisation (SIP)
Share issue privatisation is one of the privatisation methods in which some or a
government's entire stake in a SOE is sold to investors through a public share
offering. The difference between share issue privatisations (SIPs) and initial public
offering (IPOs) is that IPOs are structured primarily to raise revenue for the original
owners and IPO firms are normally owned by wealth-maximising entrepreneurs and
continue the corporate objectives already in place before listing (Chen et al 2000).
SIPs are structured to raise money for the state and to respond to some of the
political factors mentioned earlier and corporate objectives will change to wealth-
maximising after privatisation.
Megginson et al (1994) document four common features of share issue privatisation
worldwide. Firstly, these share issues were immense, both in absolute size and
relative to other issues made in their respective national capital markets. Secondly,
most of the governments simply sold off their stake and no capital flowed to the
firms13. Thirdly, SIPs have significant, politically motivated features, in which
governments seemed much more intent on maximising the number of shareholders -
at least in part to make the privatisation politically irreversible - than on maximising
sale proceeds. Finally, a characteristic common to almost every SIP is a restriction on
the fraction of the share issue that foreign investors could purchase.
1 Whereas in the case of Chinese share issue privatisation, share issue proceeds will normally flow to
the newly listed or privatised firms to fund new investments and projects.
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Megginson and Netter (2000) suggest that any government that intends to privatise
state-owned enterprises using public share offerings faces three sets of interrelated
decisions. The first is how to transfer control, which includes whether to sell the
state-owned enterprises all at once or through a series of partial sales. If the
government chooses the latter course, then it must determine how large a fraction of
a firm's shares to issue in the initial versus subsequent offers. The government must
also decide whether to insert any post-privatisation restrictions on corporate control.
The second is how to price the offer, which requires that the government determine
the amount of underpricing, whether the offer price should be set by a tender offer, a
book-building exercise, or at a fixed price. If the fixed price is used, the government
must decide whether the offering price should be set immediately prior to the offer or
many weeks in advance. The third is how to allocate shares, which requires the
government to choose whether to favour one group of potential investors over
another (i.e., domestic investors, enterprise employees, or both, over foreign and
institutional investors). It also requires deciding whether to use the best available
investment banker as a lead underwriter (regardless of nationality) or to favour a
national champion.
Accompanying by deregulation, competition and ownership changes, privatisation
brings a huge impact on firms' financial performance and corporate governance. Due
to the complexity in terms of the various privatisation methods employed in
transition economies, the effect of privatisation on firm performance in transition
economies will not be discussed here. The later survey of empirical literature mainly
focuses on the impact of share issue privatisation on firm performance in non-
transition economies.
3.1.4 Privatisation & Firm Performance
Theoretical literature in the west strongly suggests that privately owned firms will
perform better than state owned ones. Transferring state enterprises to individuals
amounts to a creation of owners, but only in the structural sense, it does not
necessarily guarantee efficiency in enterprise operations. Vickers and Yarrow (1991)
argue that competitive conditions and regulatory environment (in the broad sense)
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are key determinants of performance after privatisation. Megginson et al (1994),
Boycko et al (1996) and D'Souza et al (2001) argue that there are mainly three
reasons why privatisation might cause firms to operate more productively. Firstly,
privatisation subjects managers to the pressure of the financial markets and to the
monitoring and discipline of profit-oriented investors. Secondly, the change in the
firm's ownership redefines the firm's objectives or goals and the manager's
incentives. Finally, releasing the firm from government control provides greater
entrepreneurial opportunities as well as freeing the SOEs from the financial
constraints imposed by the government's public sector borrowing requirements. For
instance, Boycko et al (1996) suggest that privatisation could push firms to employ
their human, financial and technological resources more efficiently due to the greater
steer on profit goals and a reduction of government subsidies. Megginson et al
(1994) suggest that privatised firms should increase their capital expenditures
because they have greater access to debt and equity markets and have more
incentives to invest in growth opportunities.
For Chinese SOEs, modern organisation structures and corporate governance
mechanisms have been build up from scratch at the time of privatisation or IPO.
Therefore, the performance of the newly privatised firms might not only be affected
by ownership changes but also the proper functioning of the newly established
modem organisation systems and corporate governance mechanisms. Unlike
developed countries, under-developed corporate governance might play important
role in financial performance of the newly privatised firms than merely ownership
changes.
The following section presents a survey of privatisation and empirical results on firm
performance in non-transition economies. The survey of privatisation and empirical
results on firm performance in China is presented in Chapter 4.
3.2 Privatisation in Non-Transition Economies
Non-transition economies refer to those countries with a free market economy in
both the developed and the developing world, in other words, all capitalist
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economies. In most of the capitalist economies, corporate governance mechanisms
have been functioning well in line with the free market and ownership change is the
major cause of performance changes after privatisation.
3.2.1 Purpose & Methods
The purpose of privatisation in non-transitional economies is mainly to improve a
firm's efficiency and/or to promote wider share ownership. The privatisation
programmes in many countries have raised tens of billions of income for those
countries' governments and have created millions of new shareholders, and have
significantly reduced state involvement in enterprise decision making. In terms of
privatisation method, case by case asset sales or share issue privatisation are widely
employed in non-transition economies.
3.2.2 Firm Performance
There is a substantial literature that reports the results of empirical studies on the
economic gains of privatisations, and there are two competing methodologies in
examining performance changes resulting from privatisation. For instance, some
studies compare actual post-privatisation performance changes with a comparison
group of non-privatised firms, while other studies only examine share issue
privatisation and compare their three years post-privatisation financial and operating
performance to their pre-privatisation financial and operating performance.14 One
influential study is from Boardman and Vining (1989), and the competing one is by
Megginson, Nash and van Randenborgh (1994). Various researchers have employed
each methodology in their respective privatisation studies. The two representative
methodologies in testifying the benefits of private as opposed to state ownership of
firms have dominated the privatisation studies and the two methodologies and
respective studies with their performance measures are summarised in Table 3.1. The
empirical findings of each study are discussed in detail in the following section.
14 In addition, the one rarely employed method is to compare actual post-privatisation performance
changes with the predicted performance of these firms if they had been SOEs. The difficulty is that it
is hard to justify the predicted (or estimated) performance of firms if they had been SOEs.
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Table 3. 1 Comparison of Performance Measures in Privatisation Studies
This table summarises and compares performance measurement or proxies employed in various
privatisation studies.
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Generally, regardless which methodology is employed, the empirical results
overwhelmingly show that firms' financial and operating performance improved
after privatisation.
■ Methodology One: State versus Private Ownership
Boardman and Vining (1989) examine the economic performance of 500 largest non-
US industrial firms (mainly in Italy, France, Canada, Germany, Britain, Japan) in
1983 in which the data set contains 409 private corporations, 23 mixed (state and
private) enterprises and 57 state-owned enterprises. Because the comparisons are
drawn between state-owned, mixed and private-owned firms, three independent
samples have to be selected.
In their study, four profitability measures are used: return on equity (ROE), return on
assets (ROA), return on sales (ROS) and net income (NI). They argue that due to
different methods of measuring depreciation and timing of profits and capital
expenditures (in different countries), accounting rates of return are generally not
equivalent to the economic rate of return. Nonetheless, accounting ratios are highly
correlated with economic rates of return and they have been employed in numerous
previous studies. In addition to the profitability indices, they also examine two
efficiency measures - sales per employee and sales assets turnover. Due to the nature
of their cross-country study, they also control the competitive and regulatory
environment of the industry as well as systematic differences in national accounting
practices in different countries.
Their results show that state enterprises and mixed enterprises are less profitable and
less efficient than private corporations. With respect to profitability indicators, mixed
enterprises perform no better and often worse than SOEs, while in terms of
efficiency, mixed enterprises perform about the same as or slightly better than SOEs.
In terms of sales per employee, mixed enterprises do better than SOEs, but in terms
of sales assets turnover there is no substantial difference. In short, large industrial
mixed enterprises and SOEs perform substantially worse than similar private
corporations. These results indicate that there are performance differences between
SOEs and private firms in the competitive environment. Boardman and Vining
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(1989) also argue that the results also indicate that partial privatisation where a
government retains some percentage of equity, which is occurring in many countries,
may not be the best strategy for a government wishing to move away from reliance
on SOEs.
Ehrlich et al (1994) focus on the influence of state ownership on firms' long-term
rate of productivity, or cost decline based on an econometric analysis of international
panel data on 23 airlines15 over the period of 1973-1983. They find a significant link
between ownership and firm-specific rates of productivity growth. Their results
suggest that private ownership leads to higher rates of productivity growth and
declining costs in the long run and these differences are not affected by the degree of
market competition or regulation. They argue that productivity level differences due
to an ownership change may be inconclusive in the short run and will eventually
result in significant and widening level differences after some passage of time due to
the cumulative influence of even a minor change in these rates. Through regressing
total factor productivity16 against ownership variables, they find that a switch from
state to private ownership unambiguously raises the rates of productivity growth, or
cost decline, whereas its effect on the levels of productivity growth and unit cost may
be ambiguous in the short run.
Ehrlich et al (1994) argue that their results appear to be independent of whether the
firms in their sample operate under an apparently more or less competitive market
structure or in a more or less regulated market environment. This argument might be
taken with caution, because by nature, airline industries are regulated in every
country to a different extent. For instance, opening air and specific routes to other
countries always involves heavy negotiation within governments and airline
companies. In addition, entering into the airline business requires high initial capital.
Therefore the airline industry is relatively insensitive to market competition
compared with other industries such as manufacturing industry. Besides, nineteen out
15 Nineteen out of 23 airlines are from OECD countries, except Air India from India, PIA from
Pakistan, Thai International from Thailand and Varig from Brazil.
1 Ehrlich et al (1994) define total factor productivity (TFP) as the ratio of total output to input. See
appendix 2.1 (pp290) for definition of total factor productivity.
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of twenty three sample firms in their study are from OECD countries where the
airline industries share much more similar features in terms of extent of regulation
and tend to be less regulated than their counterparts in the developing world.
Consequently there is no comparison benchmark for competitiveness of market or
regulatory environment. Given these two factors, it is hard to justify from their study
whether productivity growth is independent of market or regulatory environment or
not.
Ehrlich et al (1994) also argue that their empirical results further indicate that partial
privatisation of fully state-owned enteiprises would produce a substantially smaller
marginal improvement in productivity growth than complete privatisation would.
Therefore they conclude that to meaningfully enhance long-term productivity
growth, state-owned enterprises would need to undergo a wholesale conversion to
private ownership. In short, the benefits of long-term productivity growth are based
on complete privatisation of the firm.
Dewenter and Malatesta (2001) use accounting ratios to conduct a large sample
cross-sectional comparison of government-owned and privately owned corporations,
based on 500 of the largest industrial companies outside the United States published
by Fortune magazine in 1975, 1985 and 1995. The methodology is similar to that of
Boardman and Vining (1989), and profitability, leverage and labour intensity are
examined. Profitability is measured by using conventional accounting ratios in terms
of return on sales, return on assets and return on equity. The leverage is measured by
total liabilities divided by assets and labour intensity is measured by employees
divided by real sales or real assets. The results show a clear tendency for SOEs to be
less efficient than private firms do. SOEs have statistically significantly higher
average employees-to-sales ratios than private firms do; they also have higher
average employees-to-assets ratios than private firms do, but the difference is not
significant. The regression results also indicate that SOEs are less profitable and
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much more highly leveraged than comparable private firms are, and they also use
more labour in relation to sales than private firms do.
■ Methodology Two: Pre-Privatisation versus Post-Privatisation
In privatisation studies, the competing MNR methodology was first employed by
Megginson, Nash and van Randenborgh (1994) in their international empirical
analysis of performance of newly privatised firms. They compare the pre- and post-
financial and operating performance of 61 companies from 18 countries that
experienced full or partial privatisation through public share offerings during the
period 1961 to 1990, and document strong performance improvements in a given
firm's operations following privatisation. Because the comparisons are made
between pre- and post-privatisation financial performance of the same group of
firms, only one (matched) sample has to be selected.
Megginson et al (1994) limit their analysis to those firms that were sold to the public
through share issues, rather than through the direct selling of state firms to other
firms or other methods. They argue that the largest and most economically
significant SOEs are usually privatised through public share issues. Performance is
measured by profitability, operating efficiency, capital investment, output,
employment, leverage level and dividend payout. They employ a matched sample
methodology to compare the pre- and post-privatisation performance measures
mentioned above. They develop a performance "time-line" which reflects firms'
performance for the three years pre-privatisation and three years post-privatisation
period (the year of privatisation is excluded from analysis) and therefore pre- versus
post-privatisation performance can be compared and the significance of changes can
be tested.
They document significant increases in profitability, output per employee, capital
spending and total employment, and also find that the financial policies of these
former SOEs begin to resemble the lower leverage and higher dividend payout ratios
typically associated with private, entrepreneurial firms. They document very strong
performance improvements following both full and partial government divestments.
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But they also document unchanged results when they compare firms operating in
competitive versus non-competitive industries; when they examine control
privatisations where the government surrenders control and contrast those with
revenue privatisations where the purpose of privatisation is primarily to raise cash
(for government); and when they compare privatisations in OECD countries versus
developing countries. They argue that the very persuasiveness of these improvements
and the fact that most share sales did not raise cash for the firm suggest that
privatisation itself - the involvement of private investors in a firm's ownership
structure - critically impacts a firm's operating and financial performance.
Boubakri and Cosset (1998) examine how privatisation in developing countries
affects the financial and operating performance of the former SOEs. They compare
average three years post-privatisation to pre-privatisation financial and operating
performance of 79 firms from 21 developing countries that experienced full or partial
privatisation during the period 1980-1992. Their sample covers a wide range of
developing countries identified by the World Bank in 1987 (based on the country's
level of GNP) as low-income economies, lower-middle-income economies and
upper-middle-income economies. In addition, their sample also includes firms
privatised not only through share issue privatisation but also direct sales since direct
sales accounted for the vast majority of privatisations in developing countries from
1988 to 1993. They use the same ratios of performance measures and MNR
methodology as those in Megginson et al (1994). To take account of the possibility
and to isolate the effect of macroeconomic changes on the financial and operating
performance of SOEs, they use both raw and market-adjusted accounting
performance measures17.
17 For banks and insurance companies, they use a market index comprising financial corporations. For
other firms, the market index consists of non-financial corporation. They estimate the market index for
each year as the median ratio for all financial or non-financial firms in the country in the Disclosure
databases (excluding all privatised firms). Hence, the market-adjusted accounting performance
measure of a firm is the difference between its accounting performance measure and the market
median accounting performance measure of its country. Industry-adjusted performance measures are
not used due to limitation of data.
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In their full sample, both unadjusted and market-adjusted results show significant
increases in profitability, operating efficiency, capital investment spending, output
(adjusted for inflation), employment level and dividends. They also observe a decline
in leverage following privatisation, but this change is significant only for unadjusted
leverage ratios. Their results are generally robust when they partition their data into
various subsamples, such as firms operating in competitive versus non-competitive
environments, firms from upper-middle-income countries versus low-income and
low-middle-income countries, for full versus partial privatisation, for control
privatisation where governments surrender voting control versus revenue
privatisations where governments sell a minority ownership stake. But they do find
weaker performance improvements for firms from low-income and lower-middle-
income countries. Furthermore, they find that the differences in the increase of
profitability and efficiency are significantly larger for control privatisations and firms
from upper-middle-income countries than for revenue privatisations and firms from
low-income and lower-middle-income countries respectively. Therefore the above
results might indicate that performance improvement gains of privatised firms in
China might not be large due to the fact that state does not surrender its ownership in
privatisation and China is still a low-income country.
Boubakri and Cosset (1998) conclude that privatisation brings with it private owners
who place greater emphasis on profit goals and also carry out new investments that
lead to increased output and employment. As a result, efficiency improves and
profitability follows. They argue that their results, combined with those of
Megginson et al (1994), suggest that in both developing and developed countries,
newly private firms improve their performance.
D'Souza and Megginson (1999) examine share issue privatisation in developing and
industrialised economies during the period of 1990 to 1996. Using a sample of 85
firms from 28 countries, they examine whether the operating and financial
performance of these firms improves after they are privatised. The most heavily
represented industries in their sample are electric utility, banking, telecommunication
and petroleum. They examine the same variables used in Megginson et al (1994) and
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Bourbakri and Cosset (1998), and test the same hypotheses that privatisation would
increase a firm's profitability, operating efficiency, capital investment spending,
output and dividend payout and decrease a firm's employment and leverage. In
addition, they also perform similar tests for subsamples of firms from competitive
versus those from non-competitive industries, control privatisation versus revenue
privatisation, firms from industrialised versus those from non-industrialised nations,
firms which change their CEO after privatisation versus those which do not, and
firms which have more than 50% of director turnover versus those with less than
50%. They argue that the rationale for splitting the sample into competitive versus
non-competitive industries is that privatisation in competitive industries is likely to
yield solid and rapid economic benefits while the sale of enterprises in non¬
competitive sectors is more complex. They argue that selling voting control to
outside investors is most conducive to efficiency improvement and thus control
privatisations may yield more substantive performance improvement than do revenue
privatisations. A large turnover of board directors in private firms represents both a
powerful signal of a desire to change firm direction and a willingness to remove
potential human capital constraints on the transformation process.
The results show that return on sales and return on assets increase significantly after
privatisation, while the changes in return on equity are insignificant, and most
subsamples also demonstrate significant post-privatisation increase in profitability.
But firms operating in non-competitive industries experience a significantly greater
increase in return on sales than do the firms from competitive industries. For
efficiency changes, regardless of industry, nature of privatisation, director turnover
etc., privatisation yields significantly higher real output per worker. Also, non¬
competitive industry firms experience greater efficiency gains than do firms in
competitive industries, and control privatisations improve efficiency more than do
revenue privatisations. Capital spending is found to decrease consistently, which is
due to sales and total assets increasing at an even faster rate than capital expenditure.
Real sales increase significantly and non-competitive firms and control privatisations
experience significantly greater increase compared to their counterparts respectively.
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In contrast to results from Megginson et al (1994) and Boubakri and Cosset (1998),
they find employment declines significantly instead of increases, and they attribute
this result to the fact that firms from regulated utilities represent over one-third of
their sample. All of the subsamples also experience decline in leverage and increase
in dividend payout, and privatisations of non-competitive firms yield significantly
greater performance improvements (leverage reduction and dividend payout
increase) than do privatisations involving firms in competitive industries.
In their results, the most intriguing effects they document are the multiple, significant
differences in performance improvements between competitive and non-competitive
firms, whereas Megginson et al (1994) and Boubakri and Cosset (1998) find
generally insignificant differences between these subsamples. D'Souza and
Megginson (1999) point out that the operating environment for electric utilities and
telecommunication firms has changed rather dramatically during the 1990s, and these
firms are experiencing substantial performance improvements in virtually all
countries. Therefore they suggest that with their data set, they cannot determine
whether these rapid performance improvements are the results of privatisation or
whether privatisation is made possible by the performance enhancements resulting
from more profound technological developments and a world-wide swing towards
deregulation. They conclude that all three factors - massive technological change, a
world-wide trend towards deregulation of utilities, and a desire among policy-makers
to privatise and modernise suddenly dynamic and increasingly vital industries -
contributed both to the heavy representation of electric and telecom utilities in the
1990s privatisation sample and to their remarkable performance improvements.
Consistent with Megginson et al (1994) and Boubakri and Cosset (1998), they
document that performance generally improves more for control than for revenue
privatisations. The above findings may indicate that there could be differences in
1 8
performance improvement between competitive or non-competitive in Chinese
privatised firms. With only partial privatisation, the deregulation of utilities has not
been realised and monopoly of partially privatised utility firms still prevails, such as
electric, telecom as well as highly regulated airline industries. There are some
18
They are also defined as regulated or non-regulated industries in this thesis.
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technological changes in utilities firms following China's economic development and
worldwide trend in technology boom, but not on a massive scale and firms are
generally not technology-oriented. Therefore remarkable performance improvements
in utility firms of 1990s privatisation sample in D'Souza et al (1999)'s study might
not be seen in partially privatised Chinese utility firms in this thesis.
In addition to employing Boardman and Vining's (1989) methodology to compare
performance of state-owned and private owned firms, Dewenter and Malatesta
(2001) also employ MNR methodology by calculating the levels of the performance
measures over different periods around privatisation and drawing inferences from
changes in performance. Their sample includes 63 global firms listed in the
Privatisation International data set and the study of Megginson et al (1994). In
addition to profitability measures of return on sales, return on equity and return on
assets and labour intensity measure, they calculate two more leverage measures in
terms of debt to equity and long-term debt to equity. They also distinguish return on
sales, return on equity and return on assets as net income profitability measures, and
add EBIT (earning before interest and tax) to sales and EBIT to assets as earning
before interest and tax profitability measures. They compare firms' pre-privatisation
and post-privatisation performance based on two sets of test. In one set, average
levels over the three years following privatisation are compared to average levels
over the three years before privatisation (small window). In the other set, average
levels over the five years following privatisation are compared to average levels over
the ten years before privatisation (full window).
Their results show that return on assets and return on sales increase after
privatisation, but changes in return on equity and in EBIT-based profitability
measures are not significant for both small and full window. All the measures of
leverage fall after privatisation for both short and long comparison periods. Dewenter
and Malatesta (2001) also argue that even though state-owned firms are less
profitable than private firms, they do not find much evidence that privatisation itself
increases firm profitability. They confirm the results of Megginson et al (1994), who
report significant increases in return on sales and return on assets during the three
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years after privatisation, but return on equity is actually lower during the three years
following privatisation than during the three years before privatisation. They argue
that government may efficiently restructure at least some firms before selling them19,
therefore if government restructures firms and improves their performance before
privatisation, then the improvements cannot be attributed to the change of ownership.
Some Chinese SOEs also experience either debt or asset restructuring before being
privatised, but these activities happen long before going public (e.g. average 1.5
?0 n
years) . It is obvious that state ownership could not improve firm performance
before privatisation while the potential from restructuring to improve firm
performance for the post-privatisation period is well diminished before privatisation.
In short, debt and asset restructuring might play a minimal role in firms' performance
improvement after going public.
D'Souza et al (2001) further identify performance determinants of firm performance
after privatisation by examining the relationship between performance changes of a
sample of 118 companies privatised through share offering from 29 countries during
1961-1995. They define determinant factors as the measures of capital market
monitoring, development of economy, economic growth rates, changes in ownership,
restructuring, changes in chief executive officers, changes in board of directors and
exposure to competition. Having confirmed that newly privatised firms experience
significant improvement in return on sales, real sales, sales per employees, capital
expenditures and leverage reduction, they then search for the determinants of these
performance improvements by partitioning their data into subsamples based on
potential factors influencing a firm's post-privatisation financial and operating
efficiency.
They document that firms from common law countries report significantly higher
profitability (e.g. return on sales). Although the difference is not significant, firms
from common law countries improve to greater extent in sales efficiency (sales per
employee) than non-common law countries. Therefore, a country's legal system
19 For example, Japan National Railways reduced its workforce by approximately 200,000 and was
split into seven separate rail companies before any share were sold to investors.
20 See appendix 13.1 (pp308) for summary of survey analysis.
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appears to affect post-privatisation performance. Firms in the competitive industries
experience significantly greater employment increases and leverage reduction than
firms in regulated industries. Interestingly, when they partition their data into two
groups - firms where private investors own at least 50% of equity and firms where
the government retains over 50% ownership, they do not find any significant
difference in any performance measure. When they compare firms from OECD
countries versus those from non-OECD countries, all performance measures indicate
stronger improvements for the firms from non-OECD countries. This finding is
consistent with Boubakri and Cosset (1998), who document impressive post-
privatisation performance improvements of newly privatised firms in developing
countries21. D'Souza et al (2001) also provide evidence that restructuring will "add
value" to the newly privatised firms. Restructured firms generally experience
significantly larger improvement in profitability, sales efficiency and leverage
reduction. Non-restructured firms show significantly higher employment. Therefore
restructuring leads to greater post-privatisation performance improvements. With
regard to changes in CEO and board of directors, efficiency increases significantly
only for firms with greater than 50% changes in board of directors, but efficiency and
capital expenditure increase significantly and leverage decreases significantly only
for firms with no changes in CEO.
They further develop regression models to identify determinants in each performance
proxy. For profitability, nature of ownership is the most significant determinant.
They identify a significant negative relation between profitability and employee
ownership, and a significant positive relation between output and competition.
Restructuring, financial market development and foreign ownership contribute to
larger improvements in operating efficiency. D'Souza et al (2001) also document
that firms become more profitable and efficient without reducing average total
employment. They conclude that ownership, protection of shareholder rights and
capital market development are the key determinants of performance changes after
privatisation. D'Souza et al (2001) suggest that the pressing issue is no longer
whether privatisation leads to performance improvements, but rather why do these
21
Including upper-middle-income, lower-middle-income and low-income countries.
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post-privatisation performance improvements occur. Their study provides some
answers regarding the sources of the financial and operating improvements of newly-
privatised firms, which indicate that the level of capital market development,
ownership change and firm restructuring are important indicators of post-
privatisation performance.
3.2.3 Summary on Non-Transition Economies
The following table 3.2 summarises results of major privatisation studies examining
share issue privatisation by employing MNR methodology.
Table 3.2 Summarised Results of Major Privatisation Studies
Employing MNR Methodology
ROS ROA ROE SALES LEVI SAT Sale/Emp INV EMP DIV
Megginson et al (1994) + + + + - n/a + + 0 +
Boubakri et al (1998) + + + + - n/a + + 0 +
D'Souza et al (1999) + + 0 + + n/a + 0 0 +
D'Souza et al (2001) + n/a n/a + - n/a + + 0 n/a
Dewenter et al (2001) + + - n/a - n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
+: Represents significant increase in performance proxies
-: Represents significant decrease in performance proxies
0: Represents no change or non-significant change in performance proxies
n/a: Not measured in that particular study
(ROS, ROA, ROE, SALES, LEVI, SAT, Sale/Emp, INV, EMP and DIV represent return on sales,
return on assets, return on equity, real sales, total debt ratio, sales to assets turnover, sales per
employee, capital expenditure to sales, total employment and dividend payout respectively. The last
four proxies can not be measured in this thesis due to lack of data.
Table 3.2 shows that with a few exceptions, the empirical results are consistent in all
privatisation studies discussed in terms of improvement in profitability, efficiency,
output, capital investment, dividend payout and decrease in leverage, with no change
in employment. Next chapter further reviews privatisation literature and empirical
results from China.
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Chapter 4 Literature Survey - Privatisation in China
China is facing the challenge of privatising its large amount of SOEs as other
transition economies did in 1990s, and it has been using partial share issue
privatisation as its major privatisation strategy to privatise some large SOEs. This
chapter introduces the background and process of privatisation in China, and further
reviews empirical results of firm performance after privatisation from China.
4.1 Background
Like most other transition economies, economic reform in China requires embracing
a great many economic and political changes simultaneously. As pointed out by Lew
(1997), the Chinese government faces the question of to what extent the government
can keep up a strong economic performance and at the same time lead the country -
in the national interest - towards capitalism, without destroying itself as a result?
4.1.1 Economic Reform
In 1978 when economic reforms were initiated under the leadership of Deng
Xiaoping, China designed its own reform agenda and was in favour of what it termed
a socialist market economy. In focusing on agriculture, China chose to emphasise the
development of the entire rural economy through the medium of Township & Village
enterprises (TVEs). In case of privatisation, China did not even use the term
privatisation, but emphasised private sector development before moving on to the
partial privatisation of the state sector. During the early reforms from 1978 till early
1990s, China focused on introducing competition in the market place and removing
production quotas and price controls from the government, and giving more decision
making powers to managers. But creating markets for products and giving
discretionary decision making powers to managers were not sufficient to optimise
resource allocation and to improve SOEs' performance, which led the government to
the view that private ownership may be needed in order to increase the economic
efficiency of SOEs. As suggested by Woo (1999), as the Chinese leadership
recognised the increasingly serious economic and political problems created by the
decentralising reforms of market socialism, the debate between the conservative
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reformers and the liberal reformers has progressed from whether privatisation is
necessary to the question of the optimal form and amount of privatisation.
4.1.2 Privatisation Methods
The next question is whether SOEs should be fully privatised or be privatised
gradually? Mass privatisation employed in other transition economies has not been
on the agenda of China's reform due to political and economic sensitivity of mass
privatisation. For instance, politically, to surrender control of the economy through
mass privatisation would lead to ideological loss of socialist economy.
Economically, given China's large population, it is harder to achieve equality in
wealth distribution through mass privatisation. As argued by Starr (1988),
governments that are in a hurry to sell state-owned enterprises may make
concessions to current managers, whose co-operation is instrumental in divestiture
and privatisation becomes an occasion for managerial enrichment and entrenchment
(such as in Russia). Black et al (2000) argue that the freedom from state control that
facilitates restructuring also facilitates theft. Based on privatisation failure in Russia,
Black et al (2000) propose four strategies in the privatisation process: staging
privatisation of large firms, designing the privatisation strategy, building institutions
to control self-dealing or asset-stripping, corruption and organised crime and creating
a friendlier business climate, especially a friendlier tax regime. Megginson and
Netter (2000) conclude that the evidence demonstrating the benefits of privatisation
is weakest for countries in Eastern Europe, where privatisation was implemented
rapidly, which may suggest that privatisation should have proceeded along a more
gradual path. Therefore the failure of the mass privatisation programme in Eastern
European transition economies has reinforced China's strategy in its gradual
approach to privatise SOEs on an experimental basis. Woo (1999) also suggests that
gradualism (in terms of partial privatisation) in China is not so much the result of a
particular theory of reform, but the result of political deadlock and compromises
between the conservative reformers and the liberal reformers, and a general lack of
consensus in the society at large. Since the early 1990s, along with the establishment
of Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges, there have been numerous partial share
issue privatisation (SIPs), in which large SOEs were corporatised with part of their
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shares sold to employees and the general public at the time of going public . The
partial ownership transfer is then termed as 'socialist-market economy', in which the
state retains ownership of majority stakes in privatised SOEs (Chen et al 2000).
Meanwhile, the government' residual ownership and minority shareholdings leave
the government as the largest shareholder in some privatised firms and pose
governance problems that it is unable to deal with. Lieberman (1997) argues the fact
that some governments in transitional economies have clawed back into an
ownership position implicitly prevents market forces from functioning properly.
Therefore Chinese government's dominant position as the largest shareholder in
many listed firm could create vacuum of corporate governance. On the other hand,
privatisation must proceed in tandem with the reform of the financial sector.
Lieberman (1995) points out an area of direct linkage of the banks to privatisation
programmes - the role of the banks in assuming equity positions in newly privatise
enterprises. He suggests that in the short term, the commercial banks are important as
a source of capital that will prevent the newly privatised firms from seeking
government subsidies and they are also a potentially important source of long-term
restructuring funds to the newly privatised enterprises. Moreover, they could become
an important source of financial discipline over enterprises through their evaluation
of the credit-worthiness of firms.
4.1.3 Purpose of Privatisation
The purpose of share issue privatisation in China is fundamentally different from that
in developed countries, with not only the strong intention to improve firm
profitability and efficiency and to create a market economy with sound capital
market, but also establish and promote efficient corporate governance mechanisms.
For instance, in most developed countries, the classic privatisation proceeds under
the implicit assumptions that there are relatively few enterprises to privatise, that a
market economy is already functioning in the country, and that capital is available
domestically or can be attracted from abroad to purchase the enterprises being
22 While the preferred privatisation methods for small and medium-size SOEs has been employee
(insider) privatisation (Woo 1999).
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offered for sale. In contrast, China is a developing country and Boubakri and Cosset
(1998) argue that developed and developing countries are not equally endowed with
factors likely to influence the success of a privatisation programme. The developing
countries are inhibited by embryonic financial markets, a weak regulatory capacity,
and lack some of the main ingredients for successful privatisation, such as competent
managers, entrepreneurs and capital. As recognised in World Development Report
(1996) by World Bank regarding privatisation in centrally-planned economies of
Central & Eastern Europe, the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union,
China and Vietnam,
Policy makers have to weigh complex and often competing stakeholders, and cope
with the administrative difficulty ofprivatising thousands offirms in a relatively
short time and without mature, functioning capital markets (pp50-51).
Hence the benefits of privatisation should be examined within the economic
environments and the institutional settings specific to those countries. Lieberman
(1995) suggests that experience reveal that privatisation requires strong commitment
at the highest political level and governments need to move from market player to
market regulator or facilitator as required. Public information campaigns are vital to
educate the public about privatisation in general and specific issues. There is also a
need to link privatisation in the public's perception to the overall reform programme
and the transition to a market economy. Lessons from other countries are crucial to
the success of privatisation in China.
4.1.4 Corporate Governance, Legal Infrastructures & Corporate
Efficiency
Xu and Wang (1997) point out that publicly-listed firms in China represent only a
small subset of China's enterprises - a clean and perhaps better performing group of
enterprises that were chosen to be listed on the two stock exchanges - Shanghai and
Shenzhen Stock Exchanges, and they are clearly not representative of all enterprises
in China, state or non-state. In addition, publicly-listed firms undertook the same
restructuring process required by the China Securities Regulatory Commission
(CSRC) before their public offerings, and their accounting books are converted to
international standards and information disclosure has to meet the CSRC's
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requirements. Therefore in terms of firm performance after privatisation, some may
argue that it could be the results of wider macro- and micro-economical reasons. For
instance, the performance failure of partial privatised SOEs might be due to the
emergence of competition from the non-state enterprises. On the other hand, the
reduction in the state's monitoring ability combined with the steady reduction in
discrimination against the private sector also made it easier for the managers to
transfer state assets to themselves (e.g. asset-stripping by managers or workers).
After privatisation, the firm enjoys financial autonomy but accepts financial
independence in terms of hard budget constraints from the state. For a listed firm, the
share price of the firm's equity is the publicly available indicator of the firm's
performance and it seems that the financial market could exercise corporate control
as in developed countries. In fact that the weak legal framework and poor
enforcement mechanisms for ensuring private property rights remain unsolved in
China. As argued by Shleifer et al (1997), without creation of large investors, agency
costs of managerial control may arise and they suggest that both the legal protection
of investors and some form of concentrated ownership are essential elements of a
good corporate governance system. The challenge in China is that how the
population replaces the state as the effective owner of SOEs, how can newly
established investment funds demonstrate that they can play a positive role in
distressed enterprises.
Subsequently, efficiency gains from privatised firms may not appear because of
inadequate corporate governance and inadequate institutional infrastructures. Boycko
et al (1996) argue that privatisation is just one of several steps that make it more
expensive for government to influence firms. It reduces the amount of inefficiency
that firms accept to satisfy government, but it does not make firms fully efficient. In
China, entrepreneurial ability still has a long learning curve and business education
for enterprise managers and new owners in technical areas such as financial
management, restructuring, marketing, corporate governance and shareholder rights
is essential. The requirements of technological excellence and financial resources are
not readily available to improve SOEs' performance and the workers are used to
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working without incentive under poor job performance measurement. Building up an
enterprise culture, which brings these players together to mutual understanding and
supportive attitudes, is crucial to improve a firm's overall performance after
privatisation. As argued by Starr (1988), to some extent, enterprise culture must be
understood in terms of micro as well as social efficiency, and this social efficiency is
very important in that each nerve of the society has to be touched. Equally,
improving corporate governance, establishing healthy capital markets, introducing
market competition and eliminating political control of capital allocation are other
important steps that make political influence more expensive. Lieberman (1995)
argues that privatisation is an essential but not a sufficient element of restructuring,
and it needs to be viewed as a part of comprehensive reform programmes to make
firms more efficient.
One of the most important lessons China has learnt from other transition economies
is that the development of a decent legal and enforcement infrastructure must
precede or at least accompany privatisation of large firms. Privatisation itself is not
enough; who the owners are, what constraints exist on self-dealing and the business
climate they operate in all matter. Black et al (2000) suggest that if it is not feasible
to introduce foreign owners, the state's second-best choice may be to first privatise
selected firms with strong profits and reputedly honest mangers and watch these
firms carefully once they are privatised, while building the legal and market
institutions to control asset-stripping. It might be better to stage privatisation and
work hard to develop this infrastructure, rather than privatise large firms anyway and
hope that the outcome will somehow be acceptable. Therefore privatisation should be
supported by sound legal and enforcement infrastructures and macro economic
environment. When conditions are not met, staged privatisation seems advantageous.
As argued by Lew (1999), protecting SOEs in order to avoid Russian-style chaos, an
urban uprising even, is a key feature of the Chinese model of "transition".
4.2 Privatisation in China
Chinese SOEs must go through a process of corporatisation before they are listed at
stock exchanges, as shown in figure 4.1.
55




The state and provincial governments select various
SOEs to be corporatised, which involves recognising
SOEs and forming them into limited liability
companies and shares are owned by the state and
various entities of the state.
Selected corporatised SOEs are privatised based on the
quota set by the State Planning Commission, the
People's Bank and the China Securities Regulatory
Commission (CSRC). Local governments are
responsible for selecting firms to be listed based on
economic and financial needs, commercial viability,
political objectives, society concerns etc. Shares are
sold to individual investors (at least 25%) and the state
and its entities retain at least 50% of the shares. Only
individual shares are tradable (A share), and other
forms of shares such as legal person, state and foreign
have to be transferred through negotiation.
The corporatisation is fairly straightforward with SOEs are corporatised into limited
liability companies with identified shareholders. In contrast, privatisation is much
more complicated in that selected corporatised SOEs for share issue privatisation are
not based upon free competition but upon economical, political, social and
geographical concerns evaluated by local governments. For instance, China's overall
economic success nevertheless masks growing regional disparities and the
discrepancy between developed (such as Eastern and Southern China) and under¬
developed regions (such as West China) is increasing. Hence given the uneven
economic development across various regions, competitive listing in the early years
of privatisation would be both politically and economically undesirable. Therefore
the selection criteria would not necessarily result in the selection of the most
dynamic, successful and high-growth companies. CSRC has started to scrap the IPO
quota system since March 2001 and firms to be nominated for public listing are
subject to screening by an independent listing committee of the CSRC. The move
helped to ensure that firms to be listed are of higher quality and the investment
funded by the equity financing is more profitable. In addition, it put an end to harsh
competition for the limited IPO quotas allocated to each local government every
year, which blocked the growth of many well-performing large-scale enterprises and
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private firms. Reforming of the listing regulatory framework will make the listing
procedure more market-oriented and will greatly improve the general performance of
listed firms (People' Daily 2001).
After privatisation or IPO, the basic feature of most privatised firms is that they are
still majority either state or its entities (legal person shareholders) owned, and
individual shareholders are minorities and their tradable shares account for only
small fraction of total shareholdings. The following section details the privatisation
process in China, including corporatisation, share allocation and share pricing.
4.2.1 Corporatisation & Reorganisation
The security regulatory authorities - the State Planning Commission (SPC), China
Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) and the People's Bank of China (the
Central bank) together determine the amount of shares that should be issued each
year. The "total quota" is then broken down and allocated among provinces and a
few major cities such as Beijing and Shanghai. The criteria used for allocation of
new issues among provinces reflect the above-mentioned security regulatory
authorities' perceived regional development needs and provincial differences in
production structure and industrial base. If a SOE intends to be listed, it has to obtain
approval from the local government, the State Economic and Trade Commission, the
State Commission of Economic Restructuring and CSRC. Then the state and
provincial government select various SOEs to be corporatised, which involves
recognising SOEs and forming them into limited liability companies and shares are
created and owned by the state and various entities of the state, such as other SOEs
or majority state owned institutions.
Once a SOE has permission for a quota of total shares to be issued, it begins a
reorganisation. The first step is to separate non-productive assets such as schools and
hospitals from productive ones. Productive assets account for 50% to 75% of total
assets of the to-be-listed stock company, while non-productive assets are left with the
SOE. All retired workers also remain on the SOE's payroll. An accounting firm is
then hired to audit the financial statements of the SOE for the last three years and the
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separated productive assets. In the meantime, managers of the SOE contact other
enterprises and institutions to ask whether they are willing to be legal person co-
founders of the stock company. These legal person institutions themselves may be
controlled by the state so long as they are not 100% owned by the state; equity they
hold in the new stock company is classified as legal person shares. The local office
of the Bureau of State Property Management (BSPM - a central government agency)
acts as the largest shareholder of listed firms if SOEs are owned by central
government or its agencies, and BSPM collects dividend revenues for the Ministry of
Finance. The SOE also talks intensively with the local government and party officials
for candidates of managers, the board and supervisory committee members2j. The
nomination must be confirmed at the first shareholder meeting and confirmation is
nearly guaranteed since the state has a majority holding of the company.
4.2.2 Share Issue Privatisation
After the SOE receives approval for the appointments from its administrative
supervisor and the local personnel department of the party, the SOE then needs to
find a group of securities firms as underwriters. On the day of IPO, at least 25% of
total shares are sold to the public, whereas shares classified as state, legal person,
employee and foreign shares are not tradable and in effect only A shares owned by
individual investors are tradable at stock exchanges.
High domestic savings in China might cause sufficient or even excessive demand for
company shares. So why does the state keep a high percentage of residual
shareholdings when firms go public? There are several possibilities for the state to
maintain residual shareholdings in listed firms, including political motivation to
control the economy, retaining a significant shareholding in strategic firms for
political reasons or hoping to sell shares to raise revenue in the after market.
However, state residual shareholding does have merit in that it may help to remove
market imperfections created by monopolisation or the dominance of some domestic
23
According to Xu and Wang (1997), 80% of such firms end up with the arrangement where the
original managers and party officials of the SOEs keep the key positions of the board and supervisory
board in the new stock company.
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or foreign companies, especially in transition economies where both free trade and
protection should be well balanced to protect the vulnerable economies.
4.2.2.1 Types of Shares
The government has introduced several types of shares24 in order to allow ownership
of SOEs to be dispersed among the government itself, other state-owned enterprises,
firms' own employees, domestic private investors and foreign investors.
• State Shares are held by central government, local governments, or solely
government-owned enterprises and the ultimate owner of state shares is the State
Council of China.
• Domestic institutions or foreign companies own Legal Person Shares. A legal
person in China is defined as a non-individual legal entity or institution, in which
25
domestic institutions include stock companies, non-bank financial institutions
and SOEs not wholly owned by the state. Securities firms, trust and investment
companies, finance companies and mutual funds are major non-bank financial
institutions. In rare cases, foreign companies are allowed to invest as legal
persons in listed firms.
• Employee Shares are offered to workers and managers of listed companies,
usually at a substantial discount. These shares are designed more like a benefit to
employees. Employee shares have to be held for 6 to 12 months after an IPO and
then can be sold at the stock exchanges following approval by the CSRC26.
• Tradable A-shares are held and traded mostly by private investors and some by
domestic institutions. There is no restriction on the number of shares traded, or
on the holding periods. It is required that tradable A-share should account for no
less than 25% of total outstanding shares when a company goes public. These
shares are the only equities that are tradable at A-share market.
24 See Appendix 2.2 (pp291) for definition of five types of shares: state shares, legal person shares,
employee shares, foreign shares and private (A) shares.
25 The Commercial Banking Law of China (1994) prohibits commercial banks from underwriting,
holding and trading securities except for government bonds.
26 In 1998 the regulatory authorities issued a circular in relation to discontinuing the issuance of
employee shares and the number of employee shares is gradually falling (Tenev et al 2002).
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The above four types of shares are the main types of shares of the listed firms under
27
study in this thesis . Meanwhile, a firm must take a number of steps after it is
selected for initial public offering and before public share offering. These steps
include the publication of a prospectus in newspapers and selection of underwriters;
a lottery or an auction mechanism to determine which individual and institutional
investors will be allowed to purchase new issues that the IPO price; and delivery of
shares to the lottery or auction winners after payments are made.
4.2.2.2 Share Pricing & Allocation
The offering mechanism adopted by most Chinese firms is quite different from those
observed in the developed markets and has undergone several substantial changes
over time. The offer price is chosen months before the market trading starts, and in
the great majority of offerings there is no feedback mechanism through market
demand that allows adjustment in the offer price. The lottery mechanism, which
remains the primary method of share allocation, has also undergone several
substantial changes.
• Before 1992, the security regulatory authorities designed a lottery system based
on a pre-announced fixed number of application forms. Each retail investor was
allowed to purchase a limited number of lottery forms from the central bank and
its subsidiaries. Lottery winners were entitled to a certain number of shares per
winning form.
• In 1993, the security regulatory authorities introduced two new lottery
mechanisms. One mechanism was based on an unlimited number of application
forms. The central bank sold as many lottery forms as investors were willing to
buy. The odds of winning the lottery were unknown to investors at the time of the
lottery. The other lottery mechanism was based on savings deposit certificates.
Investors were required to deposit a certain quantity of funds into a special saving
27 In addition, B-shares are originally restricted to foreign investors and some authorised domestic
securities firms, and they are denominated in US dollars at the Shanghai Stock Exchange and Hong
Kong dollars at Shenzhen Stock Exchange. B-share market has been opened for domestic investors
since November 2001. A-shares and B-shares issued by the same company carry equal rights and are
comparable in all respects except for the trading currency. There are a few cases where firms issued
H-shares at the Hong Kong Stock Exchange and N-Shares at the NYSE, either through IPOs or as
ADRs.
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account (giving relatively low interest) when submitting an application for
shares, which could not be withdrawn until the lottery was completed.
• In 1994, two kinds of auction mechanisms were introduced. Under the first, an
issuer set an initial price and investors were required to bid for the price and
quantity. The final offer price was set at the level where the cumulative quantities
demanded by investors equalled the total number of new shares available. Under
the second auction mechanism, the offering price was fixed and investors were
invited to bid for the quantity of shares. In case of oversubscription, all investors
were guaranteed a certain amount of shares and the remaining shares were
distributed on a pro-rata basis.
Firms could choose either lottery mechanisms or auction mechanism to distribute
initial public offering shares. After the process of pricing and allocation is finished,
shares can then be traded on the stock exchange at the pre-announced initial public
offering date.
4.2.2.3 Voting Power & Control
After the IPO, the original SOE either disappears or becomes the majority holder of
the stock company. The state, legal person (including domestic and foreign),
employee and private (A-share) shareholders exercise their voting power and control
through their direct shareholding of the firm. If the original SOE disappears, the local
office of the Bureau of State Property Management (a central government agency,
BSPM hereafter) acts as the largest shareholder of the listed company if the SOE was
owned by the central government or its agencies before the IPO. Otherwise, the local
finance bureau, or a local government-run holding company plays the role of the
largest shareholder. In many listed firms, state holds more than 50% of shares and in
effect has the ultimate control over the firms, but whether the state exercises its
control is an critical issue on firm performance28. If the firms are founded by legal
person shareholders, these firms are more democratic with less government
interference. Even though the founding legal persons have to get permission to go
public and a quota from government agencies, they can nominate board members and
choose corporate officers at their will. It is not required to obtain government or
28 This will be further analysed through 16 cases in Chapter 11 (pp222) and Chapter 12 (pp240).
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party approval of their choices. Consequently, the board membership of stock
companies founded by legal person is less concentrated than that of state-controlled
coiporations transformed from SOEs. If there are a few legal person shareholders
instead of concentrating on one, the balancing act in exercising control within legal
person shareholders might have impact on firm performance. Employee shares are
registered as individuals under the title of the labour union of the company that also
represents employee shareholders to exercise their rights. After a holding period of 6
to 12 months, the company may file with CSRC for allowing its employees sell the
shares in the open market.
Only a small number of legal person and state shares can be traded on the Security
Trading and Automatic Quote System (STAQS) and National Electronic Trading
System (NETS). Since only private A shares are tradable at A-share markets of the
two official exchanges, in effect share prices at A-share markets are determined by
the trading of private shares.
4.2.3 Firm Performance
The nature of privatisation in China differ markedly from those in non-transition
economies, therefore the empirical results of firm performance after privatisation in
China may differ from other countries. Chen et al (2000) suggest that the reasons for
initiating privatisation programmes, privatisation processes, characteristics of
privatised firms, maturity of stock markets, national economies, and political systems
differ across countries, so the findings from a study based on one country cannot be
automatically extrapolated to another country. In similar vein, the findings from non-
transitional economies or free market economies also cannot be automatically
assumed in China.
Chen et al (2000) examine 275 share issue privatisations during 1991 and 1995 (most
of the listings took place in 1992 and 1993) and try to find out whether the strong
international consensus that improved profitability and improved efficiency
accompanies privatisations extends to China. They employ the same MNR
methodology as Megginson et al (1994) but fewer economic variables. They examine
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profitability, capital expenditures, sales efficiency and leverage. They suggest that
lack of employment data means that many productivity measures used in other
studies such as sales per employee cannot be calculated. In addition, changes in
dividends are not examined as very few Chinese SOEs pay dividends prior to share
offering. They document that return on assets, return on equity and sales assets
turnover deteriorate after privatisation, and in absolute terms, return on assets and
return on equity are very low, while return on sales and real sales do not change after
privatisation. They find that the sales increase is not significant and sales gains after
privatisation are less than those reported in studies based on data from other
developing and developed countries. They argue that, given that the privatisation also
raises capital for privatised firms to expand operations, it is very disappointing that
sales have not improved after privatisation. This result is puzzling since real sales is
expected to increase if privatised firms generally receive share issue proceeds to
expand the businesses, as indicated in the analysis of case studies in this thesis. The
lack of change in return on sales might be due to the fact that the increase in sales is
offset by the increase in costs. They also find reduction in debt ratios as the new
issue proceeds increase and in some cases part of the proceeds is used to repay debt;
and they document significant increase in capital expenditure. They partition data
into subsamples and find that the state of the economy when the IPO was made and
the size of the firm are not significant indicators of changes in profitability, asset
efficiency, capital expenditure, sales growth and debt ratios. Foreign ownership does
not have a major influence on changes in profitability and changes in sales
efficiency; level of state ownership has a weak association with sales growth and
individual share ownership has no significant association with any of the
performance measures.
Because Chen et al (2000) examine share issue privatisation in China employing
MNR methodology, their results could be compared with other share issue
privatisation studies employing MNR methodology and are summarised in table 4.1.
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Table 4.1 Comparison of Results from China with Major Share Issue
Privatisation Studies Employing MNR Methodology
ROS ROA ROE SALES LEVI SAT Sale/Emp INV EMP DIV
Megginson et al (1994) + + + + n/a + + 0 +
Boubakri et al (1998) + + + + n/a + + 0 +
D'Souza et al (1999) + + 0 + + n/a + 0 0 +
D'Souza et al (2001) + n/a n/a + n/a + + 0 n/a
Dewenter et al (2001) + + - n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
China:
Chen et al (2000) 0 - - 0 - n/a + n/a n/a
+: Represents significant increase in performance proxies
Represents significant decrease in performance proxies
0: Represents no change or non-significant change in performance proxies
n/a: Not measured in that particular study
(ROS, ROA, ROE, SALES, LEVI, SAT, Sale/Emp, INV, EMP and DIV represent return on sales,
return on assets, return on equity, real sales, total debt ratio, sales to assets turnover, sales per
employee, capital expenditure to sales, total employment and dividend payout respectively.
The above table shows that study of Chen et al (2000) contrasts major share issue
privatisation studies, in which some performance measures deteriorated after share
issue privatisation.
In addition to comparing the mean performance before and after privatisation, Chen
et al (2000) also develop regression models to explain the changes in performance
from pre-privatisation to post-privatisation. They employ independent variables of
change in GNP per capita, foreign ownership, ownership structure and control
variables of firm size, industry and year of listing, but they document that their
models fail Lo identify reasons for the deterioration in profitability and efficiency.
The existence of foreign ownership of shares, high levels of legal person share
ownership and high levels of individual share ownership do not mitigate the poor
performance of privatised firms. Although these ownership characteristics are
hypothesised to be positively related to performance because of the monitoring
activities of the investors, the empirical support is very weak. They argue that
corporate governance structures based on pressure applied on management by
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investors do not appear to have much influence in improving firm performance . In
fact, based on their argument, Figure 4.2 gives a possible indication of the reasons
why their models fail to explain performance changes.
Figure 4.2 The Relationship between Ownership, Governance and Performance
As shown in figure 4.2, a firm's economic performance is affected by its surrounding
macro and micro variables. Macro variables are not in firms' control but have a
direct impact on the firms' performance, such as a country's monetary, competition
and regulatory policies. Firm level micro variables also bring direct impact on the
firms' performance, such as business strategies etc. Specifically, ownership structure
is an important micro variable and many researchers, including Chen et al (2000), try
to model it as a direct explanatory variable in explaining performance change after
privatisation. But change in ownership may not automatically improve the firms'
economic performance; it is the subsequent improved corporate governance does the
job. In other words, ownership change might have indirect impact on the firms'
performance changes.
Figure 4.2 illustrates that ownership structure itself does not improve a firm's
economic performance directly, but the accompanying improved corporate
governance fulfils the task. In free market economies where ownership structure is
strongly associated with corporate governance function, a firm's economic
performance can be examined based on ownership structure directly. If ownership
29
Interestingly, after examining the economic performance of 14 privatisations where individual
shareholders collectively own more than 50% of the shares, Chen et al (2000) find that the economic
performance deterioration remains.
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structure does not lead to sound corporate governance and the link between the two
is weak, it could be difficult to detect the relationship between ownership structure
and firm performance. Therefore, in the case where it is unknown whether ownership
structure has association with corporate governance or not, in addition to ownership
variables, corporate governance variables may have to be added into the analysis in
identifying determinants in a firm's economic performance. Chen et al (2000) mainly
employ ownership structures and macro and other micro variables to explain
performance deterioration and fail to identify the reasons for performance changes.
In this thesis, some corporate governance variables (e.g. size of board of directors,
cross-sitting between board directors and executives, human capital of senior
management) will be incorporated to identify the determinants in performance
changes, which is further discussed in chapter 5 research design and methodology.
Nevertheless, Chen et al (2000) try to give some possible reasons for performance
deterioration:
■ The Chinese style of partial privatisation has inhibited the incentives and
motivations associated with free market policies. Although privatisation
represents a move towards individual ownership of firms, the state retains voting
control.
■ The senior and junior management of privatised SOEs are the same as before
privatisation and managers are often political appointees who have little or no
experience of running businesses.
■ Bonus-incentives schemes based on corporate profitability and/or share price
appreciation are rare or are of a small magnitude. The lack of pay incentive
schemes and performance indicators provides no incentive for managers to
maximise profitability.
■ The incumbent senior management of many privatised firms lack the necessary
skills and experience to successfully run their firms in the new economic
environment and it will be impossible to replace all of them with highly skilled
alternatives. In contrast, in developed markets, a large pool of skilled mangers is
available from enterprise sector.
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Chen et al (2000) conclude that the twin themes of weak corporate governance
(accompanied by continuing state interference) and poorly motivated management
(allied with weak incentive system) have resulted in the deterioration of profitability
and economic efficiency in privatised firms. They contend that in order to realise the
full benefits from privatisation, the state and its entities need to sell all of their shares
to individuals and non-government affiliated institutional investors.
The following two studies examine the effect of ownership changes on either
accounting performance or stock market valuation of privatised firms in China
without employing MNR methodology, and both studies exhibit different results
from Chen et al (2000). Xu and Wang (1997) investigate whether ownership
structure in terms of ownership concentration and ownership mix30 has significant
effects on the performance of listed firms for the years 1993, 1994 and 1995. They
employ market-to-book ratio (MBR), return on equity and return on assets to
measure firms' performance. They suggest that few of the Chinese listed firms issue
debt securities, it is almost impossible to estimate the market value of the firms' debt,
therefore they employ market-to-book ratio (MBR) - market value of equity to book
value of equity as the replacement of Tobin's Q. But it is also arguable that MBR
may not be a good performance measure. As documented by Xu and Wang (1997),
the turnover ratios of the Chinese stock exchanges are extremely high, for example,
over 200% at both exchanges (Shanghai and Shenzhen) in 1994, as compared to 67%
in the US; in addition, the average holding period in China is about 1 to 2 months,
while it is 18 months in the US. This is a strong indication that it is very hard to
justify that the MBR is a good performance benchmark if the market is so volatile.
They also examine the relationship between performance proxies and concentration
ratios (top five and top ten shareholding), ownership structures (state, private and
foreign ownership) as well as other explanatory variables such as sale size, debt
assets ratio, and growth rate of net income, industry etc. to identify the role of
ownership structures in a firm's performance. The potential problem in their
30
Ownership concentration is the sum of the squares of the top 10 shareholdings, regardless type of
shareholders. Ownership mix is the actually shares hold by different types of shareholders.
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regression analysis is the colinearity between firms' performance measures and
explanatory variables such as sale, growth rate of net income etc.
Results from their empirical analysis show that ownership structure indeed has
significant effects on the performance of listed firms.
■ First, there is a positive and significant correlation between ownership
concentration and profitability.
■ Second, the effect of ownership concentration is stronger for firms dominated by
legal person shareholders than for those dominated by the state.
■ Third, firms' profitability is positively correlated with the proportion of legal
person shares, but it is either negatively correlated or uncorrelated with the
proportion of state shares and tradable A-shares held mostly by individuals.
■ Finally, labour productivity tends to decline as the proportion of state shares
increases.
Xu and Wang (1997) argue that the above results suggest the importance of large
institutional shareholders in corporate governance and performance, the inefficiency
of state ownership, and potential problems in an overly dispersed ownership
structure. They argue that in OECD countries ownership and control rights are
increasingly concentrated in the hands of financial and non-financial institutions.
The driving force behind this trend seems to be related to the benefit of ownership
concentration as a direct measure of corporate control, since concentration provides
the investors with both the incentives and the power to monitor and control the
management.
Empirically and theoretically, there are several potential problems in their study:
■ The period under study has a high market turnover and speculation, leading to
too much noise in share prices. The main performance benchmark is market to
book ratio, which is vulnerable to volatile stock market.
■ Firms with high legal person shareholding tend to have high market to book
value ratio that may not be the result of the firms' real economic or accounting
performance. It might instead be the result of autocorrelation in which individual
investors look favourably on, and then to invest more in, firms with high legal
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person shareholding. The reason might be that individual investors regard
dominant state shareholding is disadvantageous in improving firm performance.
■ The strong effect of legal person shareholders may not be the result of their
monitoring, but as argued by Chen et al (2000), legal person shareholders may
invest in profitable firms rather than motivating the firm's management to make
firms profitable.
■ Although Xu and Wang (1997) also employ return on equity (ROE) and return on
assets (ROA) as performance proxies to offset the possible distortion of market to
book value ratio of equity (MBR), the less strict and loose accounting procedures
before 19973' weaken the credibility of ROE and ROA in measuring firms'
accounting performance.
■ Finally, their study has not answered the question of how much performance has
been improved, but only the relationship between the ownership and performance
for three specific years.
Tian (2000) examines the stock market valuation of 825 firms listed at the Shanghai
Stock Exchange from 1994 to 1998. He traces down the ultimate shareholder with a
direct holding larger than a certain threshold by examining pyramids, cross-
shareholdings and reciprocal shareholding, and he finds the main difference of the
firms listed on China's stock market from western modem firms is the dominance of
the government shareholder. Since Tobin's Q is a highly regarded measure of
corporate value, Tian (2000) employs Q, which is simplified Tobin's Q - the sum of
market value of equity and book value of debt over book value of total assets instead
of respective market value of debt and assets. He argues that Q includes some basic
accounting information, but it is mainly based on market prices of shares because the
market can capture the growth opportunity of a firm if the market is efficient. He also
employs return on assets (ROA) to examine profitability. Interestingly, he finds that
during the years under study, Q rises but return on assets falls, which may indicate
that market value may not be a good performance proxy for listed firms if the stock
market "bubble" exists.
31 All listed firms are obliged to publish their standard balance sheet, income statement and cash flow
statement mainly based on International Accounting Standards.
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The results show that firms without state shareholding perform significantly better
than those with state shareholding in terms of market valuation on the stock market;
firms where a non-state shareholder holds the most perform better than those with the
state as the largest shareholder; and firms with a non-state majority shareholder
perform better than those with the government majority shareholder. This implies
that the overall role of the government shareholder is detrimental in terms of
corporate value, and Tian (2000) concludes that the finding of the overall detrimental
impact of the government shareholder supports full privatisation. The question arises
here is whether the state actually exercises its control rights over listed firms.
Tian (2000) also finds that coiporate value decreases with the fraction of smaller
state share-holdings but rises when the government is a larger shareholder - he
regards this as the grabbing hand and helping hand of government. He argues that the
finding of the U-shaped relationship between state shareholding and corporate value
supports full privatisation and therefore he concludes the policy implication is to sell
out state shares at one go rather than piecemeal at the firm level. This argument is
particularly interesting but not particularly convincing in favour of full privatisation.
If larger government shareholding increases firm value (ignoring measurement bias
in the study), why did SOEs perform badly in the past when government wholly
owned them before partial privatisation, and what is the rationale to privatise SOEs
in the first place? The possible explanation for the findings of the government's
grabbing and helping hands could be due to the fact that Tian (2000) employ Q to
measure firm valuation and at the same time state shareholding has signalling effects
in China's transitional context. Given the highly speculative stock market in China,
small state shareholding may signal to investors or the stock market that potential
managerial entrenchment and large institutional shareholder discretion would be
significant and therefore private shareholders tend to downgrade firm value32.
Similarly, large government shareholding may indicate to investors and the market
that potential managerial entrenchment and institutional investor discretion tend to be
32 As discussed earlier, state, legal person and employee shares are non-tradable, and share price of a
firm is based on tradable shares of the firm hold by private investors.
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less significant and government would try to protect state assets. In this case,
investors and the market tend to upgrade firm value. Therefore corporate market
value may not be a good performance proxy to examine firm performance and the
impact of ownership structures on firm performance.
4.2.4 Summary on China
Employing MNR methodology, Chen et al (2000) find performance deterioration in
return on assets, return on equity and sales to assets turnover, but there is no
significant improvement in return on sales and real sales which are further
investigated in this thesis. The finding of the non-significant changes in real sales
might be due to inadequate accounting rules resulting in low quality of accounting
data before the introduction of new accounting rules based on International
Accounting Standards in 199733. Chen et al (2000) also find a significant reduction in
debts and an increase in capital expenditures. In addition to the weakness in sample
selection, Chen et al (2000) employ only ownership variables to conduct regression
analysis but admit they fail to identify reasons for the deterioration in some
profitability and efficiency measures. The reason might be that their analysis is based
on the assumption that ownership changes could lead to corporate governance
improvement automatically and subsequent performance improvement and they
employ no corporate governance variables in their regression analysis. The failure in
their analysis might indicate that the strong association between ownership structure
change and corporate governance improvement in the free market economies may
not be true in China where corporate governance has established from scratch and its
improvement may not be quickly realised through ownership changes.
Regarding other two studies that employ non-MNR methodology, Xu and Wang
(1997) mainly investigate the impact of ownership concentration and ownership mix
on firm performance in terms of market-to-book ratio, return on equity and return on
assets. Their findings indicate the importance of large institutional (legal person)
shareholders in corporate governance and performance in an overly dispersed
33
They examine 275 share issue privatisation during 1991 and 1995 at both Shanghai and Shenzhen
Stock Exchanges.
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ownership structure. Their opinion of importance of institutional investors is not
convincing: it is unclear whether the positive association between performance and
ownership concentration of institutional (legal person) shareholders is due to better
monitoring by institutional shareholders or the momentum of private investors on the
presence of large legal person shareholders. The strong effect of legal person
shareholding may not be the result of their monitoring because legal person
shareholders may invest in profitable firms rather than motivating firms'
management to make firms profitable. Therefore the above double effects might push
up the market valuation of firms with high legal person shareholding. Tian (2000)'s
study also shows the similar weakness to that of Xu and Wang (1997) by employing
Q (simplified Tobin's Q) to examine the relationship between firms' market
valuation and ownership structures. He suggests that the detrimental effect of state
shareholdings on corporate value supports full privatisation. In fact it is not clear in
his study whether state shareholding has a positive or negative effect on firms'
accounting performance; and whether the impact of state shareholding on Q is due to
the poor monitoring of state shareholder or signalling effect of state shareholding.
Therefore, current privatisation studies of share issue privatisation in China have
suffered various shortcomings and further research is needed to clarify the actual
post-privatisation versus pre-privatisation accounting performance changes based on
more reliable accounting data, the determinants of such changes incorporating not
only ownership variables but also incorporate governance variables. Behavioural
theory might suggest that with information asymmetry, momentum investment is the
favoured style especially in the stock market bubble period, therefore conventional
analysis of the market value does not work. Obviously, given China's weak efficient
financial market, it is stressed in the thesis that market related performance measures
(e.g. market-to-book ratio, Q etc.) are not appropriate in studying privatisation in
China's transitional context.
Nevertheless, there is a consensus in privatisation studies showing that privatised
firms perform better than state-owned ones and partial privatised firms and
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most researchers maintain that privatisation is necessary for significant performance
improvements. Boardman and Vining (1989) argue that partial privatisation may not
be the best strategy for a government wishing to move away from reliance on state
ownership, and along with Boardman and Vining (1989), Ehrlich et al (1994),
Megginson et al (1994), Tian (2000), Chen et al (2000), Dewenter and Malatesta
(2001) and others, they advocate full privatisation of SOEs. As argued by D'Souza et
al (2001), the pressing issue is no longer whether full privatisation leads to
performance improvements, but rather why do these post-privatisation performance
improvements occur. With regard to privatisation in China, the difficult question is
whether full privatisation is the optimal strategy to privatise SOEs and to improve
their economic performance, what are the exact performance changes after
privatisation and what are the key drivers in firms' performance changes. These
unsolved issues are the focus of this thesis and are further investigated in the
following chapters.
4.3 Discussion
The consensus on share issue privatisation in China is that the supervision of
enterprises through stock exchanges would strengthen the performance of SOEs.
Despite some progress in the development of property rights, the absence of clear
definitions of ownership has been an obstacle for enterprise restructuring and
performance improvement in partially privatised firms. Meanwhile, China does not
have the institutions in place to deal with the social costs of privatisation, such as
asset stripping by insiders, and relies on free market principles to solve these
problems. Therefore the present economic situation requires active steps in
privatising SOEs.
Yarrow (1986) and Bishop and Kay (1989) argue that competition and deregulation
are more important than privatisation in improving performance of firms. In addition
to the positive role of concentrated ownership and large institutional shareholders,
Xu and Wang (1997) suggest that competition and deregulation may be an
alternative for privatisation to improve SOEs' profitability and efficiency. But their
argument should be interpreted with caution because maybe with privatisation the
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benefits of competition and deregulation will be even greater. Megginson and Netter
(2000) points out that enterprise restructuring, concentrating on improving the
allocation of property rights and incentives may yield large benefits even without
privatisation. The question here is whether economic reform coupled with
privatisation could lead to even greater performance improvement. There is limited
empirical evidence, especially from China, to suggest that non-privatising reform
measures, such as price deregulation, market liberalisation and increased use of
incentives, can improve the efficiency of SOEs. But it also seems likely that these
reforms would be even more effective if coupled with privatisation.
Responsible policy-makers in China are understandably reluctant to bet their
economies on a rapid privatisation program without some assurance that all
necessary prerequisite policies have been put into place. Since share offering has
been China's major privatisation strategy, it is essential to examine whether those
firms that went public in the past have gained economic efficiency after their partial
share issue privatisation and identify obstacles in performance improvement. Vickers
and Yarrow (1991) argue that what holds for a developed, market-based economy
may not hold for a developing country, especially less for an economy emerging
from decades of state control. Therefore the success or failure of privatisation is not
only related to privatisation programme itself, but also often closely related to the
function of a nation's institutional settings34 and economic environment as a whole.
Until these institutional setting are identified and implemented and the interaction
between various economic policy options are established, launching a large-scale
privatisation program will eventually be possible in China.
34 Part of these issues are discussed in Chapter 2 (pp6) - corporate governance survey.
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Chapter 5 Research Design & Methodology:
Methods, Sampling & Data Collection
This chapter will present the research methodologies be taken.
• Firstly the two traditional research paradigms - quantitative and qualitative research
methods - will be discussed.
• Then the research methods employed in this thesis will be presented, evaluated and
assessed.
The intended audience of this research includes all the relevant groups of policy-makers
or decision-takers in government agencies, managers in the public and private sectors,
and investors. The findings of the effect of partial share issue privatisation on firm
performance in China should provide valuable guidance to government officials,
domestic and foreign investors, SOE managers and financial economists or researchers
inside and outside China.
5.1 Quantitative and Qualitative Research Methods
Both quantitative and qualitative research methods are considered in this thesis.
5.1.1 Quantitative Research Method
Bryman (1990) suggests that quantitative research is often conceptualised by its
practitioners as having a logical structure in which theories determine the problems to
which researchers address themselves in the form of hypotheses derived from general
theories. These hypotheses are invariably assumed to take the form of expectations about
likely causal connections between the concepts that are the constituent elements of the
hypotheses. Warshay (1975) further suggests that quantitative research tends to comprise
the examination of concepts, which are hardly derived from some prior theory. He
argues that literature review about previous research in relation to a particular concept or
cluster of concepts, which is a standard precursor to the presentation of the results of a
piece of quantitative research, is often used as substitute for a prior body of theory.
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Therefore, hypotheses, when constructed, are often not derived from a theory as such but
from a body of literature relating to a concept.
There is growing empirical evidence documenting post-privatisation performance
improvements and how privatisation affects a firm's financial and operating
performance within the wide spread of privatisation programmes around the world,
including those in transition economies. In fact there is no general theory in privatisation
study, but some concepts have been established in previous research in relation to the
effects of privatisation on firms' financial performance world-wide, and most research
document that privatisation does improve firms' financial performance. Hence, these
concepts are seen as major focuses and the point of departure for this thesis.
Quantitative research is associated with a number of different approaches to data
collection, such as secondary data, survey and experimental data collection. In this
thesis, secondary data such as accounting data and stock market share price data are
collected to examine firms' financial performance; survey data are collected to examine
firms' corporate governance change after partial share issue privatisation.
5.1.1.1 Secondary Data Analysis
Bryman (1990) regards secondary analysis as the re-analysis of data collected by other
researchers or organisations. It offers the advantages of speed and relatively low costs
compared to other types of study, and the ground to be covered can be specified fairly
precisely before the project is started. The disadvantage is that the scope and depth of
the study will be constrained by the material already available. Since the reliability of
accounting data in transition economies is highly arguable, the selection of the sample
and when the data were published will be carefully considered in order to achieve
maximum reliability. In addition, in social sciences, business issues like corporate




Kerlinger (1964) suggests that survey research is typified by the collection of data from
a population, or some sample drawn from it, to assess the relative incidence, distribution
and interrelationships of naturally occurring phenomena. Bryman (1990) regards survey
research as the collection of data on a number of units and usually at a single juncture in
time, with a view to collecting systematically a body of quantifiable data in respect of a
number of variables which are then examined to discern patterns of association.
Apparently, the emphasis on quantification, on variables and on sampling from
populations shows how survey research shares a basically similar scientific nature of
experiment research.
Yin (1994) argues that it is advantageous when the research goal is to describe the
incidence or prevalence of a phenomenon or when it is to be predictive about certain
outcomes. Robson (1996) further suggests that it may be that in non-laboratory
situations where experiments are often neither feasible nor ethically defensible, surveys
give that reassuring scientific ring of confidence. In this thesis, the set goal is to examine
the prevalence of corporate governance change in partially privatised firms, and seek to
predict the effect of IPO on corporate governance of partially privatised firms as a
whole.
But Robson (1996) argues that on the one hand, there is a problem of internal validity
where the survey questions are either incomprehensible or ambiguous, or where valid
information about respondents and what they are thinking, feeling or whatever cannot be
obtained. On the other hand, if the sampling is faulty, external validity cannot be
achieved and the failure in generalising research findings is unavoidable. Finally, lack of
relation between attitude and behaviour of respondents is another cause of failure to
achieve external validity. Therefore the survey questions and their ordering are carefully
designed and samples are carefully selected from the population to overcome the
problems of internal and external validity. Robson (1996) suggests that reliability can be
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achieved by presenting all respondents with the same standardised questions, carefully
worded after piloting. It is then possible to obtain high reliability of response.
A survey can try to deal with phenomena and context, but its ability to investigate the
context is extremely limited in terms of limited numbers of variables to be analysed.
Because phenomenon and context are not always distinguishable in real-life situations,
the data collection and analysis strategies need to be added by quality method such as
case study. Therefore, a survey might be complemented by a small number of case
studies to either confirm the findings or throw further light on the associations found in
the survey study and provide analytic generalisation.
5.1.2 Qualitative Research Method
Bryman (1990) suggests that the most fundamental characteristic of qualitative research
is its express commitment to viewing events, action, norms, values, etc. from the
perspective of the people who are being studied. In other words, it refers to an approach
to the study of the social world that seeks to describe and analyse the culture and
behaviour of humans and their groups from the point of view of those being studied. The
methods of data collection associated with qualitative research involve participant
observation, unstructured interview, group discussion etc. In this thesis, semi-structured
interview is employed to investigate the effect of IPO on corporate governance practice
in newly privatised firms.
5.1.2.1 Case Study
Robson (1996) defines case study as a strategy for doing research, which involves an
empirical investigation of a particular contemporary phenomenon within its real life
context using multiple sources of evidence. Valsiner (1986) claims that the study of
individual cases has always been the major (albeit often unrecognised) strategy in the
advancement of knowledge about human beings. In a similar vein, Bromeley (1986)
maintains that 'the individual case study or situation analysis is the bed-rock of scientific
investigation'. Case study contributes uniquely to our knowledge of individual,
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organisational, social and political phenomena. Yin (1994) regards case study as
advantageous when a 'how' or 'why' question is being asked about a contemporary set
of events over which the investigator has little or no control, and when the focus is on a
contemporary phenomenon within some real-life context.
Given the dynamic of economic development in China's transitional economy, in depth
case studies are required to find out the effects of IPO on corporate governance and
management, the reasons why financial performance changes in a certain direction and
how corporate governance change affects firms' post-privatisation performance. The
unique strength of case studies is their ability to deal with a full variety of evidence -
documents, artefacts, interviews and observations. The two sources of evidence - direct
observation and systematic interviewing - can be achieved through in depth case studies.
In addition, firms' documents are used to enrich the findings of the case studies.
One concern about case studies is that they provide little basis for scientific
generalisation. Yin (1994) argues that like experiments, case studies are generalisable to
theoretical propositions and not to populations or universes. In this sense, case studies
like experiments do not represent a sample, and researchers' goal is to expand and
generalise theories (analytic generalisation) instead of enumerating frequencies
(statistical generalisation).
5.1.3 Combining Qualitative and Quantitative Methods - Triangulation
Denzin (1988) defines triangulation as the 'combination of methodologies in the study
of the sample phenomenon. Many researchers believe that quantitative and qualitative
research are simply denotations of different ways of conducting social investigations
which may be conceived as being integrated; in other words, they are simply different
approaches to data collection. Hakim (1987) argues that quantitative and qualitative
research are different ways of conducting research and that the choice between them
should be made in terms of their appropriateness in answering particular research
questions. Jick (1979) also suggests that qualitative and quantitative methods should be
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viewed as complementary methodologies; and for the organisational researcher, this
would involve the use ofmultiple methods to examine the same dimension of a research
problem.
Through combining quantitative and quantitative and qualitative methods, this thesis
tends to answer the question of the effect of IPO or partial share issue privatisation on
firm performance, which can be achieved through combined methods by:
• Evaluating firms' performance change through financial data analysis;
• Examining the determinants of firms' performance changes after IPO and the
relationship between firms' post-IPO share price return and accounting performance
through financial data analysis.
• Examining the effect of IPO on corporate management and corporate governance
through survey study and case study analysis.
5.2 Research Methods
5.2.1 Secondary Data Analysis
Firstly, MNR (Megginson, Nash & van Randenborgh) methodology will be discussed;
then five major methodological problems such as time period to be studied, sources of
data, defined variables, unit of measurement, testable predictions and regression models
will be demonstrated accordingly.
5.2.1.1 Design Comparative Studies - MNR Methodology
As mentioned earlier, there are two representative methodologies in testing the benefits
of private as opposed to state ownership of firms, and MNR methodology is one of
them. Megginson, Nash and Van Randenborgh first employed MNR methodology in
their international empirical analysis of the performance of newly privatised firms.
Megginson et al (1994) compare the pre-privatisation and post-privatisation financial
and operating performance of 61 companies from 18 countries that experienced full or
partial privatisation through public share offerings during the period 1961 to 1990, and
document strong performance improvements in a given firm's operations following
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privatisation. This methodology is subsequently widely employed by other researchers
in privatisation studies, including Boubakri et al (1998), Chen et al (2000), D'Souza et al
(2001) and Dewenter et al (2001). Because the comparisons are drawn between pre-
privatisation and post-privatisation financial performance of the same group of firms,
only one (matched) sample has to be selected. On the other hand, the competing
methodology is the one employed by Boardman and Vining (1989), who examine the
economic performance of the 500 largest non-US industrial firms in 1983 through
comparing the performance of government-owned to privately owned companies. The
results show that state-owned and mixed (state and private) ownership enterprises are
significantly less profitable and productive than are privately owned firms. Because the
comparisons are drawn between state-owned, mixed and private-owned firms, three
independent samples have to be selected.
So, which methodology should be employed in this thesis?
In comparative sample studies, there is often the opportunity to choose between two
alternative designs called independent samples and matched samples as mentioned
above. In principle one would like to choose the design that, for given cost, leads to
smaller sampling errors. Neter (1988) suggests that the matched-sample method will
lead to a smaller sampling error. The general principle is that if the observations before
and after (certain event) are positively related, the method involving matched
observations will lead to smaller sampling errors than the use of the independent sample.
Matched samples need not always involve the same sample elements; elements with
similar characteristics may be paired in advance of the experiment. Therefore, MNR
methodology seems advantageous technically because it uses a matched sample to
investigate the effect of IPO on firm performance.
One may argue that Boardman et al's methodology is advantageous because it directly
compares state-owned firms with comparable privately owned firms. But the most
obvious challenge with this methodology is the difficulty in setting the proper
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benchmarks to choose private firms that are comparable with state-owned firms. In the
context of China, state-owned firms generally are larger in terms of firm size,
employment and investment etc., while privately owned firms are generally smaller
given the new growing private sector. In addition, the law does not require the disclosure
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of financial information of private firms. Article 2 of Company Law states that "The
term 'company' as mentioned in this law refers to a limited liability company or a joint
stock limited company...". Since private firms are mainly sole ownership or partnership,
they are not regulated by Company Law. Financial information disclosure is only
required for public listed firms and it is regarded as highly confidential for private firms
and in principle not accessible for general public. All these factors suggest that
Boardman et al's methodology is practically not feasible in the study of China.
But Frydman et al (1997) argue the 'historical' approach of MNR can suffer from the
difficulty of sorting out a potential variety of causal factors. Pre- vs. post-privatisation
performance comparisons are more meaningful if they involve privatisation programmes
through which significant numbers of state companies are transferred to the private
sector. Such programmes, however, usually come as part of broader shifts in economic
policies, often including, in addition to privatisation, such changes as tighter financial
discipline and a reduction in subsidies. As a result, it is difficult if not impossible to
separate the effect of new ownership from the impact of the new policies. Moreover,
traditional privatisation programmes frequently involve significant injections of funds
into firms to be privatised and are usually preceded by extensive preparation during
which management and organisational structures are revamped. The impact of this
preparation may well account for some of the post-privatisation performance
improvements and clouds the impact of ownership change on firm performance
(Frydman et al 1997). Following the same line, Vickers and Yarrow (1991) argue that
some of the difficulties facing empirical analysis must be noted, such as the difficulties
in distinguishing between the effects on efficiency of changes in ownership, competition
35
Company Law of the People's Republic of China (1993).
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and regulatory policies. In China, organisational reconstructing is required for all firms
before going public with tighter financial discipline and reduction in subsidies, which
are essential steps for SOEs to go public because historically modem corporation
structure and financing structure were not in place in Chinese SOEs. These pre-IPO
policies are essential elements of the newly introduced corporate governance, such as
board of directors and financing structure etc. Therefore the effect of these new policies
is just one important part of the effect of IPO on firms' corporate governance practice.
Megginson et al (2000) suggest that studies employing MNR methodology have two key
advantages. On the one hand, since they focus on post-IPO versus pre-IPO performance
changes of firms privatised through share issue privatisation, they can examine and
directly compare large samples of economically significant companies, from different
industries, privatised in different countries, over different time periods. On the other
hand, because each company is compared to itself (post- versus pre-privatisation), using
simple, inflation-adjusted sales and income data that produce results in simple
percentages, this methodology allows one to efficiently aggregate multi-national, multi-
industry results. In practice, this advantage can be a drawback because different
countries have specific macro and micro economic conditions as well as different
institutional settings36. It should be in caution to pool data from different countries
together to conduct cross-country analysis, but this is less relevant in a single country
study. A single country study can overcome the problem of various accounting standards
and practice in different countries, but the amount and quality of information disclosed
can only be based on current practice in that country, especially in transition economies,
where the disclosure of financial information is a new phenomenon. Furthermore, the
possibility of sample selection bias can arise from several sources, including the desire
for governments to make privatisation "look good" by privatising the healthiest
companies first.
36 Most important of these is that accounting standards and practice differ in different countries, which
directly affects the comparison of firm performance.
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Megginson et al (2000) also admit that there are difficult methodological problems with
research in privatisation study. One important problem is that of data availability and
consistency. The amount of information that must be disclosed is much less in most
countries than in the United States, and these standards vary from country to country
over time. A large literature in accounting has shown that management can manipulate
U.S. accounting data, and this problem is probably greater for international companies,
as well as those in transition economies. In this thesis, it must be emphasised, firstly,
accounting information quality is improved by selecting IPO firms in desired listing
years. Secondly, the sample firms do not necessarily represent all SOEs national wide,
but only those listed at domestic "A" share market, which is the major platform for
SOEs to go public. In addition, no matter what performance these SOEs used to achieve,
the main focus of the thesis is on to what extent that IPO or share issue privatisation has
an impact on firms' overall financial performance and corporate governance.
Galal et al (1992) and Barberis et al (1996) suggest that there are also many problems in
measuring performance changes that arise from using accounting or stock data,
including determining the correct measure of operating performance, selecting an
appropriate benchmark with which to compare performance, and determining the
appropriate statistical tests to use. Finally, Megginson et al (2000) suggest that the
finance literature has not reached a consensus on the ways to deal with these problems
for U.S. companies, much less for privatised international companies. Therefore, the
results of each of the studies must be kept in perspective. The above view provides
strong arguments for choosing a proper methodology in a specific country study in terms
of determining performance measurements, selecting comparison benchmarks, and
performing statistical tests accordingly.
In sum, technical and practical considerations lead to the conclusion that MNR
methodology will be employed to examine pre- versus post-IPO financial performance
change of listed firms.
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5.2.1.2 Sampling
This thesis limits the analysis to those firms that went public through share issues in
1997 and 1998 at the Shanghai Stock Exchange A share market.
(1) Sampling Strategies
Sample selection is the first crucial step towards data collection, in which proper
sampling strategies should be developed.
• Share Issue Privatisation
07
Firstly, share issue privatisation (SIP) is the main privatisation method in China.
There are a few private sales, which are basically in fact government arrangements to
transfer assets and employees of one SOE to another, not private sales in the developed
markets. In China, the large and most economically significant SOEs are partially
privatised through share issue38, not through private sale. Megginson et al (1994) argue
that firms sold publicly are by far the most visible and politically sensitive of all
privatisations, and it is the public's perception of their post-divestment operating
performance that will determine whether the entire privatisation programme is judged a
success or a failure. The Chinese government prefers SIP to private sales because SIP
offers the chance to test the results of partial privatisation39 and then can subsequently
boost both government and pubic confidence in privatisation.
• Shanghai Stock Exchange's A Share Market
Shares are classified as domestic (A share) and foreign (B share, H share, N share and L
share) by the shareholder's residency, in which the first targets domestic investors with
Chinese Yuan as the trading currency and the others target foreign investors with foreign
currencies as the trading currency. The A-share market is the main platform for Chinese
SOEs to go public, and there are rare cases where foreign investors invest in the
37 Share Issue Privatisation (SIP) is interchangeable with Initial Public Offering (IPO) in this thesis.
38 China Security Regulation Committee (CSRC) website: http//www.csrc.org.cn
39 This gradual approach did gain wide support among public at the early years of SIP programme but not
in recent years because of listed firms' poor financial performance and corporate governance.
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domestic A share market as legal person shareholders. For the B-share market, just 54
firms listed till the end of 1998 at the Shanghai Stock Exchange, and no firm went public
in 2001 and 2002. The following table 5.1 shows the number of firms that went public
over the years 1991-98 in both the A-share and B-share markets at the Shanghai Stock
Exchange.
Table 5.1 Number of Companies Listed at the Shanghai Stock Exchange
This table presents the number of Chinese companies that went public in the A-share and B-share
market over years till the end of 1998 at the Shanghai Stock Exchange.
Total 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98
A-Share 423 7 22 71 67 15 103 85 53
B-Share 54 - 9 12 12 2 6 8 2
For overseas listings, there are just a few firms listed in Hong Kong, the US, London and
Singapore. The following table 5.2 shows the numbers of firms that went public outside
Mainland China till year-end of 1998.
Table 5.2 Number of Chinese Companies Listed Overseas
This table presents the number of Chinese companies listed overseas till the end of 1998 at
HKEx** (including dual listed at LSE**, NYSE** and NASDAQ**), and solely listed at
NYSE** and SES**.
Total 92 93 94 95 96 97 98







* Of 41 firms, 8 firms are dual listed in the US as American Depository Receipts (ADRs),
2 firms are dual listed in London as GDRs.
** HKEx: Hong Kong Exchange
LSE: London Stock Exchange
NYSE: New York Stock Exchange
NASDAQ: National Association of Securities Dealers' Automated Quotation
SES: Stock Exchange of Singapore
Sources: Datastream; China Securities Regulatory Commission (www.csrc.org.cn)
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The main focus of this thesis is the A Share market because it is the major platform for
Chinese SOEs to go public. There are two stock exchanges in China - Shanghai Stock
Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange - both have A share markets40. The latter has
acted as a regional market since its establishment (and is becoming more national)41 and
the former has always acted as a national market since its establishment, so its listed
firms are more representative nation-wide. Therefore the sample for this thesis will be
selected from the Shanghai Stock Exchange A share market.
• Accounting Issues
Accounting regulation in China experienced a significant change in 1997. The newly
introduced Stock Company42 Accounting Regulation requires listed firms to provide
standard financial statements43 and this new accounting standard was put into effect on
the 1st January 1998. The new accounting regulation can be seen as a Chinese version of
International Accounting Standards but with Chinese characteristics due to different
business practice. Listed firms are required to publish balance sheet, profit and loss
account and other notes to the accounts and any statements of the principles or
assumption on which they have been prepared in their financial reports. Coming into
effect on the 1st January 2001, the Stock Company Accounting Regulation was further
revised as Enterprise44 Accounting Regulation, and cash flow statements are required for
the public firms due to changes in business practice and the needs to meet the gap
between Chinese accounting standards and IAS.
40 Cross listing between these two markets is not permitted.
41 China Securities Regulatory Committee (CSRC) website: http//www.csrc.org.cn
42 Stock company refers to those companies with limited liabilities, no matter they are listed on the stock
exchange or not.
43 The new accounting regulation is based on International Accounting Standard (IAS) and it was
introduced in A share (domestic) market for the first time, while it was introduced in B share market in
1993, according to Financial Times International Accounting Survey 1999, David Cairns, LSE London.
44
Enterprise refers to any stock company, which is set up in China, except small-scale businesses and
financial insurance companies.
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The accounting information based on new regulation is a crucial element in sample
selection criteria. The accounting regulation change in 1997 made the financial reports
published after 1997 fundamentally different from those published before 1997, with
stricter accounting rules and better accounting information based on International
Accounting Standards. Equally important, more recent years' information reflects better
accounting practice and information disclosure in accordance with capital market
development, corporate governance improvement and government legislation in China.
Therefore three years pre-IPO accounting information published in IPO prospectus and
post-IPO accounting information are all based on new conventions and more reliable
after 1997, and comparable pre- and post-IPO accounting data can be collected.
Consequently firms that went public from 1997 onwards will be chosen as potential
sample firms.
• The Amount of Accounting Information
In order to evaluate the corporate financial performance change, the financial accounts
of three years pre- and post-IPO are collected, and performance analysis includes the
comparison between the average three years post-IPO performance and average three
years pre-IPO performance. Given that sample firms must have at least three years post-
IPO financial accounts till the end of 2001, firms that went public no later than 1998 fit
this criterion. Therefore, the sample ends up with 85 and 53 firms that went public (A
share) in 1997 and 1998 respectively at the Shanghai Stock Exchange, within which
there is no dead or delisted firm.
(2) Main Sample
Shanghai Stock Exchange database provides only post-IPO financial accounts while
Shenzhen Stock Exchange database provides both pre- and post-IPO financial accounts
for firms listed at both exchanges. Within the 85 and 53 companies that went public in
1997 and 1998 respectively, financial accounts of 9 firms are not fully available from
either database, and therefore these firms are excluded from data analysis.
Crosschecking is conducted between the two databases during the data collection
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process. Two firms' financial accounts in their respective years are not consistent in the
two databases and they are excluded from the data analysis. Unfortunately, relevant
annual reports of these 11 firms cannot be found. Excluding the above mentioned 11
firms, the sample under study finally ends up with 127 firms - which is called main
sample in this thesis.
Table 5.3 Sector Distribution of the Main Sample Firms
Total No.
Sector
Commercial Industrial Miscellaneous Real Estate Utility
Firms listed at Shanghai
Stock Exchange 'A' share
market till year-end 1998
423 48 248 84 9 34
Main Sample Firms 127 2 82 33 0 10
It is noted that there are just 2 firms from the commercial sector and none from the real
estate sector in the main sample firms. As shown in table 5.3, the commercial sector
accounts for a relatively small proportion of listed firms and there are just 2 firms in this
sector listed during the period 1997-1998. Meanwhile, only 9 firms in the real estate
sector are listed at the end of 1998 at the Shanghai Stock Exchange. The nearly absence
of real estate firms is the result of that China's State Council banned the listings of real
estate firms in 1993 amid rampant speculations in the property market (Hong Kong
Trade Development Council 2001 )45. Manufacturing firms have traditionally played a
key role in China's economy and therefore they take the largest proportion of the listed
firms.
(3) Minor Sample
Also, the original accounting dataset may be extended by the addition of data to provide
a broader, objective and more comprehensive basis for the main sample firms' financial
performance analysis and an overall assessment of findings on thesis questions. The IPO
firms in the main sample have almost identical seven years of pre-IPO and post-IPO
45 On 15lh January 2001, the CSRC put an end to the ban on listings by real estate firms.
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performance window period, the question arising is whether the main sample firms'
financial performance changes are the result of the economic cycle in that period or the
effect of IPO. In order to confirm the existence of IPO effect, a further financial
performance analysis of 100 non-IPO firms listed at the Shanghai Stock Exchange along
with those IPO firms at the end of 1998 is undertaken to clarify whether these non-IPO
firms perform differently from those IPO (main sample) firms. If non-IPO firms perform
significantly differently from IPO firms during the similar seven-year window period,
IPO is proved to have effect on firm performance. This sample of non-IPO firms is
referred to as the minor sample throughout this thesis.
In selecting minor sample firms, main sample firms (IPO firms) are firstly excluded
from all firms listed at the end of 1998. Then minor sample firms are selected from the
firms left based on the following three principles. Firstly, the minor sample firms should
cover the same proportion of sectors as those of main sample firms, and more
specifically, the same proportion within industry classifications set by Datastream within
each sector46. Secondly, firms should also have comparable sales size or asset size with
those of the main sample firms. Thirdly, an effort is made to ensure that these firms
cover a wide range of IPO years from 1991 to 1996 (main sample firms that went public
in 1997 and 1998 are excluded) to improve their representativeness of the population.
Table 5.4 Sector Distribution of Main Sample & Minor Sample Firms
Total No.
Sector
Commercial Industrial Miscellaneous Real Estate Utility
Main Sample Firms 127 2 82 33 0 10
Minor Sample Firms 100 2 65 28 0 5
46 Datastream does not assign sector classification for Chinese listed firms, instead, it uses five sectors
defined by the Shanghai Stock Exchange.
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The characteristics of main sample firms and minor samples at the end of 199747 are
summarised in the following table 5.5.
Table 5.5 Statistics of Main Sample & Minor Sample Firms
This table summarises statistics of some basic characteristics of main sample (at the end
of 1996/1997) and minor sample firms (at the end of 1996). SALES represents
sales size, ASIZE represents asset size. CYm represents Chinese Yuan in millions
(the exchange between UK pound and Chinese is 1:13 in June 2003) .
SALES ASIZE SALES ASIZE
Main Sample (CYm) (CYm) Minor Sample (CYm) (CYm)
Mean 646 825 Mean 732 1315
Median 312 384 Median 273 577
Std.D 1157 2238 Std.D 1482 2761
Min 33 78 Min 18 140
Max 8513 23042 Max 12203 19025
Valid Cases 127 127 Valid Cases 100 100
The statistics in table 5.5 show that main sample firms and minor sample firms are
comparable with each other in terms of mean and median values of both sales size and
asset size, given the same proportion of sector distribution shown in table 5.4 (pp90).
5.2.1.3 Data Collection
It should be made clear that financial accounts collected are those originally published
immediately after the respective fiscal year, not subsequent adjusted accounts presented
in the following year's financial reports. For example, if firms publish their 1998
financial reports in early 1999 for the fiscal year of 1998 (from 1st January 1998 to 31st
December 1998), financial accounts in 1998 financial reports are recognised as original
ones and are collected for data analysis. Many firms do make some adjustments to
previous year's financial accounts at the time of publishing their current year's financial
reports. Since it is very difficult to justify appropriateness of these adjustments, the
47 The post-1997 versus pre-1997 performance changes of minor sample firms are compared with post-
IPO versus pre-IPO performance changes of main sample firms.
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official database categorises financial accounts published in the respective fiscal year's
financial report as original ones; not the subsequent amended ones in the following
year's financial report.
(1) Data Sources
Datastream does not provide financial reports and accounting related ratios, such as
price/earnings ratio (P/E ratio), but only historical share price for firms listed at China's
two stock exchanges. Therefore firms' financial reports are collected from the Shanghai
Stock Exchange database and the database company managed by the Shenzhen Stock
Exchange. The Shanghai Stock Exchange database provides company financial reports
only from 1998, which may indicate that Shanghai Stock Exchange regards later years'
accounting practice and information, especially after the new accounting regulation, as
more reliable than that for previous years. This strongly supports the rationale behind the
sample selection procedures described above. In short, accounting data are obtained
48from the CSRC authorised database provider-Shenzhen Stock Exchange database
company - Shenzhen JuChao Information Services, Shanghai Stock Exchange database,
company annual reports, Shanghai Stock Exchange YearBook and other relevant
websites and data sources. Firm share prices, market information and sector
classifications are obtained from Datastream. GDP data are obtained from Datastream.
(2) Missing data
For unknown reasons, some firms' data are not fully available from the stock exchange
database. For the main sample (IPO firms), within the original 138 IPO firms, 9 firms'
financial accounts are not fully available and as mentioned earlier, they are excluded
from the main sample. There is no missing value in the financial accounts of the 127
main sample firms. For the minor sample (non-IPO) firms, all financial accounts are
available and there is no missing value.




Errors in the database do appear. During the data collection process, crosschecking is
conducted between the Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange
databases to identify whether any firm's financial accounts are presented differently. In
fact 2 firms emerge with differences and therefore they are excluded from the main
sample firms (IPO firms).
5.2.2 Survey Study
5.2.2.1 Sampling
The most concerns in survey study design are sampling and questionnaire design as well
as proper ordering of questions. Samples should be representative of the population and
a well-designed questionnaire could improve information collection. In this thesis,
sample selection is based on three principles. Firstly, the sample firms should cover the
same proportion of sectors as those of all listed firms in Shanghai Stock Exchange.
Table 5.6 Sample Firms Chosen for Survey Study
Total
Sector
Commercial Industrial Miscellaneous Real Estate Utility
Firms listed at Shanghai
Stock Exchange 'A'
share market till year
end 2000
557 57 340 103 10 47
Survey Sample Firms 243 26 143 48 2 24
Secondly, firms should be geographically located around China; in other words, sample
firms should be concentrated on neither developed coastal areas nor under-developed
western part. All sample firms spread around north, south, west and east of China
covering the majority of provinces. Finally, sample firms should also cover all different




Semi-structured questionnaire contains two parts: open-ended questions and close-ended
questions 49 Open-ended questions are designed to generate maximum information from
the respondents and to encourage the respondents to express their own opinions freely
without constraints of specific options provided in the questionnaires. Close-ended
questions are designed to collect standardised answers. In addition, both open-ended and
close-ended questions are designed not to be too sensitive to answer, or too ambiguous
to draw the line and definition.
The questions are mainly corporate governance related issues and designed to be short
so as to improve response rate. In the open-ended questions in part one, issues like
purpose of going public, objectives of the firms, state influence after going public, firm
level changes after going public and communication with financial community are
presented. In the close-ended questions in part two, issues like assets and debt
restructuring before going public, the role of board chairman and chief executive officer,
executive turnover and performance-related pay are raised.
5.2.2.3 Data Collection & Limitations
Using a designed questionnaire, a simple sample survey was conducted to collect
standardised data from a representative sample of 243 firms derived from all firms listed
at the Shanghai Stock Exchange at the end of 2000. A pilot survey study was conducted
in June 2001 with 28 randomly chosen firms to improve survey questions, but only 5
firms responded. The formal survey was conducted in July 2001, and the response rate
was only 9%, in which within 243 firms, only 20 firms responded. Because of the low
response rate, the data from survey study is summarised in appendix 13.1 (pp308) and
13.2 (pp317) as reference.
49 See appendix 5.2 (pp293-294) for survey questionnaires.
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5.2.3 Case Study
Prior to any data collection, the decision must be made of how cases are going to be
used to address research questions. Silverman (2000) suggests that five components of
case study design are especially important, namely research questions, propositions,
units of analysis, pattern matching and criterion for interpreting findings. In this thesis,
the research question is how and why corporate governance changes after going public.
The proposition is that, if there is a change in corporate governance, it may lead to
change in performance. It is intended to find logic that links interview data to the
propositions through pattern-matching and finally reach the successful interpretation of
case study findings. A pilot study was conducted to reveal inadequacies in the initial
design of case study questions. The flexibility of case study designs is in selecting cases
different from those initially identified, not in changing the purpose or objectives of the
study to suit the cases that were found.
5.2.3.1 Sampling
Sampling strategy was developed through the following steps. Firstly, cases were chosen
from different regions in China - north, east and southwest - to make them more
representative national-wide. Secondly, the wide range of listing years and various
sectors are emphasised. One limitation is that there is a tendency for well performing
firms to accept interviews, but not those badly performing ones.
5.2.3.2 Semi-Structured Interview Questions
The case study strategy was developed as semi-structured interviews with structured
questions and open discussion. Semi-structured interview allows maximum data
collection and focusing on questions under investigation, while open discussion allows
interviewees to offer their valuable insights with maximum free information flow. In
addition, company annual reports are used as references. The semi-structured interview
questions50 are based on three related issues: going public, the effect of IPO on corporate
50 See appendix 5.4 (pp296) for semi-structured interview questions.
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management and the effect of IPO on corporate governance, and they are listed as
follows:
1. Going Public Issues:
What are the main changes resulting from going public?
What is the major state influence on your firm, has there been a change in state
influence after going public?
2. The effect ofIPO on Corporate Management:
What are the major challenges in improving financial performance? Any
solution?
Has the firm's asset quality improved? Any good experience or lesson?
Has the firm's cash management improved? Any good experience or lesson?
How does the firm conduct strategic management, investment and market
research?
3. The Effect of IPO on Corporate Governance:
Does the current corporate governance system work? Any solution?
How do you evaluate the roles of independent supervisors and independent
directors?
How do you describe the relationship between the board of directors and
shareholders (especially small and medium shareholders)?
How does the firm communicate with the financial analysts and its shareholders
(especially small and medium investors)?
How do you evaluate performance-related pay and its design? Is there any
practice in the firm?
These three issues are closely related, because IPO has effects on corporate governance
and corporate management, and corporate governance change is an important factor in
driving corporate management change. Consequently, when some effects of IPO on
corporate governance cannot be observed directly, they can then be reflected through the
96
corporate management change. Therefore several corporate management related issues
are also incorporated into interview questions.
5.2.3.3 Data Collection & Limitations
Case studies are typically based on two or more methods of data collection. The use of
multiple sources of evidence allowed case studies to present more rounded and complete
accounts of social issues and processes. The fieldwork for case studies may incorporate
the analysis of administrative records and other documents, in-depth interviews,
participant and non-participant observation and collecting virtually any type of evidence
that is relevant and available. Prior to the interviews, faxes with the attached structured
questions were sent out to the targeted companies, and normally senior executives were
asked for an hour interview, in which some structured and informal questions would be
asked. According to actual circumstances and time available, executives could also
discuss other issues in which they were interested after the scheduled interview.
The original interview data were firstly transcribed into Chinese, and then translated into
English. In order to achieve minimum loss of information, a further crosschecking
between English and Chinese transcripts was conducted and the final transcripts came
into being. There are some considerations in data collection. There may be large blocks
of missing data which present serious problems for further analysis if interviewees are
not familiar with some specific firm issues. For reasons of confidentiality, some
information revealed during interview may not be allowed to be revealed to a third party
or be produced in any written form.
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5.2.3.4 Data Analysis
Since the cases studies are based on semi-structured interview questions, the general
pattern is not difficult to detect and the data are characterised as three main topics: going
public issue, the effect of IPO on corporate management and the effect of IPO on
corporate governance. The detailed case study transcripts are written following these
three topics, and the main themes are identified for further analysis, which will be
further discussed in case study analysis in chapter 11 and chapter 12.
5.3 Summary
This chapter presents the details of the research methodologies employed in this thesis.
Firstly the two traditional research paradigms - quantitative and qualitative research
methods - are discussed. Then the research methods employed in this thesis are
presented, evaluated and assessed. In secondary data analysis, MNR methodology,
sampling and data collection are discussed. In survey study, sampling, questionnaire
design, data collection and limitations are discussed. In case study, sampling, semi-
structured interview questions and data collection and limitations are discussed. Because
of the low response rate, the results from the survey studies are summarised in appendix
13.1 (pp308) and 13.2 (pp317) as reference.
Next chapter further demonstrates detailed methodologies used in hypotheses testing,
performance change analysis and regression analysis.
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Chapter 6 Research Design & Methodology: Hypotheses Testing,
Performance Change Analysis & Regression Analysis
This chapter further demonstrates the methods employed in hypotheses testing,
performance change analysis and regression analysis.
6.1 Performance Proxies
Before conducting hypothesis tests, performance proxies are categorised as fundamental
and supplementary performance proxies.
• Fundamental performance proxies are based on accounting performance measures
and are available for both pre-IPO and post-IPO years.
• Supplementary performance proxies include both accounting and market
performance measures that are available for only post-IPO years since cash flow
statements and share price data are available for only post-IPO years.
In order to compare post- versus pre-IPO performance changes, performance proxies
must be examined. Firstly, fundamental performance proxies are defined, and then
supplementary performance proxies in terms of cash flow and share price related
performance measures are also defined and the choice of performance proxies in other
studies is further discussed. Secondly, in order to test whether post- versus pre-IPO
performance changes are significant or not, testable predictions are presented, and
specific hypothesis test methods are evaluated and explained.
6.1.1 Fundamental Performance Proxies
Following Megginson et al (1994) methodology by comparing pre- and post-IPO firms'
performance, performance proxies employed are profitability, output and leverage
measures, in which profitability is measured by return on sales, return on assets and
return on equity; output is measured by real sales and leverage is measured by total debt
and long-term debt ratio. All these performance proxies are widely employed in
privatisation studies, such as Megginson et al (1994), Xu et al (1997), D'Souza et al
(2000), Chen et al (2000) etc.
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• Profitability
In terms of profitability measures, return on sales, return on assets and return on equity
are three basic and well-recognised profitability measures in finance literature.
• Output
Output is measured by deflated and normalised nominal sales; in other words, each
year's nominal sales are deflated by the respective year's consumer price index and
normalised by the firm's real sales on the year of IPO. The purpose of deflation and
normalisation is to improve comparability of each year's real sales. Megginson et al
(1994) argue that better incentives, more flexible financing opportunities, increased
competition and greater scope for entrepreneurial initiative after going public could lead
to increased real sales. But one may argue that unlike profitability measures, real sales
may not be a meaningful performance measure in that it is an absolute measure, and
small firms may generate low sales and large firms may generate high sales. The reason
for choosing this absolute measure is that Chinese SOEs used to emphasise output in the
past, so output might be regarded as a straightforward performance indicator for newly
listed firms. Meanwhile, because this performance measure is simple and
straightforward, unsophisticated private investors may depend on it to guide their
investment in the stock markets. This question will be further investigated through a
regression analysis of firms' post-IPO stock market performance against post-IPO
accounting performance in chapter 10.
• Leverage
Leverage is measured by total debt (LEVI) and long-term debt ratios (LEV2). On the
one hand, concern should be put on firms' long-term debt since it is a reflection of debt
management policy, while short-term debt is constantly changing and it is more or less a
reflection of trade practice in the short run. Traditionally Chinese SOEs are highly long-
term debt financed; therefore it is valuable to examine firms' financing structure after
IPO. Megginson et al (1994) suggest that SOEs' high debt level is at least in part
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because they can not sell equity to private investors, and thus the only forms of "equity"
available to SOEs are capital injections from the government and retained earnings.
• Liquidity
Because most firms are facing challenges of cash management51 and in a situation of
either shortage of cash or with a large amount of cash in hand but without good
investment projects after IPO, it is important to examine the short-term solvency in
terms of liquidity. Two liquidity ratios are examined: quick ratio and net working
capital to total assets. Regarding quick ratio, inventory is often the least liquid current
assets, and some firms may be overstocked by large inventories. Relatively large
inventories are often a sign of short-term trouble in terms of overbuying or
overproduction. Net working capital is also frequently viewed as the amount of short-
term liquidity a firm has and low value indicates low liquidity.
• Operating Efficiency
In line with the argument in Chen et al (2000), employment related efficiency measures
such as sales efficiency are not examined as lack of employment data in Chinese listed
firms. Instead, Chen et al (2000) employ sales to asset turnover to measure sales assets
efficiency. Therefore, sales assets turnover is employed in this thesis to examine firms'
operating efficiency. Chen et al (2000) also point out that changes in dividends, which
are investigated in other studies, are not examined as very few Chinese SOEs paid
dividends prior to the IPOs. For the same reason, dividend payout measures are not
employed in this thesis.
6.1.2 Supplementary Performance Proxies
Firms' cash flow statements are a newly added requirement in new accounting
regulation and they are only available since 1998, in other words, only available for
51 This will be further discussed in case study analysis in Chapter 11 (pp222) and Chapter 12 (pp240).
102
main sample firms' post-IPO years. The cash flow related and share price related
performance measures are defined as supplementary performance proxies.
• Accounting Performance Proxies
Supplementary accounting performance proxies include two capital expenditure related
measures - capital expenditures to assets and capital expenditures to sales. They are
employed by D'Souza et al (2001) and also employed in this thesis to examine capital
expenditure during firms' post-IPO years.
Andrade & Kaplan (1998) investigate the cost of financially distressed firms, and they
employ cash flow margin (net cash flow/total sales) as one of their quantitative operating
performance measures. In accounting practice, net cash flow generation is the main
indicator of a firm's financial health and Chinese listed firms do have problems in
generating cash from their businesses , and therefore cash flow margin is taken as an
important performance measure of firms' cash efficiency for post-IPO years.
• Market Performance Proxies
Supplementary market performance proxies refers to firms' stock market performance
measures which include market to book ratio (MBR), price-earning ratio (PE) and share
price return (Re). Market to book value ratio (MBR) is a firm's market value of equity
divided by book value of equity. In other words, it is the share price on the last trading
day of each year times the number of total outstanding shares on that day, and then
divided by book value of equity. Originally, Tobin's Q, the market value of debt plus the
market value of equity divided by the replacement cost of total assets, has been used as a
major indicator of firm performance. As Xu and Wang (1997) point out, since there are
few Chinese listed firms issue corporate bond, it is almost impossible to estimate the
market value of firms' debt. Therefore Xu and Wang (1997) employ MBR as a
substitute for Tobin's Q to measure firms' performance. Because book value of equity is
an accounting number and reflects historical cost of equity, market to book value ratio
52 Evidence are presented in Chapter 11 (pp222).
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(MBR) in fact compares the market value of a firm's investment to its cost. A ratio
lowers than one means that the firm has not been successful overall in creating value for
its shareholders. Price-earning (P/E) ratio is defined as price per share divided by
earning per share, which measures how much investors are willing to pay for the current
earnings for each share. Higher price earning ratio means firms have significant
prospects for future growth; or very low earnings; or even investors' over-optimism
towards market or firm performance. Share price return (Re) is the difference of share
price on the last trading day and the first trading day of each year, plus dividend
payment, and then divided by share price on the first trading day. Share price returns are
firms' real stock market performance for a given year, while market to book value ratio
and price-earning ratios are mixtures of market and accounting performance measures in
that they incorporate both firms' stock market performance and accounting performance
- share prices with book equity and earnings.
6.1.3 Discussions
(1) Accounting and Market Performance Proxies
Fundamental performance proxies employed incorporate widely used accounting
performance measures in most privatisation studies and other relevant finance
literatures, taking into account availability of data and the nature of the questions to be
answered in this thesis.
Due to data constraints, some accounting and market performance proxies are available
only for the post-IPO period and are defined as supplementary performance proxies.
There are two purposes in examining supplementary performance proxies. Firstly, to
identify if firms' post-IPO market performance in terms of market to book ratio, price
earning ratio and share price return are consistent with firms' post-IPO accounting
performance (including those accounting performance measures in fundamental
performance proxies). Secondly, to further explore the relationship between share price
return (Re) and all post-IPO accounting performance proxies mentioned above in order
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to identify which accounting performance proxies are mostly closely reflected in the
share price return (Re).
(2) Performance Proxies for the Chinese Firms
As mentioned in the privatisation survey (Chapter 4), there are three main privatisation
country studies on China, by Xu and Wang (1997), Chen et al (2000) and Tian (2000).
Chen et al (2000) mainly follow Megginson et al's (1994) methodology by employing
accounting performance measures, while the other two adopt different approaches. As
mentioned earlier, Tobin's Q, the market value of debt plus the market value of equity
divided by the replacement cost of total assets, has been used as a major indicator of
firms' performance. Tian (2000) uses simplified Tobin's Q, which is called Q to replace
Tobin's Q as a measurement of firms' performance to explore the relationship between
firms' value and ownership structures. Q is defined as the sum of market value of equity
and book value of debt over book value of total assets. Xu and Wang (1997) employ
market to book ratio (MBR) to replace Tobin's Q as major measurement of firms'
performance to explore the relationship between firms' performance and ownership
structures. MBR is defined as a firm's market value of equity divided by book value of
equity53.
Both Q and MBR incorporate market value of equity, namely, share price information of
firms' equity. Estrin et al (1999) argue that MBR relies on the market valuation of the
firm and hence the expectation of the financial markets. Its reliability is dependent upon
financial markets being fairly well developed. Given under developed Chinese stock
markets, both MBR and Q are obviously not reliable as performance indicators.
Therefore it would be arguable to employ them as firms' performance proxies and even
further explore their relationship with ownership structure changes.
53 In other words, market to book value ratio is firm's share price on the last trading day of each year times
the firm's total number of outstanding shares and then divided by the firm's book equity.
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6.2 Testable Predictions & Hypotheses Testing Methods
Testable predictions are based on the major share issue privatisation studies that
document improved performance after going public. Following MNR matched pairs
methodology in Meggingson et al (1994), post-IPO and pre-IPO performance proxies
are calculated and compared. Testable predictions, hypothesis test methods of
Wilcoxon-Signed Rank test, Sign test and Kruskal-Wallis test are discussed in the
following section.
6.2.1 Pre-IPO & Post -IPO Fundamental Performance Proxies
To test performance change predictions, fundamental performance proxies are
calculated. Firstly, fundamental performance proxies for each firm for a seven-year
window period are calculated - three years before IPO and three years after IPO. Then
the mean of each proxy for each firm over three years pre-IPO and three years post-IPO
periods are calculated, in which years -3, -2, and -1 represent pre-IPO years, year 0
represents IPO year; years 1, 2, 3 represent post-IPO years. Year 0 (IPO year) is
excluded from mean calculation because this year includes both pre-IPO and post-IPO
phases and the effect of IPO can not be singled out.
Therefore, firms' three years pre-IPO fundamental performance proxy mean is firms'
pre-IPO performance proxy, and three years post-IPO fundamental performance proxy
mean is firms' post-IPO performance proxy. For example, ROSb ('b' represents before
IPO) is a firm's three years pre-IPO return on sales mean and ROSa ('a' represents after
IPO) is a firm's three years post-IPO return on sales mean. ROSb and ROSa represent
the firm's pre-IPO and post-IPO performance proxy respectively, and the difference
between ROSa and ROSb (ROSa - ROSb) is the change in return on sales - AROS.
In summary, all performance proxies including return on sales (ROS), return on assets
(ROA), return on equity (ROE), sales to assets turnover (SAT), real sales (SALES),
quick ratio (QR), net working capital (NWCTA), total debt (LEVI) and long-term debt
(LEV2) are as follows:
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post-IPO performance proxies are denoted as ROSa, ROAa, ROEa, SATa, SALESa,
QRa, NWCTAa, LEVla and LEV2a respectively;
pre-IPO performance proxies are denoted as ROSb, ROAb, ROEb, SATb, SALESb,
QRb, NWCTAb, LEV lb and LEV2b respectively.
changes in performance proxies or performance changes are denoted as AROS,
AROA, AROE, ASAT, ASALES, AQR, ANWCTA, ALEV1, ALEV2 respectively.
Subsequently, all firms' mean (median) values of post-IPO performance proxies can be
compared with respective mean (median) values of pre-IPO performance proxies; and
firms' performance changes after going public can be identified and the significance of
these performance changes can be tested.
6.2.2 Testable Predictions
By comparing mean and median value of post- and pre-IPO performance proxies of
sample firms, it is expected that profitability, operating efficiency, real output and
liquidity will increase and leverage will decrease after going public. If privatisation or
IPO works and brings positive impact as predicted in most privatisation studies, it is
expected to see improvements in return on sales (ROSa > ROSb), return on assets
(ROAa > ROAb), return on equity (ROEa > ROEb), sales to assets turnover (SATa >
SATb), real sales (SALESa > SALESb), quick ratio (QRa > QRb), net working capital
(NWCTAa > NWCTAb); and reduction in total debt level (LEVla < LEVlb) and long-
term debt level (LEV2a < LEV2b). The variable definitions and testable predictions are
summarised in the following table 6.1.
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6.2.2.1 Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test & Sign Test
Wilcoxon's matched pair test is then employed to test the significance of post-IPO
versus pre-IPO performance changes. Specifically, it tests paired differences of changes
in firms' performance proxies and endeavours to answer the question of whether
changes in performance proxies in terms of AROS, AROA, AROE, ASALES, ASAT,
AQR, ANWCTA, ALEV1 and ALEV2 are significant or not. This nonparametric test for
two related samples is used when assumptions required by paired-samples t test are not
met. The Wilcoxon signed-ranks method tests the null hypothesis that two related
medians are the same and it is used to compare the paired performance proxies' medians
from the matched sample in this thesis54. The median values of changes in performance
proxies are computed and classified as positive, negative, or tied. If two performance
proxies are similarly distributed, the numbers of positive and negative differences will
not be significantly different. Therefore this test will identify any significant difference
in median values between post- and pre-IPO performance proxies. In addition, the sign
test is employed to test whether the percentage of firms experiencing performance
change in a certain direction is greater than 50%, in other words, it tests the hypothesis
that the proportion of median changes in a certain direction is significant.
6.2.2.2 Kruskal-Wallis Test
Firms' performance changes can be further examined based on grouping variables
employed according to theoretical and empirical criterion. In this thesis, main sample
firms are further divided into groups of listing year, sector, regulated/non-regulated
industry and dominant shareholder, and then firms' performance changes are examined
within each group. Because sample firms include all the firms that went public in 1997
and 1998, listing year is employed as a grouping variable. Sector and regulated/non-
regulated industry are widely used as grouping variables in most of the privatisation
studies, such as in Megginson et al (1994), therefore they are taken as grouping
54 Whether the test assumption is meet or not will be examined through data examination and choice of
Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test and Kruskal Wallis Test methods are further explained in Chapter 7 (ppl22).
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variables. The grouping variable of dominant shareholder is purely arbitrary. In Chinese
listed firms, the dominant shareholder plays a decisive role in corporate governance and
corporate management, and it is expected that the dominant shareholder is an influential
factor in a firm's performance changes. Therefore dominant shareholder is taken as a
grouping variable. Due to data limitations, foreign share ownership cannot be employed
as a grouping variable since there are only three firms with foreign ownership. The four
grouping variables employed are defined as follows:
• Listing Year - the years when the firms went public, namely 1997 or 1998.
• Sector - it includes commercial, miscellaneous, industrial, utility and real estate
defined by Shanghai Stock Exchange and Datastream. Commercial sector refers to
firms in retailing business; miscellaneous sector includes those firms that are widely
diversified and their core businesses are difficult to define; and industrial sector
mainly includes manufacturing firms. No real estate firms are in the main sample
because there are just a few real estate firms listed at the Shanghai Stock Exchange.
• Regulated/Non-Regulated Industry - D'Souza (2001) identifies regulated
industries as those of electric, gas, water and telecom in comparing firms that
operating in competitive versus those in non-competitive industries. In this thesis,
more industry categories are included as regulated industries due to the actual
regulation and practice in China. For instance, airlines, airports, automobiles,
broadcasting, shipping and ports, and steel industries are also highly regulated in
China and they are identified as regulated industries.
• Dominant Shareholder - it refers to a firm's largest shareholder after IPO, which
could be state, legal person, private or employee or foreign shareholders. As
mentioned earlier, because there are just three firms in the main sample with foreign
shareholders, foreign shareholder is excluded from data analysis, leaving four
dominant shareholders.
After grouping variables are chosen, Kruskal-Wallis analysis of ranks is then employed
to determine whether changes in performance proxies within each group are
significantly different or not. Although one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) is the
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method of choice when testing for differences between multiple groups, it assumes that
the test variable is reasonably normal and similar in all groups. The Kruskal-Wallis test
is an analysis of variance by ranks and it does not require normality of variable
distribution. Based on the Kruskal-Wallis test results, a grouping variable can be
potential performance determinants if firms within the group perform significantly
differently, and this grouping variable can be a potential predictor in performance
change regression models. For example, if firms' performance changes with sector of
commercial, miscellaneous, industrial and utility are significantly differently from each
other, then sector might be an important determinant in firms' performance changes after
IPO.
6.3 Performance Change Analysis
The SPSS programme is used for financial data analysis.
6.3.1 Main Sample Firms
Performance changes of main samples firms are one of the focuses of this thesis. As
mentioned earlier, firms' post-IPO and pre-IPO performance proxies are first calculated
and then all firms' mean (median) values of post-IPO and respective mean (median)
values of pre-IPO performance proxies are compared with each other, in which the
differences between post-IPO and pre-IPO performance proxies are firms' performance
changes. Wilcoxon Signed-rank and sign tests described above are then performed to
test the significance of post-IPO versus pre-IPO performance changes as well as
significance of proportion of firms experiencing those changes. Furthermore,
performance changes within each grouping variable are examined to identify whether
firms that went public in different years perform differently; whether firms in different
sectors perform differently; whether firms with different dominant shareholders perform
differently; and whether firms in regulated industries perform differently from those in
non-regulated industries.
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6.3.2 Minor Sample Firms
As mentioned earlier, in order to identify the existence of IPO effect, a further 100 non-
IPO firms listed at the end of 1998 are examined to identify whether these non-IPO
firms experience the same performance changes as those of main sample firms (or IPO
firms). Following the same procedures as those of main sample firms, minor sample
firms' performance changes are calculated, and then Wilcoxon-Signed Rank test and
Sign test are performed. Then a comparison can be made between main sample firms
and minor sample firms through Kruskal-Wallis test of group difference to confirm
whether firms in two samples experience significantly different performance changes in
the seven-year window period. If firms in these two samples experience significantly
different performance changes during the same window period, it confirms that IPO
does have effect on firms' performance, whether positive or negative. If there is no
difference in performance changes between main sample and minor sample firms, it is
expected that IPO does not have effect on firms' performance.
6.3.3 Post-IPO Performance Proxies Analysis
Cash flow and share price related performance proxies are available only for post-IPO
years and are called supplementary performance proxies. For these supplementary
performance proxies, only average three years post-IPO performance can be calculated
for cash flow margin, capital expenditure to sales, capital expenditure to assets, market
to book value ratio, price earning ratio and share price return, and they are summarised
in the following table 6.2.
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Table 6.2 Summary of Supplementary Performance Proxies
This table summarises the supplementary performance proxies. Because cash flow statements are
available from 1998 and share prices are available only after IPO, the supplementary performance proxies




Capital Expenditures to Assets (CETSa)
Capital Expenditures to Sales (CETAa)
Capital Expenditures / Total Assets
Capital Expenditures / Sales
Cash Efficiency Cash Flow Margin (CFMa) Net Cash Flow / Sales
MBR ratio
of Equity
Market to Book Value (MBR)
PE ratio (PE)
Market Value of Equity /Book Value
Share Price / Earning per share
Share Price Return (Re) *(P,+ D,- P„)/P„
*Empirically, dividend payment is zero in practice, therefore share price return is in effect defined as
(Pi- P0)/Poin data analysis.
In later regression analysis, post-IPO share price return is regressed against all post-IPO
accounting performance proxies from both fundamental (defined in table 6.1, ppl08)
and supplementary performance proxies to explore the relationship between firms' stock
market performance and accounting performance.
6.4 Regression Analysis
One of the main aims of much quantitative research in the social sciences is the
demonstration of causality or relationship. Therefore in addition to comparing the mean
(median) value of firms' post-IPO versus pre-IPO performance proxies, further
regression models are developed through regressing a set of changes in performance
proxies (dependent variables) on predictors (independent variables) based on theoretical
and empirical grounds. The Ordinary Least Square method is employed and the purpose





Dependent variables are changes in performance proxies, which are the differences
between firms' post-IPO and pre-IPO performance proxies. As discussed earlier, firms'
three years pre-IPO fundamental performance proxy mean is firms' pre-IPO
performance proxy, and three years post-IPO mean is firms' post-IPO performance
proxy, and the difference between the two is performance change after going public,
which is defined as a dependent variable in regression analysis. Dependent variables
include change in return on sales, change in return on equity, change in return on assets,
change in sales assets turnover, change in quick ratio, change in net working capital,
change in total debt, change in long-term debt, changes in real sales, which are denoted
as AROS, AROE, AROA, ASAT, AQR, ANWC, ALEV1, ALEV2, ASALES respectively.
• Explanatory variables
There are few literature available providing convincing explanatory variables in single
country study, therefore the new predictors chosen in this thesis are based upon
theoretical and practical importance. In other words, they are theoretically and
empirically identified as potential sources of performance changes.
Past research shows that ownership structure, ownership concentration and other country
factors are performance determinants. Megginson et al (1994), D'Souza et al (2001) and
Chen et al (2000) employ ownership structure changes as important explanatory
variables for examination of post-IPO performance changes. Ownership structure
changes after going public are expected to have an impact on firm performance. In this
thesis, the shares held by state, legal person, private individuals and employees after IPO
are employed as explanatory variables.
Xu and Wang (1997) and Tian (2000) also employ ownership concentration -
Herfindahal index - as an explanatory variable in their country studies on China.
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Herfindahal ownership concentration index is the sum of squared percentage of shares
controlled by a firm's top ten or five shareholders. For most Chinese listed firms, shares
are concentrated in the hands of five top shareholders, therefore Herfindahal index of top
five shareholders is employed to measure ownership concentration.
Chen et al (2000) employ firms' listing year and sector as explanatory variables in their
country study on China. Therefore if firms that went public in different years and in
different sectors perform differently, these grouping variables should be employed as
explanatory variables in subsequent regression analysis.
Chen et al (2000) document that one characteristic of IPO in China is that fresh capital is
usually raised by selling new shares to the investing public, contrasting with
privatisations in many other countries, where governments are the beneficiaries. Since
most of the share issue proceeds are directly channelled into newly privatised firms
instead of the government, it is assumed that the share issue size (or share proceeds) may
affect firms' subsequent investment activities and financial performance.
Human capital is defined as the percentage of senior management members holding
higher education degrees, including both boards of directors and senior executives.
Throughout the case studies, it is found that generally managers lack managerial skills in
tackling sophisticated business issues after going public. Therefore it is expected that
human capital may have a positive impact on firms' performance changes.
It also emerges from the case studies that it is a common practice for senior executives
to sit on boards as directors. Hence the total number of senior executives sitting on board
is employed to examine the impact of cross-sitting of senior executives as board
members.
The total number of board directors varies significantly ranging from five to more than
twenty and case studies indicate that directors can hardly reach any consensus in
115
boardrooms in some firms. Therefore board size is employed as an explanatory variable
to examine whether board size matters in firms' performance.
Total assets size at the year-end before IPO is used to control firm size. It is assumed
that larger firms tend to have better economy of scale, but also tend to be less efficient in
controlling costs.
D'Souza et al (2001) also employ restructured firms, regulated firms and real GDP
growth in their cross-country study. As mentioned earlier, all firms must be restructured
before IPO, hence restructuring is not a variable, but whether an industry is regulated or
not can be potential explanatory variable. Most studies employ change in GDP or GNP
as one of the explanatory variables since change in economy is expected to have an
effect on firms' post-IPO performance if they go public in different years. Because all
main sample firms went public within two years (1997 and 1998), hence they experience
almost the same seven-year window period. The change in GDP (average three years
post-IPO GDP versus average three years pre-IPO GDP) is constant for all samples so it
is not taken as an explanatory variable.
6.4.2 Performance Change Regression Analysis
In developing performance models, cross-sectional regression is performed, in which
change in each performance proxy is regressed against explanatory variables, such as
state ownership, legal person ownership, private ownership, employee ownership,
Herfindahal ownership concentration index, human capital, share issue size, asset size,
board size, executive cross-sitting and grouping variables.
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6.4.2.1 Performance Change Regression Models
APFM = p0 + P,ST + p2LP+ p3 PLC + p4EMP + p5CON + p6HMC + p7SSIZE
+ p8ASIZE + p9BOD +p10CRS + PnGrouping Variables + s
Where:
• Dependent Variable:
APFM = change in return on sales (AROS), change in return on equity (AROE), change
in return on assets (AROA), change in sales assets turnover (ASAT), change in working
capital to total assets (ANWCTA), change in quick ratio (AQR), change in total debt
(ALEV1), change in long-term debt (ALEV2) and change in real sales (ASALES).
• Independent Variables:
There are only 36 firms out of 127 main sample firms with the presence of employee
ownership; therefore employee ownership is transformed into a dummy variable to
improve the explanatory power.








for post-IPO three years;
average percentage of shares owned by legal person shareholders
for post-IPO three years;
average percentage of shares owned by private investors
for post-IPO three years;
Herfindahal index of ownership concentration of top five
shareholders;
percentage of members of senior management team holding
university degrees;
log of share issue size (in million Chinese Yuan);
log of total assets of the firm (in million Chinese Yuan) at the year
end before going public;
total number of board of directors (board size);
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CRS total number of senior executives sitting on board as directors;
EMP 1, if firms with employee ownership; otherwise 0;
s regression error term.
Grouping variables will be added into regression models as potential independent
variables if Kruskal-Wallis test results show that firms within each group perform
significantly differently. Since 82 out of 127 main sample firms are from industrial
sector, sector variable is set as dummy - industrial or non-industrial firms. Since 87 out
of 127 main sample firms have state as dominant shareholders, dominant shareholder is
set as dummy - state or non-state dominant shareholders. The grouping variables are as
follows:
Year = 1, if firms went public in 1997; 0, if firms went public in 1998.
Regulated = 1, if firms are in regulated industry; 0, if firms are in non-
Based on the theoretical and empirical grounds, it is expected that state ownership is
negative associated with performance changes after IPO, and legal person, private
individuals and the presence of employee ownership are positive associated with firms'
performance changes after IPO. It is also expected that higher ownership concentration
will lead to performance improvement. As a result of the cash injection after IPO, it is
expected that share issue size will lead to improvement in liquidity and reduction in
firms' debts and subsequently improve firms' investments and performance. It is




1, if firms are from industrial sector; otherwise 0.
1, if state is dominant shareholder; otherwise 0.
6.4.2.2 Regression Hypotheses
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Meanwhile, larger board size and higher cross-sitting of executives as board directors
are expected to have negative impact on performance changes.
6.4.3 Market against Accounting Performance Regression Analysis
Because both post-IPO market performance proxies and post-IPO accounting
performance proxies are available, it is possible to regress firms' market performance
against their accounting performance to identify the relationship between the two. The
question of whether firms' stock market performance reflects firms' accounting
performance, and which of those accounting performance proxies are more important
than others can be answered.
There are three market performance indicators discussed earlier - market to book value
ratio (MBR), price-earning ratio (P/E) and share price return (Re). Because both MBR
and P/E connect accounting and market information (market value and book value of
equity), which may lead to auto-correlation in regressing either MBR or P/E against
accounting performance proxies. Therefore it is assumed that only share price return is
the pure market performance measure.
6.4.3.1 Market against Accounting Performance Regression Model
Share price return (Re) is always the true indicator of firms' stock market performance,
no matter whether the financial market is weak or semi-strong efficient. In the market
against accounting performance model, Re is employed as a dependent variable, and it is
the average three years post-IPO share price return. The explanatory variables are post-
IPO accounting performance proxies.
Re = p0 + p, ROSa + p2 ROAa+ p3 ROEa + p4 SATa + p5 SALESa + p6 QRa
+ p7 NWCTAa + p8 LEVI a + p9 LEV2a + p10 CETAa + P„ CETSa + p12 CFMa




Re = average three years post-IPO share price return;
• Independent Variables:
fundamental accounting performance proxies
ROSa average three years post-IPO return on sales;
ROAa average three years post-IPO return on assets;
ROEa average three years post-IPO return on equity;
SATa average three years post-IPO sales to total assets;
SALESa average three years post-IPO sales;
QRa average three years post-IPO quick ratio;
NWCTAa average three years post-IPO net working capital to total assets
LEV la average three years post-IPO total debt ratio;
LEV2a average three years post-IPO long-term debt ratio;
supplementary accounting performance proxies
CETAa average three years post-IPO capital expenditure to assets;
CETSa average three years post-IPO capital expenditure to sales;
CFMa average three years post-IPO cash flow margin.
and
8 = regression error term
Grouping variables may be added into the regression model as potential explanatory
variables if they are determinants of the share return after initial Kruskal-Wallis test of
group difference of average three years post-IPO share price return. They are the same
as those in performance change regression models:
Year = 1, if firms went public in 1997; 0, if firms went public in 1998.
Regulated = 1, if firms are in regulated industry; 0, if firms are in non-
regulated industry.
Industry = 1, if firms are from industrial sector; otherwise 0.
State = 1, if state is dominant shareholder; otherwise 0.
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6.4.3.2 Regression Hypotheses
As suggested by Ross et al (1998), share price is a function of the future dividend
payments. Since listed firms seldom pay dividends, it is not possible to value share price
based on expected dividend payments. It is hypothesised that the share price return is
associated with real output instead of profitability measures, and this is will be further
discussed in data analysis later on.
6.5 Summary
This chapter presents the testable predictions and hypotheses testing methods employed
in performance change analysis; regression method employed and hypotheses in
performance change regression analysis.
From the next chapter onwards, the analysis of financial data and case study is presented
accordingly. Chapter 7 and 8 present the performance change analysis, chapter 9 and 10
presents regression analysis and post-IPO performance analysis, chapter 11 and 12
presents case study analysis, and chapter 13 summarises findings of the thesis.
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Chapter 7 Performance Change Analysis: Exploring Data
Before conducting the analysis, improvements can often be made to data at hand
without resorting to the expense of collecting new data. Marsh (1990) argues that the
purpose of transforming data is to make them more amenable to analysis, to promote
comparability and to focus attention on differences. In addition to data
transformation, the characteristics of the data set will then be examined to justify
econometric methods for further data analysis.
7.1 Data Transformation
As mentioned in Chapter 6, performance proxies data are collected for sample firms
(both main sample and minor sample) over a seven years period - three years before
going public, the year of going public and three years after going public.
Performance proxies include return on sales, return on assets, return on equity, sales
to assets turnover, real sales, quick ratio, net working capital to total assets, total debt
and long-term debt55:
- post-IPO performance proxies are denoted as ROSa, ROAa, ROEa, SATa,
SALESa, QRa, NWCTAa, LEVla and LEV2a respectively;
pre-lPO performance proxies are denoted as ROSb, ROAb, ROEb, SATb,
SALESb, QRb, NWCTAb, LEV lb and LEV2b respectively.
changes in performance proxies or performance changes are denoted as AROS,
AROA, AROE, ASAT, ASALES, AQR, ANWCTA, ALEV1, ALEV2 respectively.
7.1.1 Performance Proxies - Sales
Within the above mentioned performance proxies, only sales performance in terms of
SALESa, SALESb and ASALES are in actual values (Chinese Yuan) and need to be
transformed to make sales of each year comparable with each other. The rationale
behind this transformation is that each year's real sales figure is affected by the
inflation rate of that particular year. Inflation is the change in average prices in an
economy over a given period of time or a general sustained rise in price level. The
price level is measured in the form of an index. So if the price index were 100 today
55 See table 6.1 (pp!08) Summary of Testable Predictions for definition.
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and 110 in one year's time, then the rate of inflation would be 10%. Deflating real
sales is to promote comparability between sales where the absolute scale values are
different due to inflation. Appendix 7.1 (pp297) summarises the annual consumer
price indices provided by Datastream as well as the rebased indices on 1997 and
1998 in order to achieve simplicity in later data transformation. Therefore, real sales
of a year can be deflated by the consumer price index of respective year and then
standardised on the base of year 0, which is the firm's listing year and not taken into
account in performance change analysis. Through deflation and standardisation, the
scale of measurement of real sales has reduced and the comparability has improved.
7.1.2 Explanatory Variables - Share Issue Size & Assets Size
The measurement unit of share issue size and total assets size is in millions (Chinese
Yuan), and the improvement that can be made is to change the scale of measurement
on which the data has been recorded. Taking logs is a re-expression of the scale of
measurement, which has the same effect as adding or subtracting a constant to the
numbers. The result is to scale the entire variable by a factor, evenly shrinking the
measurement of the variable. Therefore, share issue size and assets size data are
transformed by using logs to reduce the scale of measurement.
7.1.3 Other Transformations
Theoretical transformation is based on the nature of the data and empirical
transformation is made in response to an examination of the data itself. Data
transformation also provides a means of modifying variables to correct violations of
the statistical assumptions underlying the multivariate techniques or to improve the
relationship (correlation) between variables to achieve normality and
homoscedasticity or linearity. The relevant transformations will be further discussed
during data analysis when it is appropriate.
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7.2 Data Examination
The main purpose of examining data is to get a thorough understanding of the basic
characteristics of the underlying data and relationships. The following section
presents the overview of the performance pattern over seven years, and the initial
examination of post- versus pre-IPO performance changes based on four grouping
variables.
7.2.1 Overview of Performance Proxies
Appendix 7.2 (pp298-299) summarises the statistics of all fundamental performance
proxies over the seven-year period under investigation, in which year 0 is the year of
going public (or event year). The mean and median values of year 0 are mainly used
here to indicate the impact of IPO year on performance and are not included in data
analysis. Appendix 7.2 shows that IPO has a strong impact on firms' performance
and generally performance proxies change dramatically after IPO. One concern is
that all main sample firms went public in 1997 and 1998, and coincidentally East
Asia's financial crisis of 1997-1998 may have had an impact on firms' post-IPO
performance. But in fact China did not itself suffer financial crisis of 1997 and 1998.
China escaped because its currency is only partially convertible which meant that its
technically insolvent banking system was not exposed56. Therefore the concern about
the impact of the financial crisis of 1997 and 1998 is eliminated.
The following graphs of mean and median values of all performance proxies are
based on data in appendix 7.2, and they further demonstrate the trends in the mean
and median values of each change in performance proxy over the three years post-
IPO and three years pre-IPO period. In the following graphs, -3, -2 -1 represent three
years before IPO, two years before IPO and one year before IPO respectively;
similarly, 1, 2 and 3 represent one year, two years and three years after IPO
respectively. Year 0 represents the year of IPO (even year).
56 In East Asia, only two economies (China's and Hong Kong's) were not directly hit by the financial
crisis of 1997 and 1998. Hong Kong escaped because of its world class banking system and abundant
foreign-exchange reserves (A Survey of Asian Finance, The Economist, 8th FEB 2003).
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The above Real Sales figure shows that firms' sales increase constantly and smoothly
during the pre- and post-IPO years and IPO does not bring a sudden impact on real
sales. The ROS figure shows that the mean and median values of return on sales are
stable during pre-IPO years and increase slightly due to IPO effect, and then drop
dramatically during three post-IPO years. Therefore firms might experience severe
problems in controlling costs, given increasing sales after IPO. The cost of sales goes
up might be due to increased competition, or firms might put focus on market share
maximization instead of profit maximization etc. during post-IPO years. The average
ROS of the three post-IPO years is much lower than that of pre-IPO years.
Return On Equity (ROE)
The above ROA and ROE graphs show that IPO has a strong impact on mean and
median values of return on assets and return on equity and both of them drop sharply
after IPO. Furthermore, ROA and ROE continue to decline dramatically during three
post-IPO years, which may indicate that as firms' assets size, equity size and real
sales increase, the returns on both assets and equity continue to deteriorate because




of possible high investment costs or expenditures. The average values ofROA and
ROE during three post-IPO years are much lower than those of pre-IPO years are.
The above SAT graph shows that IPO has a significant impact on sales to assets
turnover and both mean and median value of SAT experience sharp decline due to
the effect of IPO, and then keep stable during three post-IPO years. It might indicate
that firms failed to improve sales assets efficiency as both the sales and the total
assets increase. The average SAT of the three post-IPO years is much lower than that
of pre-IPO years is.
The above two graphs show that both liquidity ratios - QR and NWCTA of pre-IPO
years - are quite low and both liquidity ratios improve dramatically after going
public, but firms could not hold improvement in QR and NWCTA and their
performance deteriorates during the three post-IPO years. Share issue proceeds
injected into the firms might help to improve the firms' liquidity, but less efficient
operating practice, such as large inventory or current liabilities etc., might contribute
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to the decline in liquidity during post-IPO years. But on average both post-IPO
liquidity ratios are much higher than those of their pre-IPO years are.
The above graphs show that total leverage (LEVI) and long-term leverage (LEV2)
drop dramatically due to the effect of IPO, and both ratios are stable during three
post-IPO years. This might indicate that share issue proceeds may help firms to
payback their debts, and firms tend to reduce borrowing, especially long-term debt
during post-IPO years. The average values of LEVI and LEV2 of the three post-IPO
years are much lower than their equivalents during the pre-IPO years are.
Therefore, as indicated in appendix 7.2 and the above graphs, IPO does have a strong
impact on all performance proxies. Firms' post-IPO return on assets, return on
equity, return on sales, sales assets turnover, total leverage and long-leverage drop
dramatically compared to their pre-IPO performance. On the other hand, firms' post-
IPO real sales, quick ratio and net working capital to total assets increase
dramatically from their pre-IPO values. It is expected that post-IPO versus pre-IPO
changes in each performance proxy could be significant. Since difference of
performance proxies between average post-IPO years and average pre-IPO years are
the focus of this thesis, the following section further examines changes of post-
versus pre-IPO performance proxies.
7.2.2 Examination of Changes in Performance Proxies
Appendix 7.3 (pp300-301) summarises the statistics of changes of post-EPO versus
pre-IPO in fundamental performance proxies. As shown in appendix 7.3, mean and
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median values of changes in return on sales, return on assets, return on equity and
sales to assets turnover are negative, which indicates performance deteriorations in
profitability and sales efficiency. Mean and median values of changes in quick ratio,
networking capital and sales are all positive, which indicates performance
improvement in short-term liquidity and real output. Mean and median values of
changes in total leverage and long-term leverage are all negative, which indicates
reduced total and long-term borrowing after going public. Kolmogorov-Smirnov test
is employed to examine the nature of changes in performance proxies.
7.2.3 Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of Changes in Performance Proxies
Firstly, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test is employed to test whether changes in
performance proxies are normally distributed and then subsequent appropriate
significance (of performance changes) test methods can be chosen. Typical statistical
tests of difference between matched samples incorporate assumptions about the
underlying distribution of data such as normality and they are called parametric
methods. If the paired difference (difference of post-IPO versus pre-IPO performance
proxy), namely change in performance proxy57 is symmetric or normally distributed,
the parametric method of Paired-Samples T Test should be employed; if the paired
difference is not symmetric or normally distributed, the non-parametric method of
Wilcoxon-Signed Rank Test then can be employed.
The Tests of Normality table 7.1 below shows Kolmogorov-Smirnov normality test
results with statistics, degree of freedom and significance values. A significance
value (Sig.) in the test table less than 0.05 indicates a deviation of the distribution of
paired difference from normality, therefore normal distribution would expect a
significance value which is higher than 0.05. The normality test results show that
only ANWCTA and ALEV1 have significance values of 0.20 in the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test, which suggests that these two performance proxies are normally
distributed, leaving most of the paired differences deviate significantly from
normality.
57
Changes in performance proxies are denoted as AROS, AROA, AROE, ASAT, ASALES, AQR,
ANWCTA, ALEV1, ALEV2 respectively.
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Table 7.1 Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test of Normality
Kolmogorov-Smirnov
Statistic df Sig.
AROS .322 127 .000
AROA .220 127 .000
AROE .264 127 .000
ASAT .146 127 .000
ASALES .146 127 .000
AQR .164 127 .000
ANWCTA .048 127 .200*
ALEVI .053 127 .200*
ALEV2 .103 127 .002
*A significance value higher than 0.05 indicates a normal distribution
As mentioned earlier, data transformation could provide a means of modifying
variables to correct violations of the statistical assumptions such as normality. But
the nature of the data set - paired differences are mostly in terms of either negative
or positive ratios - does not suggest that data transformation is an appropriate way to
achieve normality.
Since the assumption of parametric test cannot be met, the non-parametric test
method has to be considered. Non-parametric test methods are sometimes known as
assumption-free tests, making no assumptions about the type of data on which they
can be used. The data therefore do not have to meet the assumptions required by the
paired-samples t test. Non-parametric tests work on the principle of ranking the data,
and the analysis is then carried out on the ranks rather than the actual data. Their
chief advantage is improved reliability when the distribution is unknown or not
symmetric. Therefore, non-parametric methods of Wilcoxon's Signed Rank test,
together with Sign test are employed to test matched sample differences and the
significance of proportion changes. In addition, the non-parametric method of
Kruskal-Wallis analysis of ranks is employed to test the significance of group
differences. In fact, most privatisation studies (employing MNR methodology) use
non-parametric method of Wilcoxon's Signed Rank test and Sign test in examining
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significance of performance changes, such as Megginson et al (1994), Chen et al
(2000), D'Souza et al (2001) etc. The possible explanation is that these studies
encounter the similar issue of a non-parametric data set.
7.2.4 Performance Change Overview By Group
As mentioned in Chapter 6, four grouping variables - IPO year, regulated industry,
sector and dominant shareholder - are employed to examine changes in performance
proxies for firms within each subgroup. The following table 7.2 lists main sample
firms' distribution within subgroup of each grouping variable.
Table 7.2 Firm Distribution within Group of IPO Year, Regulated/
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Changes in performance proxies for main sample firms within each grouping
variable are examined through bar charts. If firms' changes in performance proxies
significantly differ within each subgroup, this particular grouping variable might be
an explanatory variable in determining firms' changes in performance proxies or
performance changes. The following figure 7.1 demonstrates the overview of
performance changes by four grouping variables.
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Figure 7.1 Overview of Performance Changes by Group
(main sample firms)
The following charts are overview of performance change (median value) of respective grouping
variable. Performance changes are denoted as CROS. CROA. CROE. CSAT, CQR. CNWCTA.
CLEV1, CLEV2 and CSALES, and they represents change in return on sales, change in return on
assets, change in return on equity, change in sales assets turnover, change in quick ratio, change in net
working capital to total assets, change in total debt ratio, change in long-term debt ratio and change in
real sales. Grouping variables are IPO years, sector, regulated or non-regulated industry and dominant
shareholder. N represents the number of the firms within each grouping variable.
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• Performance Change by Year of IPO
When firms' performance changes are compared by the year of IPO, the median
values of performance changes in different IPO years show identical patterns.
Regardless of firms went public in 1997 or 1998, profitability and operating
efficiency performance are negative, which means that return on sales, return on
assets, return on equity and sales to total assets deteriorate after going public.
Liquidity, leverage and real output improve as predicted, in which quick ratio, net
working capital and sales improve dramatically after going public, and there is a
moderate improvement in net working capital to total assets. Total leverage and long-
term debt level decline as expected. The only difference for firms in this group is that
performance changes in quick ratio, net working capital and real sales are slightly
higher for firms that went public in 1997 than for firms that went public in 1998.
• Performance Change by Sector
When firms' performance changes are compared by sector, the median values of
performance changes in each respective sector - industrial, miscellaneous, utility and
commercial - show a similar pattern, except that the commercial sector stands out
from the rest. In the first three sectors, profitability and operating efficiency changes
are negative, which shows that return on sales, return on assets, return on equity and
sales to total assets deteriorate after going public. But liquidity, leverage and real
output improve as predicted, with a sharp improvement in quick ratio and sales as
well as a moderate improvement in quick ratio. Total leverage and long-term debt
ratios decline as excepted. The commercial sector shows the same negative changes
in profitability and operating efficiency as those of the other three sectors, and a very
small increase in sales. Different from others, this sector shows a sharp decrease in
long-term debt ratio and quick ratio as well as some increase in total-debt ratio. The
main reason could be that there are only two firms in the commercial sector, which
may not be representative of that peer group.
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• Performance Change by Regulated or Non-regulated Industry
When firms' performance changes are compared between regulated and non-
regulated industries, the pattern again shows that performance changes in regulated
or non-regulated industries are almost identical. Profitability and operating efficiency
deteriorate after IPO, with negative changes in return on sales, return on assets,
return on equity and sales to total assets. Liquidity and sales changes are positive,
quick ratio and real sales improve dramatically and there is a moderate improvement
in net working capital to total assets. Both long-term and total debt ratios decrease as
predicted.
• Performance Change by Dominant Shareholder
When firms' performance changes are compared by dominant shareholder, the
similar pattern exhibits again, except employee shareholder shows the fewest
changes in all performance benchmarks. With dominant shareholder of state, legal
person and private investors, profitability and operating efficiency decline at the
same level, with deteriorated return on sales, return on assets, return on equity and
sales to total assets after IPO. Liquidity and real sales improve as predicted, with
significant improvement in quick ratio and real sales, as well a moderate
improvement in net working capital to total assets. Total debt and long-term debt
ratio decrease as expected. Regarding employee as dominant shareholder, the basic
change pattern is the same as those of other three dominant shareholders, but the
extent of change is much smaller. One exception is that long-term leverage increase
for employee dominant shareholder, but not for other dominant shareholders. The
main reason could be that there are only four firms with employee dominant
shareholder, which may not be representative of that peer group.
7.3 Summary
In data transformation, both share issue size and firm assets size need to be
transformed. In data examination, the overviews of performance proxies over seven-
year window period and post- versus pre-IPO changes in performance proxies by
grouping variables are presented. The performance patterns show that firms
experience deteriorated performance after IPO, with only improvement in real sales,
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liquidity and leverage. In addition, performance changes based on grouping variables
of IPO year, sector, regulated industry and dominant shareholder all show similar
deteriorated patterns and it seems that firms do not perform differently within each
group. Data examination also suggests that the non-parametric methods of
Wilcoxon's Signed Rank test and Sign test should be employed to test matched
sample differences and the significance of proportion changes.
The detailed performance change analysis is further presented in the next chapter.
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Chapter 8 Performance Change Analysis:
Main Sample Firms & Minor Sample Firms
This chapter presents a detailed performance change analysis of main sample firms
and minor sample firms, and then the results of each are compared to identify
whether the IPO effect exists.
8.1 Performance Change Analysis (Main Sample Firms)
Firms in the main sample are drawn from firms went public in 1997 and 1998 at the
Shanghai Stock Exchange. In the main sample, for 79 firms that went public in 1997,
their average three years post-IPO performance from 1998 to 2000 are compared
with their average three years pre-IPO performance from 1994 to 1996. For 48 firms
went public in 1998, their average three years post-IPO performance from 1999 to
2001 are compared with their average three years pre-IPO performance from 1995 to
1997. The values of performance on both IPO years (year 0) are excluded from the
data analysis.
In the analysis of performance change, firstly, the mean and median value of the
average three years post-IPO performance proxies and average three years pre-IPO
performance proxies are calculated separately. Then the post-IPO versus pre-IPO
performance changes - the mean and median values of paired difference - are
calculated. The firms within each grouping variable (i.e. IPO year) are then examined
by calculating the mean and median value of each paired difference within each sub¬
group (i.e. 1997 and 1998). The significance of paired difference is examined by
non-parametric method of Wilcoxon-Signed Rank test, the significance of proportion
of firms experiencing performance changes is examined by Sign test; and the
significance of the group difference is examined by Kruskal-Wallis test.
8.1.1 Post-IPO versus Pre-IPO Performance Change Results
The results of post- versus pre-IPO performance changes are summarised table 8.1.
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As shown in table 8.1, return on sales, return on assets and return on equity all fall
significantly after IPO. The mean (median) value of return on sales decreases from
19.77% (14.65%) to 12.87% (14.03%); mean (median) value of return on assets
declines from 13.63% (11.64%) to 5.9% (5.97%) and mean (median) value of return
on equity drops from 35.34% (32.08%) to 5.36% (10.2%). Return on equity exhibits
a sharp decline compared with both return on assets and return on sales. With given
net profits, return on sales depends on firms' operating costs, return on assets
depends on firms' total assets, and return on equity depends on firms' book equity.
To some extent, firms can control their operating costs and total assets after going
public, but not book equity - which is a fixed amount. If firms cannot generate
enough profits after IPO, return on equity would deteriorate due to the double effects
of dramatically increased book equity and poor net profits.
Output is measured by each year's real sales. It is deflated by inflation rate of each
respective year and then standardised based on output in year 0 (IPO year), so that
each year's sales figure is expressed as a unit of output in year 0. As expected,
following going public, mean (median) value of real sales increases from 0.71
(0.7156) to 1.60 (1.37).
Operating efficiency is measured by sales to total assets, which reflects the amount
of sales generated by assets. The results suggest that the mean (median) value drops
from 96.03% (80.81%) to 55.22% (45.16%) with 89.76% of firms experiencing a
negative change and the median change is significant at 1% level. If firms' output (or
real sales) improves, the sharp decline in sales assets turnover could be the result of a
large expansion in total assets size. Therefore the possible explanation is that firms
may embark on over-investment after IPO. Due to lack of employment data for
sample firms, sales efficiency (sales/employee) is not measured in this thesis.
Liquidity is examined to find out whether share issue proceeds could improve firms'
liquidity position. Liquidity is measured by quick ratio and net working capital to
total assets. Both liquidity ratios rise as expected following going public. Mean
138
(median) value of quick ratio increases from 99.49% (81.13%) to 157.76%
(135.89%), mean (median) value of net working capital to total assets increases from
10.5% (10.88%) to 21.7% (23.55%). The dramatic improvement in liquidity suggests
that as the share issue proceeds are injected into the firms after IPO, firms may use
the cash to pay back short-term bank loan and debts so as to improve their short-term
liquidity position.
The leverage is measured by total debt and long-term debt ratios. Both debt ratios fall
as expected. Mean (median) value of total debt ratio decreases from 58.05%
(61.15%) to 38.62% (37.64%), and mean (median) value of long-term debt ratio
decreases from 20.1% (16.4%) to 8.3% (4.45%). Therefore in addition to improving
short-term liquidity, firms may use share issue proceeds to reduce long-term debts.
The above results show that for firms listed at the Shanghai Stock Exchange, the
return on sales, return on assets, return on equity and sales to total assets deteriorate
after IPO, while quick ratio, net working capital, total debt ratio, long-term debt ratio
and real sales improve as predicted.
As performance changes are identified, the question that arises is whether changes in
performance proxies are significant or not. In the next section, the significance of the
above examined post- versus pre-IPO performance changes are further tested by
Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test & Sign test.
8.1.2 Wilcoxon-Signed Rank Test & Sign Test Results
The Wilcoxon's matched pair test is employed to test differences between the post-
IPO and post-IPO performance. The Wilcoxon signed-ranks method tests the null
hypothesis that two related medians are the same. In this thesis, Wilcoxon signed-
ranks method is employed to compare the median values of post-IPO versus pre-IPO
of performance proxies from the matched sample. In addition, the sign test is
employed to determine whether the proportion of firms experiencing changes in a
specified direction is greater than 50%. The differences between two performance
proxies for all firms are computed and classified as either positive, negative, or tied.
139
If these two performance proxies are similarly distributed, the numbers of positive
and negative differences will not be significantly different.
As shown in table 8.1, Wilcoxon-Signed Rank test results show that decrease in
return on sales, return on assets, return on equity and sales to total assets are all
significant at 1% level; increase in quick ratio, net working capital, real sales and
improvement in total and long-term debt reduction are also significant at 1%
respectively. The sign tests suggest that only 33.86% of firms generate better return
on sales, 7.87% of firms show improved return on assets, 4.72% of firms produce
higher return on equity and 10.24% of firms improve their operating efficiency after
IPO. The majority firms experience deterioration in return on sales, return on assets,
return on equity and sales assets turnover. The proportion of firms with declined
performance is significant at 1% level in return on sales, return on equity, return on
assets and sales assets turnover respectively. Meanwhile, the sign tests also find that
81.89% and 76.38% of firms exhibit improved quick ratio and net working capital to
total assets respectively; 91.34% and 72.44% of firms reduce their total debt and
long-term debt level respectively, and 94.49% of firms generate higher sales after
IPO. The sign tests indicate that the proportion of firms with improved performance
is significant at 1% level in quick ratio, net working capital, total and long-term debt
and real sales respectively.
Now the overall performance of main sample firms is drawn. In the next section,
firms' performance changes within each grouping variable of IPO year, sector,
regulated industry and dominant shareholder are examined in detail.
8.1.3 Kruskal-Wallis test of Subgroup Performance Change Results
The post-IPO versus pre-IPO performance changes are further examined based on
grouping variables - IPO year, regulated or non-regulated industry, dominant
shareholder and sector. Based on each grouping variable, firms are further partitioned
into their subgroup, and then each subgroup's performance changes are tested by
Wilcoxon Signed Rank test and subgroup differences are further tested by Kruskal-
Wallis test. In this thesis, Kruskal-Wallis analysis of ranks is employed to test the
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differences in each subgroup of all sample firms due to the non-parametric nature of
the data set.
8.1.3.1 Comparison of Performance Changes by IPO Year
Table 8.2 presents the comparison of performance changes after IPO for firms with
different IPO years.
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As shown in table 8.2, all performance changes are significant for firms that went
public in either 1997 or 1998. However it is noted that the mean (median) change of
return on sales for firms that went public in 1998 is -3.48% (-2.27%) as compared to
-8.98% (-0.98%) for firms that went public in 1997. The median changes are
significant at 1% and 5% respectively.
Overall, there is not much difference between these two subgroups, and firms that
went public in 1997 only perform differently from firms that went public in 1998 in
net working capital to total assets, and other performance changes are not
significantly different from each other. The mean (median) change of net working
capital to total assets is 8.11% (4.98%) for firms that went public in 1998 as
compared to 13.07% (14.14%) for firms that went public in 1997. The p value of
Kruskal-Wallis test reveals that the subgroup difference in net working capital to
total assets is significant at the 5% level. The possible reason could be that firms
went public in 1997 have greater concern to improve their liquidity as the financial
crisis started in Asia in 1997. As mentioned earlier, since Asian financial crisis in
effect has small impact on the Chinese domestic-oriented firms, firms went public in
1998 then improve their liquidity position at a smaller extent compared to firms went
public in 1997.
8.1.3.2 Comparison of Performance Change by Regulated/Non-
Regulated Industry
Table 8.3 presents the comparison of performance changes for firms in regulated
versus non-regulated industry. D'Souza (2001) identifies regulated industries as
those of electric, gas, water and telecom in comparing companies operating in
competitive industries. In this thesis, some other industry categories will be included
as regulated industries due to the actual regulation practice in China. For instance,
the airlines, airports, automobiles, broadcasting, shipping, ports and steel industries
are highly regulated in China and so they are identified as regulated industries.
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All performance changes are significant in either regulated or non-regulated industry,
and median changes are significant at the 1% level. However it is noted that the
mean (median) value of return on sales in regulated industry falls from 25.20%
(14.96%) to 19.53% (12.76%), which is not significant at all. This may indicate that
firms in regulated industry can maintain certain profitability such as return on sales
after going public as they are backed by advantageous government regulations.
Overall, there is no significant difference between firms in regulated and non-
regulated industries. The p values of Kruskal-Wallis test of subgroup difference
suggests that whether firms are in regulated or non-regulated industry, they do not
perform very differently after going public.
8.1.3.3 Comparison of Performance Change by Dominant
Shareholder
Table 8.4 table presents the comparison of performance changes for firms with
dominant shareholder of state and legal person. Since there are only four private and
employee dominated firms respectively in the main sample, these eight firms are
omitted from the comparison, leaving only state and legal persons as dominant
shareholders. As shown in the table 8.4, all changes in performance proxies are
significant, but no Kruskal-Wallis test p value is significant. The p values of Kruskal-
Wallis test of subgroup difference suggest that whether a firm's dominant
shareholder is state or legal person, they do not perform differently after going
public. In other words, the presence of dominant shareholder does not affect firms'
performance changes after going public.
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8.1.3.4 Comparison of Performance Change by Sector
Table 8.5 presents the comparison of performance changes for firms within sectors of
industrial and miscellaneous. Since there are only two firms in the commercial sector
and ten firms in the utility sector, these twelve firms are omitted from the
comparison, leaving only industrial and miscellaneous sectors. As shown in the table
8.5, the mean (median) value of deterioration in return on sales is -5.33% (-1.24%)
for firms in the industrial sector as compared to -11.35% (-2.67%) for firms in the
miscellaneous sector. The median changes are significant at 10% and 1%
respectively, and Kruskal-Wallis p value is also significant at 10% level, which may
indicate that the sector is an important factor in changes in return on sales. The p
values of Kruskal-Wallis test of subgroup difference in other performance proxies
changes are insignificant. Therefore, firms from industrial and miscellaneous sectors
do not perform significantly differently from each other, except in return on sales.
Since firms from miscellaneous sector are more diversified than firms from industrial
sector are, it might be more difficult for the former to improve return on sales if
corporate management in terms of strategic and financial management and corporate
governance are incapable to deal with more complicated business activities.
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The above analysis shows that dominant shareholder and regulated/non-regulated
industry do not play significant role in firms' performance changes after going
public. Firms that went public in 1997 and in 1998 perform differently in net
working capital to total asset; firms from industrial and miscellaneous sectors
perform differently in return on sales. Therefore IPO year and sector are added as
explanatory variables in later regression analysis since they have potential
explanatory power in determining firms' performance changes after going public.
Till now, main sample firms' performance changes are examined. As discussed in
Chapter 6, since sample firms are drawn within a two-year IPO window period, it is
difficult to distinguish firms' performance changes are due to IPO effect or economic
effect. In the next section, further 100 non-IPO firms listed with main sample firms
are examined to identify whether the IPO effect does exist.
8.2 Performance Change Analysis (Minor Sample Firms)
Following the same procedures as those of main samples, the purpose to analyse the
minor sample firms is to identify the IPO effect on the main sample firms. The mean
and median values of performance changes of the minor sample are calculated. Then
the significance of performance change is tested by Wilcoxon-Signed Rank test.
Furthermore, the group difference between minor sample firms and main sample
firms is further tested by Kruskal-Wallis test.
8.2.1 Post-1997 versus Pre-1997 Performance Change Results
Table 8.6 presents the results of performance change of minor sample firms.
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Firms in the minor sample are drawn from all those listed firms at the end of 1998
(excluding firms that went public in 1997 and 1998, which are also main sample
firms); and their three year performance after 1997 (from 1998 to 2000) is compared
with their three year performance before 1997 (from 1994 to 1996).58
As shown in the table 8.6, firms' profitability and operating efficiency deteriorate
while output improves after 1997. The mean (median) value of return on sales
decreases from 20.68% (11.53%) to 13.04% (7.64%) and the mean (median) value of
return on equity drops from 16.1% (12.31%) to 28.44% (8.44%). The mean value of
return on assets increases from 8.26% to 17.28% while its median value declines
from 6.33% to 4.21%; and the mean value of sales to assets turnover increases from
66.46% to 362.04% while its median value decreases from 51.49% to 43.8%. The
increase in mean value of both returns on assets and sales to assets turnover might be
the result of a few extremely well performing firms, but their influence is eliminated
in median values. The mean (median) value of real sales rises from 0.7288 (0.7376)
to 1.6296 (1.2289). In terms of liquidity, the mean value of quick ratio increases
from 126.05% to 135.2% (because of outliers), but its median value decreases from
111.1%1 to 104.13%. The mean (median) value of net working capital to total assets
decreases from 18.25% (16.51%) to 14.07% (13.99%). Regarding leverage, the mean
value of total debt decreases slightly from 45.12% to 44.94%, and the median value
increases slightly from 44.50% to 45.12%, which suggests that the total debt does not
change much. The mean (median) value of long-term leverage decreases from
13.60% (9.66%) to 9.29% (4.37%) and the decrease in median value is significant at
the 1% level, which indicates that even without share issue proceeds, minor firms
still can improve their long-term leverage position.
8.2.2 Wilcoxon-Signed Rank test & Sign test Results
Wilcoxon-Signed rank test reveals that deterioration after 1997 for minor sample
firms in return on sales, return on assets, return on equity, sales assets turnover and
58 In the main sample, 79 (went public in 1997) out of 127 firms (60%) are examined during period
from 1994 to 2000, 48 (went public in 1998) out of 127 firms (40%) are examined during period from
1995 to 2001. Based on the fact that the majority of firms in the main sample are examined during
1994 to 2000, minor sample firms are also examined based on this time period.
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real sales are significant at the 1% level, and their respective proportion tests are
also significant at 1% level. The median changes in quick ratio and total debt are not
significant and net working capital to total assets decreases significantly at the 10%
level. The non-significant change in quick ratio and significant deterioration in net
working capital indicate that minor firms do not have the chance to use IPO proceeds
as the main sample firms to improve their short-term liquidity positions. However,
with only 45% of firms experience declined performance in both liquidity ratio and
net working capital to total assets, the fact that none of these two proportion test is
significant further suggests that deterioration in liquidity and leverage are not
prevalent in minor sample firms. Meanwhile, with only 44% of firms experiencing
increase in total debt level, the proportion test is not significant; which suggests that
the increase in total debt is not prevalent in minor sample firms. With 63% of firms
experiencing decrease in long-term debt level, the proportion test is significant at the
1% level, which suggests that minor sample firms also manage to reduce their long-
term borrowing. In addition, given the non-significant change in total debt ratio,
minor sample firms might increase short-term borrowing.
In general, it seems that the minor sample firms also perform badly comparing their
three years' performance after 1997 with their three years' performance before 1997.
Both profitability and operating efficiency in terms of return on sales, return on
assets, return on equity and sales to assets turnover deteriorated, with only
improvement in real sales. Meanwhile, the deterioration in liquidity is not prevalent
in minor sample firms. In addition, minor sample firms even manage to reduce their
long-term debt significantly, but not total debt.
So, what are the differences in performance changes between main sample firms
(IPO firms) and minor sample firms (non-IPO firms)? Given the similar seven-year
window period or same economic cycle, if main sample firms perform differently
from minor sample firms, IPO effect might exist. Otherwise, IPO has no impact on
firm performance and main sample firms' performance changes are purely due to
economic effect as minor sample firms. In the following section, performance
changes of the main sample firms and minor sample firms are compared with each
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other to identify the effect of IPO. Since the main sample firms and minor sample
firms are two independent groups, group difference is further tested by Kruskal-
Wallis test.
8.3 Comparison of Performance Changes between Main Sample
Firms & Minor Sample Firms
8.3.1 Initial Comparisons
The results of performance changes of main sample firms in table 8.1 and minor
sample firms in table 8.6 are examined again and the comparison of percentage of
firms experiencing improved or deteriorated performance and the significance of the
proportion test are summarised in table 8.7.
Table 8.7 Initial Comparison of Performance Proxies between
Main Sample & Minor Sample Firms
This table compares percentage of firms experiencing expected performance changes and
significance of those changes between main sample firms and minor sample firms.
Main Sample Firms Minor Sample Firms
(%) (1740 Sig. (%) (174) Sig.
Profitability
AROS 66.14% 4 *** 73% 4 ***
AROA 92.13% 4 *** 78% 4 ***
AROE 95.28% 4 *** 74% 4 ***
Operating Efficiency
ASAT 89.76% 4 *** 66% 4 ***
Liquidity
AQR 81.89% T *** 45% 4 -
ANWCTA 76.38% t *** 45% 4 -
Leverage
ALEVI 91.34% t *** 44% 4 -
ALEV2 72.44% t *** 63% T ***
Output
AReal Sales 94.49% T *** 77% T ***
%: Percentage of firms experience expected performance change.
T: Improved performance as expected.
4-: Declined performance, not as expected.
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Sig.: Significance of proportion of firms experiencing that particular performance change.
*** Indicates significance at the one percent level.
** Indicates significance at the five percent level.
* Indicates significance at the ten percent level.
Note:
Based on the survey study of 257 firms listed at the Shanghai Stock Exchange, Tenev et al
(2002) document only 8% of sample firms' tradable shares represent more than 50% of all
shares. Similarly, within the main sample in this thesis, only 4 firms are with dominant
shareholders of private investors. Therefore both main and minor sample firms share the
similar feature of dominant non-tradable state and legal person shares, and the shareholding
structure is not considered in performance comparison.
As reported in table 8.7:
■ Percentage of firms with deteriorated profitability in terms of return on sales,
return on assets and return on equity are 66.14%, 92.13% and 95.28%
respectively for main sample firms and these three proportion tests are significant
at the 1% level, compared to 73%, 78% and 74% of those of minor sample firms
respectively and three proportion tests are also significant at the 1% level. Except
that there are 66.14% main sample firms that show deteriorated performance in
return on sales compared with 73% of minor sample firms; more main samples
firms show deteriorated performance in both return on assets and return on
equity. Therefore, for the majority of profitability measures, main sample firms
underperform minor sample firms.
■ Regarding operating efficiency, 89.76% of main sample firms show decreased
sales to assets turnover, while only 66% of minor sample firms perform badly.
Therefore, main sample firms underperform minor sample firms in operating
efficiency measure.
■ For liquidity measures, 81.89% and 76.38% of main sample firms show
improved quick ratio and net working capital to total assets and these two
proportion tests are both significant at the 1% level. Meanwhile, minor sample
firms show no significant deterioration in liquidity measures. As mentioned
earlier, main sample firms' liquidity improvement might be due to the share issue
proceeds; but without share issue proceeds, minor sample firms do not show
significant deterioration in liquidity. In this regard, main sample firms do not
outperform minor samples firms in liquidity measures.
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■ For leverage measures, 91.34% and 72.44% of main sample firms show reduced
total debt and long-term debt levels and these two proportion tests are both
significant at the 1% level. Meanwhile, minor sample firms show no significant
change in total debt but the decrease in long-term debt is significant at the 1%
level. In other words, given the non-significant change in total debt, the minor
sample firms manage to reduce their long-term debt but have to increase short-
term borrowing. Therefore, main sample firms outperform minor sample firms in
reducing total debt by simply using share issue proceeds to payback debt, but
minor sample firms performance equally well as main sample firms do in
reducing long-term debt.
■ For output, 77% of minor sample firms show increased real sales compared to
94.49% of main sample firms and both proportion tests are significant at the 1%
level. Therefore main sample firms perform better than minor sample firms in
output measure do.
8.3.2 Performance Comparison between Main & Minor Sample Firms -
Kruskal-Wallis Test Results
The performance of main and minor sample firms is further compared through
Kruskal-Wallis test. The performance changes of main and minor sample firms, the
respective Wilcoxon signed-rank test results and the Kruskal-Wallis group difference
test results are summarised in table 8.8.
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Wilcoxon signed rank test shows that both main and minor firms experience
performance deterioration in return on sales, return on assets, return on equity, sales
assets turnover, and real output, and they are all significant at the 1% level. For
instance, the median value of return on sales decreases from 11.53% to 7.64% and
from 14.65% to 14.03% for minor and main sample firms respectively. The median
value of return on assets decreases from 6.33% to 4.21% and from 11.65% to 5.97%
for minor and main sample firms respectively. In leverage measures, the median
value of long-term debt decreases from 9.66% to 4.37% and from 16.24% to 4.45%
for minor and main sample firms respectively, and they are significant at the 1%
level, which suggests that main sample firms experience larger long-term debt
reduction. The improvement in quick ratio is significant at 1% level for main sample
firms, and there is no significance deterioration found in minor sample firms. The
reduction in total debt is significant at 1% level for main sample firms, and there is
no significance increase in total debt found in minor sample firms. The results might
suggest that main sample firms use share issue proceeds to pay short-term debt.
The Kruskal-Wallis test results reveal that the main sample and the minor sample are
significantly different from each other in all performance measures. Minor sample
firms outperform main sample firms in return on assets, return on equity and sales
assets turnover, with mean ranks of 133.36, 152.24 and 144.67 compared to 98.76,
83.39 and 89.85 of main sample firms respectively. The p values suggest that the
differences between the two samples are significant at the 1% level.
But minor sample firms underperform main sample firms in return on sales and real
sales, with mean ranks of 105.63 and 102.43 compared to 120.59 and 123.11 of main
sample firms respectively. The p values suggest that the differences between these
two samples firms are significant at the 10% and 5% level respectively.
Minor sample firms underperform main sample firms in liquidity and leverage
measures, with quick ratio and net working capital mean ranks of 85 and 84.72
compared to 136.83 and 137.06 of the main sample firms, and the group differences
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are significant at the 1% level. Regarding leverage, minor sample firms have higher
total debt and long-term debt mean ranks of 152.77 and 129.13 compared to 83.47
and 102.09 of main sample firms, and the group differences are significant at the 1%
level for both total and long-term debt. The above results are summarised in the
following table 8.9.
Table 8.9 Summary of Comparison of Performance Change
between Main Sample Firms & Minor Sample Firms
This table compares mean ranks (in Table 8.8, ppl60-161) of performance proxies between
main sample firms and minor sample firms, the significance of such differences in ranks and











AROS 105.63 120.59 * MAIN
AROA 133.36 98.76 *** MINOR
AROE 152.24 83.89 *** MINOR
Operating Efficiency
ASAT 144.67 89.85 *** MINOR
Liquidity
AQR 85.00 136.83 *** MAIN
ANWCTA 84.72 137.06 *** MAIN
Leverage
ALEVI 152.77 83.47 *** MAIN
ALEV2 129.13 102.09 *** MAIN
Output
AReal Sales 102.43 123.11 ** MAIN ;
*** Indicates significance of group difference at 1% level.
** Indicates significance of group difference at 5% level.
* Indicates significance of group difference at 10% level
Table 8.9 indicates that:
■ Minor sample firms perform better in most of profitability and operating
efficiency measures in terms of return on assets, return on equity and sales to
assets turnover, which suggests that minor sample firms are more capable of
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producing return for their shareholders, generating cash from assets and
providing higher sales assets efficiency.
■ Main sample firms outperform minor sample firms in return on sales and real
sales, but the difference between main sample firms and minor sample firms are
only at 10% and 5% respectively. When comparing their respective mean ranks,
minor sample firms do not perform very differently from main sample firms in
both return on sales and real sales, given the fact that output is an approximate
measure of firm performance compared to profitability measures. In this context,
newly listed firms normally embark on new investments using share issue
proceeds, which may result in slight better performance for main sample firms in
both sales and return on sales.
■ Main sample firms perform better in liquidity and leverage than minor sample
firms and group difference in quick ratio, net working capital to total assets, total
debt and long-term debt are all significant at the 1% level, which may be mainly
attributable to the fact that main sample firms use issue proceeds to repay their
short-term and long-term debts to improve their liquidity and leverage positions.
Therefore the results suggest that IPO does have effect on firm performance. As
expected, it improves liquidity and reduces debt, but fails to improve firms'
profitability and operating efficiency.
8.4 Performance Change Analysis Summary
8.4.1 Findings
The overall results suggest that, for the newly privatised Chinese firms, not as
expected, their profitability and operating efficiency performance deteriorate, while
liquidity, leverage and output performance improve as predicted after IPO.
Specifically, return on sales, return on assets, return on equity and sales to total assets
drop after IPO while quick ratio, net working capital and real sales all increase and
total debt and long-term debt ratios decrease. The possible explanation could be that
for newly listed firms, share issue proceeds might partially fund new investments and
partially pay the firms' short-term and long-term debts, and therefore the firms' real
sales (output) will improve and leverage will be reduced anyway. While profitability
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and efficiency measures, such as return on sales, return on equity, return on assets
and sales to assets turnover, are true benchmarks (not absolute measures) and do not
necessarily improve as more cash are injected into the newly listed firms. Their
improvement is based on whether a firm can generate sound net profits to deliver
good return on sales, return on equity and return on assets. In addition, firms with
dominant shareholder of state and legal person do not perform differently; as well as
firms from regulated and non-regulated industries. It is not known why firms went
public in 1997 have significant higher net working capital to total assets than firms
went public in 1998 do. The possible reason could be that firms went public in 1997
have greater concern to improve their liquidity as the financial crisis started in Asia
in 1997. It is also not known why firms from industrial sector produce significant
higher return on sales than firms from miscellaneous sector do. The possible
explanation is that since firms from miscellaneous sector are more diversified than
firms from industrial sector are, it might be more difficult for the former to improve
return on sales if corporate management and corporate governance are not mature
enough to deal with more complicated business activities.
Through examining the performance differences between the main sample firms and
minor sample firms, it is found that minor sample firms (non-IPO firms) and main
sample firms (IPO firms) do not show the same performance pattern and group
differences are significant for all performance measures. Specifically, main sample
firms underperform minor sample firms in three important profitability and
efficiency measures - return on assets, return on equity, sales assets turnover. Main
sample firms performing better than minor sample firms in return on sales and real
sales might be the results of expanded businesses and subsequent improved output.
Main sample firms' good performance in liquidity and leverage could be the
consequence of issue proceeds in exchange of debts. In sum, main sample firms do
not perform better than minor sample firms do, or IPO firms do not perform better
than non-IPO firms do. Given the same economic conditions, IPO does not bring
positive instead of negative effect on firms' overall performance. The results suggest
that IPO firms' post-IPO performance is worse than their pre-IPO performance. Even
compared with non-IPO firms, they underperform in most profitability and operating
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efficiency measures, with mainly improvements in liquidity and leverage. Therefore
going public does not help the newly privatised firms to perform better. Therefore
the results suggest that IPO does have effect on firm performance. As expected, it
improves liquidity and reduces debt, but fails to improve firms' profitability and
operating efficiency.
8.4.2 Comparison of Findings between this Thesis & other
Privatisation Studies
The findings of this thesis in performance changes are not consistent with major
empirical studies comparing post-privatisation versus pre-privatisation performance
changes for firms privatised via share issue privatisation, with just some consistency
with one recent country study on China, but not across all performance proxies. In
these share issue privatisation studies, newly privatised firms mainly show
improvement in efficiency and profitability, and reduction in leverage.
Megginson et al (1994) conduct international empirical analysis of 61 newly
privatised companies via share issue privatisation from 18 countries, and their results
document strong performance improvements in return on sales, return on assets and
return on equity after going public. The improvement is also reflected on higher
employment and higher dividend payout, which are not measured in this thesis due to
lack of data. Boubakri and Cosset (1998) compare average three years post-
privatisation to pre-privatisation financial and operating performance of 79 firms
from 21 developing countries over the period 1980-1992. They document significant
post-privatisation increases in output (real sales), operating efficiency, profitability,
capital investment spending, dividend payments, and employment - as well as
significant decreases in leverage. D'Souza et al (1999) document significant
improvement in return on sales and return on assets, but not return on equity in their
study of performance of 61 companies from 18 countries. D'Souza et al (2001)
provide evidence of performance improvement of a sample of 118 companies
privatised through share offering from 29 countries, and the performance
improvement on sales, employment, capital expenditure and debt level are also
significant. It seems common that after going public, firms' profitability, operating
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efficiency, real output and liquidity will rise and leverage level will fall and short-
term and long-term borrowing will drop. Dewenter and Malatesta (2001) calculate
the levels of the performance measures over different periods around privatisation
and draw inferences from changes in the levels. Their sample includes 63 global
firms listed in the Privatisation International data set and the study of Megginson et
al (1994). In addition to profitability measures of ROS, ROE, ROA, and labor
intensity measure, they calculate two more leverage measures in terms of debt to
equity and long-term debt to equity. They confirm the results of Megginson et al
(1994) who report significant increases in return on sales and return on assets during
the three years after privatisation, but most of the profitability measures are actually
lower during the three years following privatisation than during the three years
before privatisation. They argue that government may effectively restructure at least
some firms before selling them59; therefore if government restructure firms and
improve their performance before privatisation, then the improvements cannot be
attributed to the change of ownership.
In one empirical study on China employing MNR methodology, Chen et al (2000)
examines 275 share issue privatisations during 1991 in 1995 (most of the listings
took place in 1992 and 1993) in China. They document that return on assets, return
on equity and sales to total assets deteriorate significantly after going public, but
return on sales does not change much (slight improvement) and real sales just show
modest gains. It is not clear why return on sales and real sales do not change much
and the most puzzling one is why real sales do not show substantial gains. In fact
newly privatised firms normally expand their businesses by using capital raised from
the capital market and their output is expected to go up. The improvement in output
does not mean that firms perform better because real sales or output is an absolute
performance benchmark, instead firms' output should simply reflect the reality of the
economic environment of the country. For instance, from the middle 90's till 2001,
China's GDP keeps at around 7% to 8%, which is a good indication of an increase in
output of all companies. Since their sample are drawn from IPO firms during the
59 One example they give is that Japan National Railways reduced its workforce by approximately
200,000 and was split into seven separate rail companies before any share were sold to investors.
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period of 1991 to 1995, where financial accounts of firms that went public early on
are less reliable due to loose accounting legislation, therefore selecting these firms in
the first place is questionable. This may be part of the reason why firms' return on
sales does not change much after going public. If both pre-IPO and post-IPO sales
figures were inflated due to poor accounting standards or fabricated by these firms at
that time, change in sales cannot be correctly observed.
The results of this thesis are not only different from major studies of share issue
privatisation, but also different from only country study on China by Chen et al
(2000). The major privatisation studies employing MNR methodology and findings
of this thesis are summarised in following table 8.10.
Table 8.10 Comparison of Results of Privatisation Studies
Employing MNR Methodology
This table compares the results of major studies of share issue privatisation, the only country
study on China and the findings of this thesis.
ROS ROA ROE SALES LEVI SAT Sale/Emp INV EMP DIV
Megginson et al (1994) + + + + n/a + + 0 +
Boubakri et al (1998) + + + + n/a + + 0 +
D'Souza et al (1999) + + 0 + + n/a + 0 0 +
D'Souza et al (2001) + n/a n/a + n/a + + 0 n/a
Dewenter et al (2001) + + - n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
China:
Chen et al (2000) 0 - - 0 - n/a + n/a n/a
Thesis' Results - - - + - n/a n/a n/a n/a
+: represents significant increase in performance proxies
represents significant decrease in performance proxies
0: represents no change or non-significant change in performance proxies
n/a: not measured in that particular study
(ROS, ROA, ROE, SALES, LEVI and SAT represent return on sales, return on assets, return on
equity, real sales, total debt ratio and sales to assets turnover, and these are part of performance
proxies measured in this thesis. Sale/EMP, INV, EMP and DIV represent employee sales efficiency, real
capital expenditures, employment and dividend payout respectively and they are not measured in this thesis due
to availability of data.
Megginson et al (1994), Boubakri and Cosset (1998) and D'Souza et al (2001)
document significant improvement in real sales after going public for their samples.
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In contrast, this thesis finds that return on equity, return on assets and return on sales
do not improve in newly privatised firms in China. Contrary to the results from Chen
et al (2000), this thesis further finds that return on sales deteriorates significantly
after going public, which is documented as slight improvement by Chen et al (2000).
Consistent with Chen et al (2000), the findings of this thesis confirm that operating
efficiency in terms of sales assets turnover deteriorated after going public. In regard
to real output, consistent with Megginson et al (1994), D'Souza et al (2000), and
Boubakri and Cosset (1998), this thesis confirms that firms' real sales do increase
significantly after going public, but return on sales deteriorates significantly which
indicates poor performance of newly privatised firms. In contrast, Chen et al (2000)
document only modest gains in real sales for newly privatised firms in China. The
increase in quick ratio and net working capital indicates that share issue proceeds do
improve firms' short-term liquidity as they are used to fund new investments.
Consistent with Megginson et al (1994), D'Souza et al (2001) and Boubakri and
Cosset (1998) and Chen et al (2000), the common finding of this thesis with the
privatisation studies mentioned above is that total debt and long-term debt decrease
as expected after going public. The drop in total debt and long-term debt suggest that
new proceeds be used not only to pay short-term debt to improve short-term
liquidity, but also long-term debt.
So, if newly listed firms perform worse after going public in China, what are the
determinants in firms' performance changes? In the next chapter, regression analysis
is performed to identify the determinants in firms' performance changes after IPO.
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Chapter 9 Performance Change Regression Analysis
This chapter presents a performance change regression analysis of main sample firms
to identify determinants in firms' performance changes after going public.
9.1 Variables & Hypotheses
In developing performance models, cross-sectional Ordinary Least Squares
regression is employed to identify determinants of firms' performance change (post-
IPO versus pre-IPO). As discussed earlier in the research methodology, the potential
determinants or explanatory variables in performance changes include not only
ownership variables, but also other corporate governance variables in the Chinese
context, such as human capital, share issue size, board size, executive cross-sitting
etc. Then change in performance proxies - APFMs (e.g. AROS, AROE etc.) - is
regressed against the above explanatory variables, and the expected models are as
follows:
APFMs = Po + PiST + p2LP + p3PLC + p4EMP + p5CON + p6HMC
+ p7SSIZE + p8BOD + p9CRS + P,0ASIZE + pnGrouping
Variables + s
The definition of explanatory and dependent variables of regression models,
considerations in model developing and regression results are presented in the
following section in detail.
9.1.1 Dependent Variables
Dependent variables APFMs are changes in firms' performance proxies three years
after going public versus three years before going public, including:
■ profitability measures of change in return on sales (AROS), change in return on
assets (AROA) and change in return on equity (AROE);
■ output measure of change in real sales (ASALES)
■ efficiency measure of change in sales assets turnover (ASAT);
■ liquidity measures of change in working capital to total assets (ANWCTA) and
change in quick ratio (AQR),
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■ leverage measures of change in total debt (ALEV1) and change in long-term debt
(ALEV2).
Therefore, three profitability models (AROS, AROA and AROE), one output model
(ASALES), one efficiency model (ASAT), two liquidity models (ANWCTA and
AQR), and two leverage models (ALEV1, ALEV2) are developed respectively.
9.1.2 Independent Variables
As mentioned earlier, firm's ownership structures under study are three years
average percentage of share owned by state, legal persons, private individuals and
employees respectively. Generally ownership structures of newly privatised firms are
seldom changed during three years after going public. For instance, Fung et al (2001)
document that the mean state ownership is 0.57, 0.55 and 0.56 in 1998, 1999 and
2000 respectively for listed firms in China. Therefore the average three years post-
IPO state ownership properly reflects firms' state ownership after IPO. Similarly, the
ownership of legal person and private ownership are calculated in the same way.
Another concern is employee ownership. There are only 36 firms in 127 sample
firms with the presence of employee ownership; therefore this explanatory variable is
transformed into dummy variable to improve its explanatory power.
Table 9.1 defines ownership variables and other explanatory variables employed in
performance change regression analysis. These variables are based on theoretical and
empirical grounds, such as Herfindahal index of ownership concentration, human
capital, issue size, total number of board directors, total number of cross-sitting
between directors and executives as well as two category variables of listing year and
t 60sector .
60 These two category variables are based on early analysis of performance changes by group, and it is
found listing year and sector may have impact on firms' performance changes.
171
Table 9.1 Definition of Explanatory Variables in Performance
Change Regression Analysis
This table defines the explanatory variables in regression analysis of performance changes.
These variables are potential determinants of performance change after IPO.
Variables Proxy for Empirical Definition




Percentage of shares owned by legal person j
after going pubic
PLC Private Ownership Percentage of shares owned by private
individuals after going public
CON Concentration Ratio Herfindahal index of ownership concentration
is the sum of squared percentage of
shares controlled by each top 5 shareholder
HMC Human Capital Percentage of members of senior
management team holding university degree
SSIZE Share Issue Size Issue proceeds from IPO, which is used to test
the impact on firm performance
ASIZE Total Assets Size The total assets of the firm at the year end
before IPO, used to control firm size
BOD Directors on Board Total numbers of board members
CRO Cross-sitting Total number of executive members sitting
on board as board directors
EMP Employee Ownership Dummy variable with value=l if
firms with employee ownership, value=0 if
without.
YR Listing Year Dummy variable with value=l if
firms went public in 1997, value=0 if
firms went public in 1998.
IND Industrial/
Non-Industrial Sector
Dummy variable with value=l, if
firms are in industrial sector; value=0,
otherwise.
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Therefore possible explanatory variables are as follows:
ST = average three years after going public percentage of shares
owned by the government;
LP = average three years after going public percentage of shares
owned by legal person shareholders;
PLC = average three years after going public percentage of shares
owned by private investors;
EMP = 1, if firms with employee ownership; 0, otherwise;
CON = Herfindahal index (HI) of ownership concentration of top five
shareholders;
HMC = percentage of members of senior management team holding
university degrees;
SSIZE = log of share issue size (in million Chinese Yuan);
BOD = total number of board of directors (board size);
CRS = total number of senior executives sitting on board as directors;
ASIZE = log of total assets of the firm (in million Chinese Yuan) at the
year end before going public;
e = regression error term.
The grouping variables - sector and year - are added into regression models as
potential independent variables because Kruskal-Wallis test of group difference of
performance changes by either sector or year shows significance within the
respective subgroups. Therefore the grouping variables are:
YR = 1, if firms went public in 1997; 0, if firms went public in 1998.
IND = 1, if firms in industrial sector; otherwise 0.
The statistics of independent variables are summarised in table 9.2.
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Table 9.2 summarises the mean, median, standard deviation, minimum and
maximum values of each explanatory variable. The median, minimum and maximum
values of human capital are 33%, 0 and 88% respectively. Therefore the worst case is
that a firm simply does not have any senior management members with a university
degree, while the best case is that a firm has 88% of senior management members
with university degrees. The education and knowledge level of senior management
members is expected to have a profound impact on a firm's performance. Average
board size is around 11 directors, and the smallest board size is 7 and the largest size
is 21. It is expected that the larger the board size is, the less efficient the board is.
Cross-sitting between board and executives is on average no more than two persons
for both mean and median values, with minimum of 0 and maximum of 5 persons. It
is expected that more cross-sitting would have negative effect on firm performance.
Share issue size also varies with average of CY345m, minimum of CY3.8m and
maximum of CY2590m61. Since IPO proceeds are generally injected into firms for
further investment therefore share issue size is employed to predict the impact of
cash injection on firm performance. Total assets of the firm at the end of year prior to
IPO is employed to control firm size. The mean and median values of total assets are
CY825m and CY384m respectively, with the smallest assets size of CY78m and
largest of CY23b. Ownership concentration index is around 30%, with minimum of
3.5% and maximum of 72.2%. In terms of ownership structures, the minimum state,
legal person and employee ownership are zero respectively, while the maximum
values for state, legal person and private ownership are 95.4%, 75% and 52%
respectively. Employee ownership is generally very low, and the mean and median
values are 3% and 0 respectively, but the maximum value is 36.8%. There are only
36 out of 127 total sample firms with the presence of employee ownership, employee
ownership is then transformed into dummy variable in the regression analysis.
9.1.3 Regression Hypotheses
The regression hypotheses are summarised in the following table 9.3.
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Table 9.3 Summary of Regression Hypotheses
This table summarises the regression hypotheses in the regression analysis. DVs represent dependent
variables (or models) in terms of change in performance proxies, namely AROS, AROA, AROE,
ASAT, ASALES, AQR, ANWCTA, ALEVland ALEV2. IVs represent independent variables in terms
of state, private, employee ownership, ownership concentration, human capital, share issue size, board
size and cross-sitting between executives and board directors.
\DVs
IVs\
AROS AROA AROE ASAT ASALES AQR ANWCTA ALEVI ALEV2
ST - - - - - - - + +
PLC + + + + + + + - -
EMP + + + + + + + + +
CON + + + + + + + - -
HMC + + + + + + + - -
SSIZE + + + + + + + - -
BOD - - - - - - - + +
CRS - - - - - - - + +
Note: +: Represents significant positive relationship between independent and dependent variables
Represents significant negative relationship between independent and dependent variables
As shown in the table 9.3, it is expected that state ownership is negatively associated
with profitability, efficiency and liquidity measures, but also positively associated
with leverage. Private ownership and legal person ownership are expected to
improve profitability, efficiency and liquidity performance, as well as to reduce
leverage. The presence of employee ownership is expected to improve profitability,
efficiency and liquidity performance, but also increases both total and long-term
borrowing. It is also expected that ownership concentration, human capital and share
issue size are positively associated with all performance measures except negatively
associated with leverage. Board size and cross-sitting of executives as board
directors are expected to have negative impact on profitability, efficiency and
liquidity performance, but are positively associated with leverage.
In model developing, each dependent variable is regressed against all explanatory
variables, including grouping variables; and assets size is used to control firm size.
61 The exchange rate between British Pound and Chinese Yuan is around 1:13 in June 2003.
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9.2 Considerations in Model Developing
Nine performance change regression models are developed to predict the explanatory
power of those explanatory variables defined in table 9.1 and to identify the major
drivers in each performance change proxy or dependent variable. Prior to model
developing, some issues need to be clarified.
9.2.1 Linear Models
Before running the regression, the scatterplots of dependent variable by each
explanatory variable are examined to determine whether linear relationship is present
and linear model is a reasonable model for these variables. The scatterplots results
show that linear relationships are present.
9.2.2 Regression Methods
There are different regression methods in entering explanatory variables in SPSS,
such as hierarchical, forced entry, and stepwise methods. In hierarchical regression,
explanatory variables are selected based on past work and known predictors should
be entered into the model first in order of their importance in predicting dependent
variable. Forced entry is a method in which all explanatory variables are forced into
the model simultaneously, and this method relies on good theoretical reasons for
including the chosen explanatory variables. Since there is no literature providing
convincing performance determinants in a single country study, therefore stepwise
method is employed to explore the relationship between performance changes and
explanatory variables. In the stepwise method, an initial model that contains only the
constant is defined, then the explanatory variable that has the highest simple
correlation with the dependent variable is selected and retained in the model. Then
the explanatory variable that can explain the biggest part of remaining variance of
dependent variable is selected, and so on. The advantage of stepwise method is that
the assumption of no perfect multicollinearity between two or more of the
explanatory variables cannot be violated.
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9.2.3 Outliers
Outliers are those observations that are far removed from the rest of the observations.
Marsh (1990) suggests that there are four possible causes: arising from a procedural
error, such as a data entry error or a mistake in coding; an observation that occurs as
the result of an extraordinary event, in this case, an explanation exists for the
uniqueness of the observation; the extraordinary observations for which the analyst
has no explanation; contains observations that fall within the ordinary range of
values on each of the variables but are unique in their combination of values across
the variables. An observation with large standardised residuals is the potential outlier
and is further investigated in this thesis.
9.2.4 Multicollinearity
In multiple regression models, there should be no exact or perfect linear relationship
between any of the explanatory variables in the model. Table 9.4 summarises the
Pearson correlation matrix of the explanatory variables.
Table 9.4 Pearson Correlation Matrix of Explanatory Variables
in Performance Regression Analysis
This table presents correlation matrix of explanatory variables (excluding dummy variables),
and Pearson correlation between any two explanatory variables is presented accordingly.
HMC, BOD, CRS, SSIZE, CON, ST, LP, PLC and ASIZE represent human capital, board
size, cross-sitting as board directors and executives, share issue size, Herfindahal index of





BOD CRS SSIZE CON ST LP PLC ASIZE
BOD .044 1
CRS -.001 .070 1
SSIZE .210 .092 -.063 1
CON .122 .099 .127 .364 1
ST .113 .082 .077 .208 .537 1
LP -.094 -.022 -.104 -.139 -.327 -.936 1
PLC -.121 -.118 .030 -.112 -.399 -.224 .061 1
ASIZE .208 .103 .009 .577 .378 .297 -.236 -.540 1
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Table 9.4 reveals that explanatory variable of state ownership is nearly perfectly
correlated with legal person ownership, and the Pearson correlation between the two
is -0.936. Both state and legal person shares are non-tradable at stock exchanges and
these shares can mainly be transferred between state and legal person shareholders in
informal transfer market through negotiation. When state shares are transferred to
legal person shareholders, state shareholding reduces while legal person ownership
increases. Because of their perfect negative correlation, they can not be both included
in the regression analysis. If the effect of dominant shareholder - either state or legal
person - on firm performance exists, then a dummy variable has to be used;
otherwise one of them can be omitted from analysis. Early results in chapter 8 show
that the presence of the dominant shareholder - state or legal person - does not affect
firms' performance after IPO, therefore either state or legal person ownership can be
eliminated from the regression analysis. In the regression analysis, state ownership is
chosen as one of the explanatory variables.
9.2.5 Heteroscedasticity
Heteroscedasticity or unequal variance across observations often occurs in cross
sectional studies. Heteroscedasticity leads to inefficiencies, since multiple regression
gives equal weight to all observations, which means large residuals have as much
weight in the model as small residuals. Therefore heteroscedasticity needs to be
tested and corrected to meet the assumption of homoscedasticity that means at each
level of the explanatory variable, the variance of the residual terms should be
constant and independent of the explanatory variables.
■ Test Heteroscedasticity
There are many tests available to detect potential heteroscedasticity, such as RESET
test, White test and so on. According to Maddala (1992), if the sample is not
particularly large (with 127 firms in this thesis), Goldfeld-Quandt test is best
employed to test the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity. Before testing for
heteroscedasticity, Pindyck and Rubinfeld (1998) suggest that a useful first
procedure is the informal check of the pattern of the residuals to see whether
estimated error variances (squared residuals) differ from observation to observation.
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For cross section models, they suggest that a plot of the error variances against one
or several explanatory variables (Xj) or against the predicted value of independent
variable (Y) will serve the purpose. For instance, if error variances differ across
explanatory variable Xj, then Goldfeld-Quandt test can be employed to test the null
hypothesis of homoscedasticity. In Goldfeld-Quandt test, sample firms are split into
two groups - one corresponding to large values of an explanatory X; and the other
corresponding to small values of the explanatory variable Xj, fit separate regressions
for each and then apply an F-test to test the equality of error variances62. If the error
variances associated with each regression line are approximately equal, the
homoscedasticity assumption cannot be rejected, but if the error variances are
substantially different, the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity can be rejected.
Therefore, the Goldfeld-Quandt test can easily be applied to the general linear model
by ordering the observations by the magnitude of one of the explanatory variables.
But Maddala (1992) suggests that if there are two or more independent variables and
none of them can provide a satisfactory ordering, then Y, the predicted value of
dependent variable Y, can be used.
■ Correct Heteroscedasticity
In order to correct heteroscedasticity, Weighted Least Square procedure is employed
and this estimation procedure is accomplished by weighting the original data and
then performing ordinary least-squares estimation on the transformed model. As
suggested by Pindyck and Rubinfeld (1998), if original model is specified as:
Yj - Pi + p2X2j + P3X3; +.. .+PkXki + 8j (A)
Where: Yj - Independent Variable
pk: - Coefficients
Xki: - Dependent Variables
Sj - Error term
62 Maddala (1992) suggests omitting some observations in the middle to increase the ability to
discriminate between the two error variances. Pindyck and Rubinfeld (1998) suggest that the selection
of middle observations to eliminate from the test is arbitrary, for instance, to be one-fifth of the total
sample size.
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To use weighted least squares in the multiple regression, variables in the original
regression model of equation (A) need to be redefined as:
Yi* = Pi *+ P2X2i*+ P3X3i*+...+PkXki*+ a*
or equivalently
Y, (1/CTi) = pi (1/Gi) + p2 (X21/CJ,) + p3 (X3i /CTi) +...+pk (Xki/Gi) + a (1/CTi)
(B)
Now the transformed error term a* or si (1/Gi) in equation (B) is homoscedastic and
has constant variance: Var (si*) = Var (a/ai) = Var (a) / ai2 = ai2 / ai2 = 1. Therefore
the weighting procedure yields efficient parameter estimators in that the transformed
model by construction satisfies constant error variance and heteroscedasticity is
corrected and assumption of homoscedasticity is met.
9.3 Regression Results
The following section presents detailed results of five performance models and
respective outliers. The five performance change models are profitability models of
AROS model, AROA model, AROE model; output model of ASALES and leverage
model of ALEV1 model. There is no significant relationship between long-term
leverage and explanatory variables, therefore ALEV2 model cannot be developed.
The adjusted R2 are much lower than 20% in the efficiency model of ASAT model,
liquidity models of AQR model and ANWC model, therefore they are not presented
here63. The outliers in each regression model and the Ordinary Least Squares
regression results to identify determinants in performance changes are summarised in
the following table 9.5 and table 9.6 respectively.
63 These three models are summarised in Appendix 9.1 (pp302).
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Table 9.5 Summary Statistics of Full Sample Firms and
Outliers in Performance Regression Models
This table summarises the statistics of full sample and outliers in five performance regression
models: AROS, AROA, AROE, AROA, ASALES and ALEV1. The values of mean, median
and standard deviation of each performance proxy of full sample firms are presented (e.g.
ROSb represents pre-IPO return on sales, ROSa represents post-IPO return on sales and
AROS represent change in return on sales). Then the pre-IPO, post-IPO and changes in
performance proxies of outliers in each model are presented. INDM is the classification of
types of core business of the firms defined by Datastream.
Panel A: AROS Model
Full Sample (127) ROSb ROSa AROS
Mean 0.198 0.139 -0.069
Median 0.146 0.140 -0.019
Std. Deviation 0.183 0.294 0.297
Outliers (case number) ROSb ROSa AROS Sector INDM
33 0.098 -2.4932 -2.5909 Industrial Electronic Equipment
47 0.499 -1.1549 -1.6535 Miscellaneous Electronic Equipment
63 1.1230 0.2955 -0.8275 Industrial Steel
74 0.989 0.192 -0.797 Miscellaneous Textiles + Leather
Panel B: AROA Model
Full Sample (127) ROAb ROAa AROA
Mean 0.136 0.059 -0.077
Median 0.116 0.060 -0.066
Std. Deviation 0.090 0.038 0.083
Outliers (case number) ROAb ROAa AROA Sector INDM
38 0.501 0.064 -0.437 Miscellaneous Broadcasting
46 0.694 0.146 -0.548 Industrial Chemicals, Speciality
56 0.460 0.081 -0.379 Utility Construction
Panel C: AROE Model
Full Sample (127) ROEb ROEa AROE
Mean 0.353 0.054 -0.300
Median 0.321 0.102 -0.223
Std. Deviation 0.237 0.326 0.389
Outliers (case number) ROEb ROEa AROE Sector INDM
33 0.140 -2.757 -2.897 Industrial Electronic Equipment
47 0.528 -1.996 -2.524 Miscellaneous Electronic Equipment
58 2.387 0.107 -2.280 Industrial Farming and Fishing
92 0.107 -0.751 -0.859 Industrial Paper
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Table 9.5 Cont'd
Panel D: ASALES Model
Full Sample (127) SALEb SALEa ASALE
Mean 0.715 1.604 0.889
Median 0.716 1.373 0.703
Std. Deviation 0.272 0.803 0.886
Outliers (case number) SALEb SALEa ASALE Sector INDM
25 0.544 4.667 4.123 Industrial Chemical, Advanced
50 0.344 5.169 4.826 Miscellaneous Computer Hardware
74 0.301 4.181 3.880 Miscellaneous Textiles + Leather Goods
96 0.936 3.814 2.878 Industrial Textiles + Leather Goods
Panel E: ALEV1 Model
Full Sample (127) LEVlb LEVla ALEVI
Mean 0.581 0.386 -0.194
Median 0.611 0.376 -0.196
Std. Deviation 0.142 0.154 0.160
Outliers (case number) LEVlb LEVla ALEVI Sector INDM
33 0.709 0.922 0.213 Industrial Electronic Equipment
47 0.441 0.684 0.243 Miscellaneous Electronic Equipment
108 0.503 0.636 0.133 Utility Water
61 0.741 0.135 -0.606 Industrial Electronic Equipment
120 0.687 0.207 -0.480 Industrial Mining
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9.3.1 Profitability Models
Three profitability models include change in return on sales (AROS), change in
return on assets (AROA) and change in return on equity (AROE).
9.3.1.1 AROS Model -Change in Return on Sales Model
AROS = 0.071 + 0.031ST + 0.034PLC + 0.006EMP - 0.008CON + 0.086HMC
(2.034) (0.380) (0.414) (0.070) (-0.099) (2.029)
+ 0.03SSIZE - 0.013BOD - 0.027CRS + 0.115ASIZE + 0.115YR + 0.037IND
(0.351) (-4.876) (-0.331) (1.374) (1.406) (2.506)
R2 = 0.214 Observations: 123
Adjusted R2 =0.194 F = 10.773 Sig. = 0.000
(Equation 9.1)
In developing the model, cases 33, 47, 63 and 74 are outliers and eliminated in the
regression model because their presence violates the assumption of constant variance
across predicted AROS. These outliers have large standardised residuals of -33.979,
-20.806, -10.145 and -9.221 respectively. Further investigation confirms that these
four firms are in electronic equipment, steel and textiles businesses. Cases 33 and 47
deliver negative return on sales during post-IPO years, and cases 63 and 74 perform
extremely well during pre-IPO years compared to their post-IPO years, which lead to
extreme deteriorated changes in return on sales compared to their pre-IPO
performance, as shown in panel A of table 9.5 (ppl82).
The scatterplots between model error variance and predicted values of change in
return on sales (AROS) and between model error variance and explanatory variables
reveal that model error variances have been constant at all levels of predicted value
of AROS. The following figure 9.1 demonstrates the scatterplots between model
error variance and predicted value of AROS.
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Figure 9.1 Scatterplots between Model Error Variance and Predicted
Value of Change in Return on Sales (AROS)
This figure demonstrates that the assumption of homoscadasticity is met since model error
variances are constant across predicted values. Cases labelled as 33, 47, 63, 74 are four
omitted cases with large standardised residuals.
-.2 -.1 0.0 .1
PREDICTED VALUE OF CHANGE IN ROS (Ustandardised)
The four omitted outliers with large standardised residuals are labelled in figure 9.1.
As a result of omission of these four outliers, the model error variances are constant
as predicted values of AROS increase and the assumption of homoscadasticity is met.
The model suggests that board size, human capital and industrial sector are the three
significant explanatory variables in explaining change in return on sales. As
expected, board size has significant negative relationship with return on sales change
and increasing one board member leads to 0.013 decrease in return on sales change.
As expected, human capital plays a positive role in return on sales improvement, and
1% increase in human capital leads to 0.086% increase in return on sales
improvement. It is also identified that if firms are from the industrial sector, they
tend to outperform firm from non-industrial sector by 0.037 in return on sales
improvement.
9.3.1.2 AROA Model -Change in Return on Assets Model
AROA = - 0.211 - 0.038ST + 0.245PLC + 0.023EMP - 0.037CON + 0.131HMC
(-3.847) (-0.421) (3.089) (2.181) (-0.327) (1.596)
- 0.078SSIZE - 0.050BOD - 0.097CRS + 0.09ASIZE + 0.004YR + 0.018IND
(-5.031) (-0.604) (-1.184) (4.822) (0.047) (1.861)
R2 = 0.258 Observations: 124
Adjusted R2 =0.226 F = 8.186 Sig. = 0.000
(Equation 9.2)
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In developing model, cases 38, 46, and 56 are three outliers and are eliminated in the
regression model because their presence violates the assumption of constant variance
across predicted AROA. These outliers have large standardised residuals of -5.071,
-8.385 and -5.194 respectively. Further investigation confirms that these three firms
are in broadcasting, chemicals and construction businesses. These three firms
perform extremely well during pre-IPO years, which leads to extreme deteriorated
changes in return on equity compared to their post-IPO performance as shown in
panel B of table 9.5 (ppl82).
The scatterplots between model error variance and predicted values of change in
return on assets (AROA) and between model error variance and explanatory variables
reveal that model error variances have been constant at all levels of predicted value
of AROA. Figure 9.2 demonstrates the scatterplots between model error variance and
predicted value of AROA.
Figure 9.2 Scatterplots between Model Error Variance and Predicted
Value of Change in Return on Assets (AROA)
This figure demonstrates that the assumption of homoscadasticity is met since model error
variances are constant across predicted values. Cases labelled as 38, 46, and 56 are three
omitted cases with large standardised residuals.
PREDICTED VALUE OF CHANGE IN ROA (Unstandardized)
The three omitted cases with large standardised residuals are labelled in figure 9.2.
As a result of omission of these three outliers, the model error variances are constant
as predicted values of AROA increase, and the assumption of homoscadasticity is
met.
The model suggests that share issue size, assets size, private ownership, the presence
of employee ownership and the industrial sector are five significant explanatory
variables. Unexpected, share issue size has negative relationship with return on
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assets, and 1% increase in share issue size leads to 0.078% decrease in return on
assets change. As predicted, private ownership is positively correlated with return on
assets improvement, in which 1% increase in private ownership leads to 0.245%
increase in return on assets improvement. Firms with employee ownership
outperform firms without employee ownership by 0.023 in return on assets
improvement. It is found that larger firms tend to perform better than smaller firms,
and 1% increase in assets size leads to 0.09% increase in return on assets change.
Finally, firms from industrial sector outperform firms from non-industrial sectors by
0.018 in return on assets improvement.
9.3.1.3 AROE Model -Change in Return on Equity Model
AROE = - 0.279 - 0.003ST + 0.385PLC + 0.096EMP - 0.169CON + 0.079HMC
(-2.043) (-0.028) (1.914) (3.099) (-1.764) (1.024)
- 0.163SSIZE + 0.035BOD - 0.027CRS + 0.139ASIZE - 0.049YR + 0.097IND
(-4.139) (0.447) (-0.358) (3.125) (-2.076) (1.285)
R2 = 0.359 Observations: 123
Adjusted R2 =0.326 F = 10.843 Sig. = 0.000
(Equation 9.3)
In developing the model, cases 33, 47, 58 and 92 are outliers and are eliminated in
the regression model because their presence violates the assumption of constant
variance across predicted AROE. These outliers have large standardised residuals of
-22.937, -18.420, -16.737 and -6.949 respectively. Further investigation confirms
that these four firms are in electronic equipment, farming and fishing and paper
businesses. Cases 33, 47 and 92 deliver negative return on equity during the post-IPO
years and case 58 performs extremely well during pre-IPO years, which leads to
extreme deteriorated changes in return on equity compared to their pre-IPO
performance, as shown in panel C of table 9.5 (ppl82).
The scatterplots between model error variance and predicted values of change in
return on equity (AROE) and between model error variance and explanatory
variables reveal that model error variances have been constant at all levels of
predicted value of AROE. Figure 9.3 demonstrates the scatterplots between model
error variance and predicted value of AROE.
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Figure 9.3 Scatterplots between Model Error Variance and Predicted
Value of Change in Return on Equity (AROE)
This figure demonstrates that the assumption of homoscadasticity is met since model error
variances are constant across predicted values. Cases labelled as 33, 47, 58 and 92 are four







The four omitted outliers with large standardised residuals are labelled in the figure
9.3. As a result of omission of these four cases, the model error variances are
constant as predicted values of AROE increase, and assumption of homoscadasticity
is met.
The model suggests that share issue size, assets size, the presence of employee
ownership, private ownership, IPO year and ownership concentration are six
significant explanatory variables in the model. As expected, private ownership is
positively associated with return on equity change and 1% increase in private
ownership leads to 0.385% increase in return on equity improvement. Meanwhile
firms with the presence of employee ownership outperform firms without employee
ownership by 0.096 in return on equity improvement. Unexpected, ownership
concentration is negatively associated with return on equity change, and 1% increase
in ownership concentration leads to 0.169% decrease in return on equity. It is also
unexpected that share issue size is negatively associated with return on equity
change, where 1% increase in share issue size contributes to 0.163% decrease in
return on equity. The model also reveals that larger firms outperform smaller firms
significantly in return on equity improvement, and 1% increase in assets size would
lead to 0.139% increase in return on equity improvement. In addition, firm went
public in 1997 underperform firms went public in 1998 by 0.049 in return on equity
improvement.
PREDICTED VALUE OF CHANGE IN ROE (Unstandardised)
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In profitability models, state ownership does not have significant influence on firm
performance. As expected, private ownership, the presence of employee ownership
and assets size are positively correlated with return on assets and return on equity
improvement. The results indicate that the pressure from private shareholders and
employees does improve firm performance in return on assets and return on equity. It
is unexpected that share issue size is negatively associated with return on assets and
return on equity improvement, which is puzzling because larger share issue size is
supposed to boost firms' profitability given the fact that all issue proceeds are
injected into firms. The possible explanation could be that firms might have a
tendency to over-invest as they receive more free cash from the financial market.
Firm size does matter in performance and larger firms outperform small firms in both
return on assets and return on equity improvement. The importance of private
ownership, the presence of employee ownership, share issue size and assets size
suggests that they are the main profitability drivers in newly listed firms. In addition,
firms from industrial sector outperform firms from non-industrial sectors in return on
sales and return on assets improvement. Unexpected, ownership concentration is
significant negatively associated with return on equity improvement. As predicted,
human capital is positively associated with return on sales improvement and board
size is negatively associated with return on sales improvement.
9.3.2 Output & Leverage Models
One output model of change in real sales (ASALES) and one leverage model of
change in return on total debt (ALEV1) are presented in following section.
9.3.2.1 ASALES Model -Change in Real Sales Model
ASALES = 0.382 - 0.063ST + 1.873PLC + 0.041EMP - 0.066CON + 1.069HMC
(0.570) (-0.759) (2.215) (0.492) (-0.744) (3.228)
+ 0.147SSIZE + 0.078BOD - 0.017CRS - 0.53ASIZE + 0.026YR - 0.038IND
(1.457) (3.679) (-0.210) (-3.130) (0.318) (-0.479)
R2 = 0.274 Observations: 123
Adjusted R2 = 0.250 F = 11.155 Sig. = 0.000
(Equation 9.4)
191
In developing the model, cases 50, 74, 25, and 96 are outliers and are eliminated in
the regression model because their presence violates the assumption of constant
variance across predicted ASALES. These outliers have large standardised residuals
of 7.167, 5.391, 5.277 and 3.898 respectively. Further investigation confirms that
these firms are in chemical, computer hardware and textiles businesses. These four
firms increase sales dramatically during post-IPO years, which leads to their extreme
improvement in real sales compared to their pre-IPO performance, as shown in panel
D of table 9.5 (ppl83).
The scatterplots between model error variance and predicted values of change in
sales (ASALES) and between model error variance and explanatory variables reveal
that model error variances have been constant at all levels of predicted value of
ASALES. Figure 9.4 demonstrates the scatterplots between model error variance and
predicted value of ASALES.
Figure 9.4 Scatterplots between Model Error Variance and Predicted
Value of Change in Real Sales (ASALES)
This figure demonstrates that the assumption of homoscadasticity is met since model error
variances are constant across predicted values. Cases labelled as 50, 74, 25, and 96 are four
omitted cases with large standardised residuals.
i
I
The four omitted cases with large standardised residuals are labelled in figure 9.4.
As the result of omission of these four outliers, the model error variances are
constant as predicted values of ASALES increase, and the assumption of
homoscadasticity is met.
The model suggests that assets size, board size, human capital and private ownership
are four significant explanatory variables. As expected, private ownership is
positively correlated with Real Sales improvement and 1% increase in private
PREDICTED VALUE OF CHANGE IN SALES (Unstandardi7«(1)
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ownership leads to 1.873% increase in Real Sales improvement. Both human capital
and board size are positively associated with Real Sales improvement, and 1%
increase in human capital leads to 1.069% increase in Real Sales improvement and
increasing one board member contributes to 0.078 increase in Real Sales
improvement respectively. Human capital is expected to improve output because
better managers can manage firms better and then improve real sales. The
unexpected result that board size is positively associated with sales improvement
might indicate that larger board size might provide better network information and
marketing channels associated with the directors sitting on board. It is also found that
larger firms underperform smaller firms in Real Sales improvement, and 1% increase
in assets size contributes to 0.53% decrease in Real Sales improvement.
9.3.2.2 ALEV1 Model -Change in Total Debt Model
ALEV1 = - 0.09 - 0.038ST - 0.450PLC + 0.084EMP - 0.129CON - 0.003HMC
(-0.805) (-0.418) (-2.665) (3.074) (-1.130) (-0.033)
- 0.078SSIZE + 0.017BOD + 0.118CRS + 0.043ASIZE - 0.081YR - 0.092IND
(-2.549) (3.630) (1.436) (0.348) (-0.967) (-1.139)
R2 = 0.234 Observations: 122
Adjusted R2 =0.208 F = 8.957 Sig. = 0.000
(Equation 9.5)
In developing the model, cases 33, 47, 61, 108 and 120 are outliers and are
eliminated in the regression model because their presence violates the assumption of
constant variance across predicted ALEV1. These outliers have large standardised
residuals of 3.280, 3.602, -3.114, 2.817, and -2.989 respectively. Further
investigation confirms that these firms are in electronic equipment, water and mining
businesses. In contrast to debt reduction of most firms, cases 33, 47 and 108
experience large increase in total borrowing while cases 61 and 120 experience large
debt reduction during post-IPO years, which leads to the extreme decreased or
increased total debt level compared to their pre-IPO period. These outliers are shown
in panel E of table 9.5 (pp!83).
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The scatterplots between model error variance and predicted values of change in total
debt (ALEV1) and between model error variance and explanatory variables reveal
that model error variances have been constant at all level of predicted value of
ALEV1. Figure 9.5 demonstrates the scatterplots between model error variance and
predicted value of ALEVE
Figure 9.5 Scatterplots between Model Error Variance and Predicted
Value of Change in Total Debt (ALEV1)
This figure demonstrates that the assumption of homoscadasticity is met since model error
variances are constant across predicted values. Cases labelled as 33, 47, 61, 108 and 120 are




The five omitted cases with large standardised residuals are labelled in the figure 9.5.
As the result of omission of these outliers, the model error variances are constant as
predicted values of ALEV1 increase, and the assumption of homoscadasticity is met.
The ALEV1 model suggests that the board size, share issue size, the presence of
employee ownership and private ownership are four significant explanatory
variables. As expected, board size is positively correlated with total debt level, and
increasing one board director leads to 0.017 increase in total debt. A larger board size
contributes to a higher total borrowing, which might be due to the free ride of
responsibility within the boards of directors. As expected, the presence of employee
ownership contributes to 0.084 increase in total debt level, which might suggest that
employee shareholders prefer borrowing instead of equity financing due to the fear
of share dilution as the result of increased equity financing of the firms. As predicted,
private ownership and share issue size are negatively correlated with total borrowing,
and 1% increase in share issue size and private ownership lead to 0.078% and 0.45%
decrease in total debt respectively. The reasons could be that private shareholders are
PREDICTED VALUE OF CHANGE IN LEVI (Unslandardized)
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generally against borrowing and share issue proceeds are used to reduce the total
debt.
9.4 Performance Change Regression Summary
9.4.1 Outliers64
As shown in table 9.5 (ppl82-183), there are in total 20 outliers in five panels.
Taking into account the overlapping of outliers in different models, there are in effect
16 firms that appear as outliers in these models. With these outliers, 11 firms are
from the industrial sector, seven from the miscellaneous sector and two from the
utility sector. In the industrial sector, there are four firms in electronic equipment
business, two firms are chemical companies and there is one firm in each of farming,
mining, textiles, paper and steel business. In the miscellaneous sector, there are two
firms in each of electric equipment and textiles businesses and one firm from each of
computer hardware and broadcasting business. In the utility sector, one firm is a
construction company and the other is a water company. Therefore the outliers are
from different sectors with wide coverage of different businesses. The reason for
these firms to be outliers is simply because they either extremely out-perform or
under-perform the majority of firms by a wide margin.
9.4.2 Findings
The findings of regression analysis are summarised in table 9.7.
64 Due to nature of the data, the observations dropped in each equation are not exactly the same. It is
recognised that some other approaches might be used, for instance, some practitioners would drop the
same observations in all equations.
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Table 9.7 Summary of Regression Results
This table summarises the regression results in the regression analysis. DVs represent dependent
variables (or models) in terms of change in performance proxies, namely AROS, AROA, AROE,
ASAT, ASALES, AQR, ANWCTA, ALEVland ALEV2. TVs represent independent variables in terms
of state, private, employee ownership, ownership concentration, human capital, share issue size, board
size and cross-sitting between executives and board directors. ASIZE, YR and IND are three grouping
variables of assets size, IPO year and industrial sector.
^NyDVs AROS AROA AROE ASALES s,QR ANWCTA ALEVI
IVs^\
ST 0 0 0 0 0 0
PLC 0 + + + ft -
EMP 0 + + 0 0 ft +
CON 0 0 - 0 0 ft 0
HMC + 0 0 + ft ft 0
SSIZE 0 - - 0 0 ft -
BOD - 0 0 + - - +
CRS 0 0 0 0 ft ft 0
ASIZE 0 + + . ft 0
YR 0 0 - () ft + 0
IND + + 0 0 ft 0
Note: +: Represents significant positive relationship between independent and dependent variables
Represents significant negative relationship between independent and dependent variables
0: Represents non-significant relationship between independent and dependent variables
x: Represents non-existent relationship between dependent and independent variables
The regression results suggest that the most important performance drivers are
private ownership, the presence of employee ownership, share issue size, board size
and asset size.
• Private ownership is one of the most important performance drivers and is
significantly positively associated with most profitability and output
improvement. It has a significant positive relationship with return on assets,
return on equity and sales changes, which may indicate that private investors
does impose pressure on firms externally and subsequently help to improve firms
profitability and output. Meanwhile it is also negatively associated with total
long-term debt change, which might suggest that private investors favour less
borrowing.
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• The presence of employee ownership is significantly positively associated with
return on assets and return on equity, which might indicate that employee
ownership impose pressure on firms internally and help to improve profitability.
It also has significant positive relationship with total debt level, which might
suggest that employee ownership encourage borrowing because equity financing
will dilute their shares.
• Share issue size is another important factor that affects firms' performance
changes. It is negatively associated with return on assets and return on equity,
which might indicate that as more funds are raised from the capital market, the
potential for misuse of IPO funds is higher, and firm performance deteriorates
subsequently. Share issue size is also negatively associated with total debt, which
could be the result of debt payment by share issue proceeds and subsequently
lower total debt level.
• Board size is negatively associated with return on sales, but positively correlated
with real sales improvement, which may indicate that real sales can be improved
through board directors' personal network, but the profitability of the firms
remains poor. Larger board size contributes to higher total borrowing because of
the free rider of responsibility within the board directors.
• Assets size is negatively correlated with sales, which might indicate that larger
firms perform worse than smaller firms do in sales improvement. Meanwhile
assets size is positively associated with return on assets. Given higher total assets
and lower sales improvement, larger firms might be in a better position in
controlling costs - either through economies of scale or their monopoly position
- to improve their return on assets performance. Assets size is also positively
associated with return on equity, and the reason could also be the cost control or
economies of scale by larger firms.
The are some less important explanatory variables, such as human capital, ownership
concentration etc. Human capital shows its positive correlation with return on sales
and real sales improvement. Firms from industrial sector outperform firms from non-
industrial sector in return on sales and return on assets improvement. Herfindahal
ownership concentration index is only negatively associated with return on equity
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and the significance is at 10%, which might indicate that ownership concentration
plays limited role in improving firm performance. Firm went public in 1997
underperform firms went public in 1998 in return on equity improvement.
9.4.3 Comparison of Findings between this Thesis & Other
Privatisation Studies
Chen et al (2000) develop cross-sectional regression models to explain the changes
in performance from pre-privatisation to post-privatisation by examining 275
privatisations made during the period 1991 to 1995 at stock exchanges in China.
The dependent variables are the changes in performance from pre-privatisation to
post-privatisation. Independent variables include the change in GNP per capital
(from the three years pre-privatisation to the three years subsequent to privatisation)
to control the state of the economy; foreign ownership and ownership structure
(percentage ownership by the state, legal person and private shareholders). Control
variables include market capitalisation of the firms at the date of the listing (to
control firm size), stock exchange (Shanghai or Shenzhen), sector and year of listing.
The major variables of interest are the existence of foreign shareholders and the
relative ownership stakes of the state and of individuals. Nevertheless, the results
show that the model fits are low.
Different from Chen et al (2000), this thesis employs total assets size to control firm
size instead of market capitalisation of the firms at the time of listing. In addition,
this thesis incorporates some corporate governance variables in the regression
models, such as human capital of senior management, cross-setting of executives as
board directors and share issue size to explain the role of corporate governance in
performance changes. The comparisons of the regression results between Chen et al
(2000) and this thesis are summarised in the following table 9.8. Table 9.8 shows that
this thesis improves R2 and provides a better understanding of the determinants in
performance changes of newly privatised firms in China.
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Table 9.8 Comparison of Regression Results of Privatisation
Studies in Identifying Sources in Performance Changes
This table compares regression results of privatisation studies in identifying determinants in
performance changes after privatisation. Comparable regression models with their respective
significant explanatory variables and R2 are presented accordingly.
Models Significant Explanatory Variables R2*
AROS
Chen et al (2000) Foreign Ownership, Market Capitalisation Size, Sector 0.141
Thesis Human Capital, Board Size, Sector 0.214
AROA
Chen et al (2000) X 0.061
Thesis Private Ownership, Presence of Employee Ownership,
Share Issue Size, Assets Size, Sector
0.258
AROE
Chen et al (2000) Stock Exchange, Sector 0.081
Thesis Private Ownership, Presence of Employee Ownership,




Chen et al (2000) State Ownership, Sector, Listing Year 0.089




Chen et al (2000) Foreign Ownership, Private Ownership, Listing Year 0.121
Thesis (2003) Private Ownership, Presence of Employee Ownership
Share Issue Size, Board Size
0.234
* Chen et al (2000) provide only R2 instead of adjusted R2, therefore only R2 are compared,
x: Represents that there is no significant independent variables in the regression models.
In summary, the analysis shows that firms' performance deteriorate after IPO, and
key determinants of performance changes are private ownership, the presence of
employee ownership, share issue size, board size and assets size. Subsequently one
question arises: How does the stock market incorporate firms' accounting
performance into their respective share prices? To what extent can stock market
discipline management through valuing firms' financial performance? Chapter 10
further analyses firms' post-IPO performance, in which firms' post-IPO market
performance against post-IPO accounting performance is explored to answer above
question.
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Chapter 10 Post-IPO Performance Analysis: Main Sample Firms
This chapter presents the analysis of the main sample firms' post-IPO accounting
performance and the regression analysis of post-IPO market performance (share
price return) against post-IPO accounting performance. It is expected that main
sample firms perform differently during the post-IPO three years within each group
of EPO year, regulated/non-regulated industry, sector and dominant shareholder and
the subgroup difference is tested by Kruskal-Wallis test. Firms' share price return
(Re) is then regressed against accounting performance - including post-IPO
supplementary and post-IPO fundamental accounting performance proxies, and it is
expected that share price returns should at least reflect firms' profitability
performance.
10.1 Post-IPO Performance of Main Sample Firms
10.1.1 Post-IPO performance Proxies
The post-IPO three years performance proxies examined are defined in the following
table 10.1.
This table presents the definition of all post-IPO performance proxies examined. Supplementary
performance proxies include both accounting and market performance measures only available for
post-IPO years. Fundamental performance proxies include accounting measures available for both
pre-IPO and post-IPO years. For instance, CETA represents post-IPO performance proxy of capital
expenditure to assets; MBR represents post-IPO performance proxy of market to book value of equity;
ROSa represents post-IPO performance proxy of return on sales, and so on.






average three years post-IPO capital expenditure to assets;
average three years post-IPO capital expenditure to sales;





average three years post-IPO market/book value of equity
average three years post-IPO price/earning ratio






average three years post-IPO return on sales;
average three years post-IPO return on assets;
average three years post-IPO return on equity;
average three years post-IPO sales to total assets;
average three years post-IPO sales;
average three years post-IPO quick ratio;
average three years post-IPO net working capital to total assets;
average three years post-IPO total debt ratio;








It is expected that Kruskal-Wallis tests of subgroup difference of post-IPO
performance are significant. For both fundamental and supplementary performance
proxies, firms went public in 1997 and 1998 perform significantly differently; firms
from industrial and miscellaneous sectors perform significantly differently; firms
with dominant shareholder of state and legal person performance significantly
differently and firms from regulated and non-regulated industry perform significantly
differently.
The following section further examines post-IPO performance results -
supplementary and fundamental performance proxies accordingly - by IPO year,
regulated/non-regulated industry, dominant shareholder and sector.
10.1.3 Post-IPO Supplementary Performance Results
The firms' post-IPO supplementary performance proxies are examined based on four
grouping variables of IPO year, regulated/non-regulated industry, sector and
dominant shareholder. The results are summarised in the respective tables, with
average three years post-IPO cash-related accounting proxies and market
performance proxies.
10.1.3.1 Post-IPO Supplementary Performance by IPO Year
The results of post-IPO supplementary performance by IPO year are summarised in
the following table 10.2.
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Table 10.2 Summary Results of Post-IPO Supplementary Performance Proxies for Firms that
Went Public in 1997 versus in 1998 & Kruskal-Wallis Test of Subgroup Difference
This table compares three years supplementary accounting and market performance proxies for firms
went pubic in 1997 versus in 1998. For each performance proxy, it shows the number of observations,
the average post-IPO three years mean and median values of all firms and firms with different IPO







Mean Rank for Subgroup




































(.0239) 70.31 60.61 .132
*** Indicates significance at the one percent level.
** Indicates significance at the five percent level.
* Indicates significance at the ten percent level.
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Table 10.2 shows that firm went public in 1997 and in 1998 do not performance
differently in most supplementary performance proxies. But share price return for
firms that went public in 1997 is higher than that for firms went public in 1998. The
mean (median) share price return for firms went public in 1997 is 33.40% (32.25%)
compared to a mean (median) value of 19.18% (16.85%) for firms that went public
in 1998, and the p value of Kruskal-Wallis test suggests that the subgroup difference
is significant at the 1% level.
10.1.3.2 Post-IPO Supplementary Performance by Regulated/Non-
Regulated Industry
The results of post-IPO supplementary performance by regulated versus non-
regulated industry are summarised in the following table 10.3. As reported in table
10.3, there is no p values that are significant in Kruskal-Wallis test. Therefore
unexpected, firms in regulated and non-regulated industry do not perform differently
from each other in all supplementary performance proxies, including post-IPO
market performance proxies and accounting performance proxies.
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Table 10.3 Summary Results of Post-IPO Supplementary Performance Proxies for Firms
in Regulated versus in Non-Regulated Industry & Kruskal-Wallis Test of
Subgroup Difference
This table compares three years supplementary accounting and market performance proxies for firms
in regulated versus in non-regulated industry. For each performance proxy, it shows the number of
observations, the average post-IPO three years mean and median values of all firms and firms from
regulated or non-regulated industry. Kruskal-Wallis test is employed to test the group difference with
mean ranks for each subgroup.
Proxy Regulated No. Mean Kruskal -Wallis Results
(or Non) After IPO Mean Rank for Subgroup




































(.0240) 64.16 63.45 .927
*** Indicates significance at the one percent level.
** Indicates significance at the five percent level.
* Indicates significance at the ten percent level.
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10.1.3.3 Post-IPO Supplementary Performance by Dominant
Shareholder
There are only four private dominated and four employee dominated firms, these
eight firms are omitted from the comparison, leaving only state and legal person
shareholders.
The results of post-IPO supplementary performance by dominant shareholders are
summarised in the following table 10.4. As reported in table 10.4, there is no p
values that are significant in Kruskal-Wallis test. Therefore as expected, firms with
dominant shareholders of state and legal person do not perform differently from each
other in all supplementary performance proxies, including post-IPO market
performance proxies and accounting performance proxies.
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Table 10.4 Summary Results of Post-IPO Supplementary Performance Proxies for Firms
with Dominant Shareholder of State versus Legal Person & Kruskal-Wallis Test of
Subgroup Difference
This table compares three years supplementary accounting and market performance proxies for firms
with dominant shareholder of state versus legal person. For each performance proxy, it shows the
number of observations, the average post-IPO three years mean and median values of all firms and
firms with different dominant shareholders. Kruskal-Wallis test is employed to test the group
difference with mean ranks for each subgroup.
Proxy Dominant N Mean Kruskal -Wallis Results
Shareholder After IPO Mean Rank for Subgroup





Legal Person 32 1.8555





Legal Person 32 18.0442





Legal Person 32 .2616





Legal Person 32 .2216





Legal Person 32 .0800





Legal Person 32 .0005
(.0207) 61.98 54.63 .303
*** Indicates significance at the one percent level.
** Indicates significance at the five percent level.
"""Indicates significance at the ten percent level.
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10.1.3.4 Post-IPO Supplementary Performance by Sector
Since there are only two firms in the commercial sector and ten firms in the utility
sector, these twelve firms are omitted from the comparison, leaving only industrial
and miscellaneous sectors.
The results of post-IPO supplementary performance by sector are summarised in the
following table 10.5. As reported in table 10.5, there is no p values that are
significant in Kruskal-Wallis test. Therefore unexpected, firms from industrial and
miscellaneous sectors do not perform differently from each other in all
supplementary performance proxies, including post-IPO market performance proxies
and accounting performance proxies.
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Table 10.5 Summary Results of Post-IPO Supplementary Performance Proxies for
Firms in Sector of Industrial versus Miscellaneous & Kruskal-Wallis Test of
Subgroup Difference
This table compares three years supplementary accounting and market performance proxies for firms
from industrial versus miscellaneous sector. For each performance proxy, it shows the number of
observations, the average post-IPO three years mean and median values of all firms and firms from
different sectors. Kruskal-Wallis test is employed to test the group difference with mean ranks for
each subgroup.
Proxy Sector N Mean Kruskal -Wallis Results
After IPO Mean Rank for Subgroup




































(.0210) 57.78 58.55 .911
*** Indicates significance at the one percent level.
** Indicates significance at the five percent level.
* Indicates significance at the ten percent level.
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Unexpected, firms' post-IPO supplementary performance proxies are not different
across grouping variables of IPO year, regulated/non-regulated industry, dominant
shareholder and sector. But share price returns (Re) for firms that went public in
1997 and 1998 are significantly different from each other, but not their respective
post-IPO supplementary accounting performance (CETSa, CETAa and CFMa).
Subsequently in the following section, firms' post-IPO fundamental performance
proxies - such as ROSa, ROAa, ROEa, SATa, SALESa, QRa, NWCTAa, LEVla
and LEV2a65) - are also examined to identify whether firms with IPO years of 1997
and 1998 perform differently in the fundamental performance proxies.
10.1.4 Post-IPO Fundamental Performance Results
The following table 10.6 summarises average three years post-IPO fundamental
performance proxies and Kruskal-Wallis comparison by IPO year. The results show
that three years average post-IPO performance for firms that went public in 1997 and
in 1998 are not significantly different from each other. But it is found that firms that
went public in 1997 do perform slightly better than firms went public in 1998 in all
performance measures in terms of higher ranks in return on sales, return on assets,
return on equity, sales assets turnover, real sales, quick ratio and net working capital
to total assets, and lower rank in total debt level. Only long-term debt level is almost
identical for the two subgroup firms.
65 See table 10.1 (pp200) for definition of post-IPO performance proxies.
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Table 10.6 Summary Results of Post-IPO Fundamental Performance Proxies for
Firms that Went Public in 1997 versus in 1998 & Kruskal-Wallis Test of Group
Difference
This table compares three years fundamental performance proxies for firms went public in 1997
versus in 1998. For each performance proxy, it shows the number of observations, the average post-
IPO three years mean and median values of all firms and firms with different IPO years.
Kruskal-Wallis test is employed to test the group difference with mean ranks for each subgroup.
Proxy Year N Mean Kruskal -Wallis Results
(IPO) After IPO Rank for Subgroup




































(1.3749) 61.02 65.81 .477
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Table 10.6 Cont'd
Proxy Year N Mean Kruskal -Wallis Results
(IPO) After IPO Rank for Subgroup






(.2448) 58.94 67.08 .227











(.0423) 63.90 64.06 .980
*** Indicates significance at the one percent level.
** Indicates significance at the five percent level.
* Indicates significance at the ten percent level.
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10.1.5 Summary
Unexpected, firms' post-IPO supplementary and fundamental performance proxies
are not significantly different within grouping variables of IPO year, regulated/non-
regulated industry, dominant shareholder and sector. But share price returns (Re) for
firms that went public in 1997 and 1998 are significantly different from each other.
Since firms that went public in 1997 and 1998 do not perform significantly
differently in all accounting performance proxies including both supplementary and
fundamental accounting performance proxies, it might indicate that stock market
may not effectively incorporate firms' accounting performance in share price
valuation. Because both post-IPO share price return and accounting performance
proxies are available, it is possible to identify the most sensitive accounting
performance proxies in determining the share price return.
10.2 Regression Analysis: Post-IPO Market Performance against Post-
IPO Accounting Performance
In post-IPO market performance against post-IPO accounting performance
regression analysis, post-IPO fundamental accounting performance proxies are
pooled together with post-IPO supplementary accounting performance proxies as
explanatory variables while share price return (Re) is then employed as a dependent
variable. The post-IPO share price return is then regressed against post-IPO
accounting performance proxies to identify the determinants in share price valuation.
10.2.1 Dependent & Explanatory Variables
Share price return is defined as the dependent variable, and all post-IPO accounting
performance proxies, including fundamental and supplementary performance proxies
are employed as explanatory variables, and they are summarised in the table 10.7
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Table 10.7 Definition of Explanatory Variables in Regression Analysis of Post-IPO
Market Performance against Post-IPO Accounting Performance
This table defines the explanatory variables in regression analysis of market performance against
accounting performance. The following explanatory variables are average three years post-IPO
performance proxies (denoted as ROSa, ROAa and so on), which are potential indicators of average
three years post-IPO market performance of share price return.
Variables Proxy For Empirical Definition
Dependent Variable
Re Share Price Return (Rl+R2+R3)/3
Post-IPO three years average share price return
Explanatory Variables
Fundamental Performance Proxies
ROSa Return on Sales Net Income / Sales
ROAa Return on Assets Net Income / Total Assets
ROEa Return on Book Equity Net Income / Total Book Equity
SATa Total Assets Turnover Sales / Total Assets
SALESa Nominal Sales Deflated & Standardised Sales
QRa Quick Ratio (Current Asset-Inventory) / Current Liabilities
NWCTAa Net Working Capital/ Total Assets
(Current Assets - Current Liabilities) / Total Assets
LEV la Total Debt Ratio Total Debt / Total Assets
LEV2a Long-term Debt Ratio Long-term Debt / Long-term Debt + Equity
Supplementary Performance Proxies
CETAa Capital Expenditures to Assets Capital Expenditures / Total Assets
CETSa Capital Expenditures to Sales Capital Expenditures / Total Sales
CFMa Cash Flow Margin Net Cash Flow / Sales
Grouping Variable
YR IPO Year Category variable with valuer 1 if
firms went public in 1997, value=0 if
firms went public in 1998.
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10.2.2 Regression Hypotheses
The purpose of the regression analysis is to identify the nature of share valuation by
the investors in China. As suggested by Ross et al (1998), the ordinary share is
difficult to value because the future cash flows are not known in advance; the
ordinary share has no maturity and the life of the investment is essentially forever;
and there is no way to easily observe the rate of return that market requires.
Therefore discounted cash flow method is not practical. But shares can be valued
through estimated dividend payment.
Pp = Pi / (T-g)
Where: r = required return in the market on the investment
g = dividend growth rate
D, = cash dividend paid at the end of year 1
Since Chinese firms seldom pay dividends, share valuation based on dividends is
practically not possible, and investors might tend to look at profitability, efficiency,
output, leverage or liquidity performance. As indicated in table 10.2 (pp 202), the
mean and median values of PE ratio are as high as 17.61 and 13.66 respectively for
all main sample firms, which is an indication that investors might pay large
premiums on earnings. Therefore it is likely that investors make their investment
decisions on earnings or net profits. Since earnings or net profits merely reflect
firms' sales and costs, it is expected that share price return or market performance
might be based on firms' real sales.
10.2.3 Regression Model
The explanatory variables are post-IPO accounting performance proxies, and the
dependent variable is post-IPO share price return.
Re = (30 + p, ROSa + p2 ROAa + p3 ROEa + p4 SATa + p5 SALESa + p6 QRa
+ p7 NWCTAa + p8 LEV la + p9 LEV2a + p10 CETAa + p„ CETSa + p12 CFMa




Re = average three years post-IPO share price return;
• Independent Variables:
Fundamental accounting performance proxies
ROSa average three years post-IPO return on sales;
ROAa average three years post-IPO return on assets;
ROEa average three years post-IPO return on equity;
SATa average three years post-IPO sales to total assets;
SALESa average three years post-IPO sales;
QRa average three years post-IPO quick ratio;
NWCTAa average three years post-IPO net working capital to total
assets;
LEV la average three years post-IPO total debt ratio;
LEV2a average three years post-IPO long-term debt ratio;
Supplementary accounting performance proxies
CETAa = average three years post-IPO capital expenditure to assets;
CETSa = average three years post-IPO capital expenditure to sales;
CFMa = average three years post-IPO cash flow margin,
s = regression error term
As shown in table 10.2, Kruskal-Wallis test results show that firms with different
IPO years perform significantly differently in share price return, IPO year is added as
grouping variable in the regression model.
YR = 1, if firms went public in 1997; 0, if firms went public in 1998.
10.2.4 Data Examination
Since explanatory variables are all accounting performance proxies, obviously there
are some correlations between the explanatory variables. In the regression analysis,
high or nearly perfect correlated explanatory variables are the concern and some of
the explanatory variables have to be omitted from regression models to achieve
simplicity in model interpretation. The correlation between explanatory variables is
shown in following table 10.8.
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Table10.8PearsonCorrelatioM tr xfD p nde t&Ex l natoryV riabl siR gression AnalysisofPost-IPOM rketerformancegai tst-IAccou ingPerformance





































































































As shown in above table 10.8, the Pearson correlation between post-IPO return on
sales (ROSa) and post-IPO return on assets (ROEa) is 0.897 and it is very close to
perfect collinearity. Therefore one of them has to be omitted from regression model.
Because ROEa has simple correlation of 0.215 with dependent variable of share price
return (Re), while ROSa has a simple correlation of only 0.154 with share price
return (Re), ROSa is dropped from regression analysis.
10.2.5 Regression Results
Re = 0.013 + 0.125YR + 0.237 NWCTAa + 0.051 SALESa + 0.057 SATa
(0.340) (4.412) (2.949) (2.993) (1.848)
R2 = 0.295 Observations: 121
Adjusted R2 = 0.27 F = 12.115 Sig. = 0.000
Note: Only significant variables are reported in the equation. (Equation 10.1)
In developing the model, cases 40, 45, 67, 79, 89 and 123 are outliers and are
eliminated in regression model because their presence violates the assumption of
constant variance across predicted share price return (Re). These outliers have large
standardised residuals of 2.923, 3.209, 3.258, 4.417, 3.049 and 3.864 respectively.
The statistics of these outliers are summarised in table 10.9.
Table 10.9 Statistics of Share Price Return (Re) & Outliers in
Share Price Return Model
This table summarises the statistics of full sample firms and outliers in share price return (Re) model.
The values of mean, median and standard deviation of share price return (Re) of full sample firms are
presented. Then the share price returns (Re) of outliers are presented. INDM is the classification of
types of core business of the firms defined by Datastream.




Outliers (case number) Re Sector INDM
40 0.772 Industrial Brewers
45 0.794 Miscellaneous Biotechnology
67 0.834 Miscellaneous Telecom Wireless
79 0.937 Industrial Steel
89 0.643 Miscellaneous House Building
123 0.751 Industrial Electricity
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As shown in table 10.9, the mean and median values of share price return are 28%
and 23.7% respectively, while the share price return of the six outliers ranges from
64.3% to 97.7%. Theses six outliers are in six different businesses - brewers,
biotechnology, telecom-wireless, steel, house-building and electricity. Three firms
are in highly regulated telecom-wireless, steel and electricity businesses and one firm
is in the biotechnology business that is highly supported by the government66.
Therefore the extreme good performance of these firms in share price return might be
the result of the signaling effect to the market in that these firms are beneficiaries of
the government support.
The scatterplots between model error variance and predicted values of share price
return (Re) and between model error variance and explanatory variables reveal that
model error variances have been constant at all level of predicted value of share price
return (Re). The following is the scatterplots between model error variance and
predicted value of share price return (Re).
Figure 10.1 Scatterplots between Model Error Variance and Predicted
Value of Share Price Return (Re)
This figure demonstrates that the assumption of homoscadasticity is met since model error
variances are constant across predicted values. Cases labeled as 40, 45, 67, 79, 89 and 123
are six omitted cases with large standardised residuals.
i
The six omitted cases with large standardised residuals are labelled in the figure 10.1.
As the result of omission of these outliers, the model error variances are constant as
predicted values of share price return (Re) increase, and the assumption of
homoscadasticity is met.
66 See analysis in Chapter 11 (222) of Case Studies Analysis.
1 2 3 4 5 6
Unstandardized Predicted Value
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The model reveals that the share price return is significantly positively associated
with liquidity, real sales and sales efficiency but not profitability. As the net working
capital to total assets and real sales increase by 1%, share price return increases
0.237% and 0.051% respectively and they are both significant at the 1% level. As
sales assets turnover increase by 1%, share price return increases by 0.057% and the
significance is at the 10% level. In addition, firms that went public in 1997 are
associated with 0.125 higher share price return than firms that went public in 1998
and the significance is at the 1% level.
As expected, the results suggest that investors and stock market emphasise short-
term liquidity, sales and sales efficiency in share price valuation instead of
profitability measures in terms of return on sales, return on assets and return on
equity. Given the fact that quarterly, interim and annual financial reports are widely
published and readily accessible by the investors, it is difficult to comprehend why
investors simply ignore profitability measures. The possible reason might be that
investors are incapable to conduct financial performance analysis by themselves or
understand public available information67.
10.2.6 Comparison of Mean Rank of All Post-IPO Performance Proxies
between Firms Went Public in 1997 and in 1998
The regression results also confirm that firms that went public in 1997 generate
higher share price return than firms that went public in 1998. As reported in table
10.2 (pp202), the mean (median) share price return for firms that went public in 1997
is 33.40% (32.25%) compared to mean (median) of 19.18% (16.85%) for firms that
went public in 1998. Theoretically, if firms that went public in 1997 outperform
firms that went public in 1998 in share price return, their accounting return -
including those of fundamental and supplementary performance proxies - should be
expected to outperform those of the firms that went public in 1998.
67 Performance changes regression results summarised in table 9.6 (pp 184-185) also suggest that
private ownership is significantly positively associated with sales and negatively associated with total
borrowing.
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As shown in table 10.2 (pp202) and 10.6 (pp210-211), there are no significant
differences in all levels of supplementary and fundamental performance proxies for
firms that went public in 1997 and 1998. Table 10.10 incorporates both tables 10.2
and 10.6 by comparing mean ranks of fundamental and supplementary performance
proxies for firms that went public in 1997 and 1998.
Table 10.10 Comparison of Mean Rank of All Post-IPO Performance
Proxies of Firms Went Public in 1997 versus Firms Went
Public in 1998
This table presents the summary of mean ranks of all post-IPO performance proxies based on
IPO year of 1997 and 1998 respectively, and the significance of such difference in ranks and
the winners are with higher ranks. The mean ranks of fundamental performance proxies are
originally in Kruskal Wallis test of group difference in fundamental performance proxies for
firms went public in 1998 and 1997 in table 10.6. The mean ranks of supplementary
performance proxies are originally in Kruskal Wallis test of group difference in
supplementary performance proxies for firms went public in 1998 and 1997 in table 10.2.
SATa, SALESa and NWCTAa are three significant variables in post-IPO market against
accounting performance model and are in bold.
Fundamental Mean Rank Mean Rank Sig. of Winner
Performance 1998 1997 Difference (1998/1997)
Proxies
ROSa 60.29 66.25 - 1997
ROAa 58.00 67.65 - 1997
ROEa 58.58 67.29 - 1997
SATa 63.90 64.06 -- 1997
SALESa 63.40 64.37 -- 1997
QRa 61.02 65.81 - 1997
NWCTAa 58.94 67.08 -- 1997
LEV la 65.46 63.11 - 1997
LEV2a 63.90 64.06 -- 1998
Supplementary Mean Rank Mean Rank Sig. of Winner
Performance 1998 1997 Difference (1998/1997)
Proxies
CETSa 66.77 62.32 1998
CETAa 67.81 61.68 - 1998
CFMa 70.31 60.61 - 1998
*** Indicates significance of group difference at 1% level.
** Indicates significance of group difference at 5% level.
* Indicates significance of group difference at 10% level.
Indicates significance of group difference is greater than 10% level
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As summarised in above table 10.10, there are no significant differences between
firms that went public in 1997 and 1998 in all post-IPO performance proxies. But
firms that went public in 1997 perform slightly better in all fundamental performance
proxies, while firms that went public in 1998 perform slightly better in all
supplementary performance proxies. If firms went public in 1997 perform
significantly better than firms went public in 1998 in share price return, which might
suggest that investors in general focus on fundamental performance proxies and
ignore supplementary performance proxies in share valuation. In addition, within the
fundamental performance proxies, investors focus on real sales, current liability and
sales efficiency instead of profitability performance proxies. Therefore it can be
assumed that the stock market does not properly reflect firms' real financial and
operating performance.
10.3 Summary68
The results show that the firms' post-IPO supplementary and fundamental
performance proxies are not different within grouping variables of IPO year,
regulated/non-regulated industry, dominant shareholder and sector. Share price
returns (Re) for firms that went public in 1997 are significantly higher than firms
went public in 1998 while their accounting performance is not significantly different
from each other at all. The regression analysis of post-IPO share price return against
post-IPO accounting performance reveals the determinants in share price valuation. It
demonstrates that share price return is highly correlated with liquidity, real sales and
sales efficiency, and profitability and other cash-related performance proxies are less
relevant in share price valuation. As argued by Vicker and Yarrow (1991), if the
efficient markets hypothesis is not true, then the information conveyed by share
prices has less value for monitoring purposes.
68 No previous privatisation studies have explored the relationship between the firms' market and
accounting performance, therefore no comparison can be made here.
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Chapter 11 Analysis of 16 Cases - Evidence from 16 Companies:
The Effect of IPO on Constitution, Financing &
Corporate Management
This chapter presents the evidence from 16 firms and intends to provide a better
understanding of the effect of IPO on constitutions, financing and corporate
management. The effect of IPO on corporate governance is presented in the next
chapter.
11.1 Introduction
In June 2001, interview requests were sent out to board chairmen and chief
executives of 39 listed firms at the Shanghai Stock Exchange. These 39 listed firms
cover various industries and their headquarters are located in Beijing (northern
China), Shanghai (eastern China) or Chengdu (south-western China), although some
of them may have production sites around China69. Within 39 interview requests (13
for each city), a total of 17 firms responded and 7, 4 and 6 interviews were conducted
in Shanghai, Beijing and Chengdu respectively. One firm from Chengdu later
required that the interview materials should not be used for any puipose, leaving a
total of 16 valid cases. It must be specified that it is highly likely that firms with
better financial performance, management practice, corporate governance practice or
which have just experienced management changes would tend to accept interviews.
Given the possible bias in the sample, the interview results may not fully reflect
corporate management and corporate governance practice in all listed firms. But as
sample firms also feature substantial differences in geographical location, industries
and ownership features covering from state-dominated, legal person-dominated,
joint-venture to private firms in 13 industries70, this analysis could well explain the
effect of IPO on corporate management and governance to a greater extent. The
interview covering letter and semi-structured interview questions are listed in
appendix 5.3 (pp295) and appendix 5.4 (pp296).
69 As mentioned before, firms in the southern part of China are mainly listed at the Shenzhen Stock
Exchange that acts more like a regional market despite its changing features.
70 See table 5.7 (pp98) for the characteristics of 16 cases.
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11.2 The Structure of Analysis
Interview data are grouped and coded based on themes within each topic. Because
each firm generally gives similar answers to most of the interview questions, it is
more logical to present the evidence based on the interview topics and themes instead
of separate case studies of 16 firms interviewed. In addition, during the interviews
there was some free discussion with interviewees aimed at achieving extra
information that might have been restricted by semi-structured interview questions.
Therefore the final themes within each topic in the analysis may well exceed those in
the original semi-structured questions listed in appendix 5.4 (pp296). The analysis
follows the following three topics:
■ The Effect of IPO on Constitutions & Financing
IPO has significant impact on constitutions and financing of former SOEs. After
going public, internal corporate governance mechanisms are introduced for the first
time for most firms. The newly listed firms now can not only raise financing through
equity market but also issue corporate bonds.
■ The Effect of IPO on Corporate Management
The firms under study in this thesis are listed publicly held corporations, in which
most of them were transformed from SOEs and normally only part of the SOEs is
corporatised and then privatised. Generally it is the profitable operating assets and
trade liabilities that are carved out into the privatised firms (Chen et al 2000). The
original motivation for firms to go public may deviate substantially from those in the
developed markets. The purpose of this topic is to understand the effect of IPO on
corporate management, which may contribute to their subsequent business failure as
listed firms later on. The identified themes are purpose of IPO, main changes after
IPO, such as changes in state intervention, changes in financial management,
strategic management and human resource management etc.
■ The Effect of IPO on Corporate Governance
Corporate governance is the catalyst of a firm's financial performance and sound
corporate governance is expected to emerge from the newly listed firms and help to
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improve firms' financial performance. The identified themes or the effect of IPO on
corporate governance are based on corporate governance mechanisms demonstrated
in Chapter 2, including legal device, external mechanisms and internal mechanisms.
The remaining chapter presents detailed analysis of the effect of IPO on constitution,
financing and corporate management. The relevant quotations from laws or
legislation are in bold format, and the company opinions are in italic format. The
71
author uses self-created short codes to represent each firm interviewed .
11.3 The Effect of IPO on Constitutions & Financing
Historically, the governance model of SOEs in China experienced three stages
(Schipani et al 2001). The first stage is the traditional model (1950s to 1984), during
which the governance structure in SOEs was an integral part of the government
governance framework. The second stage is the transitional model (1984-1993), in
which a contracting system was introduced and implemented to separate state
ownership and SOE management rights. But this model failed to improve SOEs'
performance and led to exploitation of state assets due to managerial autonomy and
subsequently SOEs Law was introduced in 1988. The third stage is the modern
corporate model (1993-present) in which Company Law of People's Republic of
China (1993)72 provides solid legal foundations with the Anglo-American featured
corporate governance structures (Tian 1998) to transform SOEs into different
business corporations, including closely held and publicly held corporations with
detailed requirement of their respective governance structures. It is the third stage
where the internal corporate governance mechanisms, such as board of directors and
supervisory board are set up from scratch in newly listed firms as a result of IPO.
Based on Company Law of 1993, the internal governance structures are summarised
in figure 11.1.
71 See table 5.7 (pp98) for the characteristics of 16 cases.
72 It is termed Company Law onwards.
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Figure 11.1 shows that firms' internal corporate governance structure after IPO has
incorporated various governance features in developed markets, such as board of
directors from the Anglo-American models and supervisory board from the German
model. The Company Law reflects the shareholder principle in the Anglo-American
model because it requires:
"The board of directors shall be responsible to the shareholders' general meeting73...".
Meanwhile, the role of the supervisory board reflects the stakeholder principle in the
German model because the Company Law also requires:
"Supervisory board shall be composed of shareholders' representatives and an
appropriated proportion of representatives of the staff and workers of the
74 j j
company ..."
Importantly, after going public, listed firms are required to pay dividends to the
shareholders as a result of equity financing. At the same time, listed firms are also
eligible to issue corporate bonds instead of receiving government subsidies as the
only financing in the past. Therefore IPO has brought huge impact on constitutional
changes in terms of governance structures, as well as the financing methods
including both newly introduced equity and bond financing. Given the apparent
effect of IPO on constitutions and financing, it is expected that IPO would also have
effects on corporate management and governance practice in the newly listed firms.
11.4 The Effect of IPO on Corporate Management
During the interviews, senior executives or directors were asked directly whether
IPO was a failure or success in improving firm performance; and then they were
further asked to answer the questions based on semi-structured interview questions.
In the free discussion, they were encouraged to talk about any issues they thought
relevant. Except one steel company, all other 15 firms suggest that IPOs bring
serious impacts on the ways they run the businesses. This section further investigates
the effect of IPO on corporate management, and the related issues including the
purpose of going public, changes in state intervention, changes in financial, strategic
and human resource management after IPO are discussed in detail.
73 Article 112 of Company Law.
74 Article 124 of Company Law.
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11.4.1 Purpose of Going Public
Going public in China deviates largely from simply raising finance in developed
markets. Conceptually, financing relates to investment activities while enterprise
reform relates to management style changes. In regard to finance, within the 16
firms, 13 state that financing is the main concern, while 9 firms indicate that
enterprise reform is another important purpose and 2 firms stress the firms' market
awareness. SOEs were mainly bank-financed and now firms are trying to tap the
equity market but with some opportunistic motivations. For instance, as stressed by
chief legal adviser of DOFA:
Going public is regarded as a means to achieve low-cost capital expansion because it can
raise a huge amount ofcapital without taking responsibility ofbank interest.
On the other hand, going public serves not only as a means of raising finance, but
also introducing enterprise reform. In the past, the general manager was responsible
for the whole company, but now a modern enterprise management structure with
various roles of chief executive officer, chief financial officer and chief operating
officer has just been introduced at the time of IPO.
Ten out of 16 firms suggest that there are significant management style changes after
IPO, and only four firms suggest that their investment activities have been positive in
improving corporate performance. Therefore it seems the objectives of organisational
changes and building a new management structure have been met while successful
investment activities have not been realised. The starting point for newly listed firms
is not promising as modern enterprises because firms did not have sound
organisational and management structures to support successful investments by using
newly raised capital from the capital market. Given the fact that only 4 out of the 16
firms are positive towards results of their investment activities, disappointing
financial performance results presented in early data analysis might be well within
expectation.
11.4.2 Changes in State Intervention
State intervention exists in every country to a certain degree and can be useful for
providing respect for corporate autonomy, protection of fair competition, guidance of
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the micro-economy and fulfilment of business opportunities and other legitimate
interests, and the ultimate goal is to improve firm performance and the overall
economy. State intervention can be either positive or counterproductive. One new
phenomena in state intervention in China is the quota system in initial public
offerings (IPO), in which each province is allocated with certain number of firms to
go public and these firms should also receive approval from regional government.
This system might fit the Chinese context in the early years of economic reform in
that the economic development in various regions is highly unbalanced. Without a
quota system, the listed firms from vast underdeveloped regions would hardly
compete with firms from developed regions to be qualified for IPO. But this quota
system also leads to the mismatch in financing and good investments. The CEO of
MF pointed out:
Many firms with good investment projects cannot find financing; meanwhile firms can go
public and raise money from the capital market but do not have good investment projects. In
this dilemma, companies having money but without projects is the result ofstate intervention,
not the effective resource allocation through market...
The Chinese government started to relinquish this quota system in 2001 and allow
more promising corporations satisfying the statutory listing requirements to be listed
at the stock exchanges.
In terms of other intervention from the government, 3 out of 16 firms state that the
state intervenes in business activities and 1 firm states it does so in employment
policies. On the other hand, 2 firms confirm that the state also provides preferential
policies towards their high-tech and environmental-related projects. Looking closely,
the degree of state influence is highly dependent on the nature of the firms in terms
of private-owned, state-owned or joint venture. For private firms, the state normally
does not intervene but sometimes may prefer private firms to help state firms out.
One instance is that Central Bank pressured private MS bank75 to takeover one
regional state bank but central bank's attempt failed due to intervention from the
State Council. Despite this incidence, the CEO of MS bank stresses that,
As a private bank, the company still has great power to make independent business decisions
without any intervention from the government.
75 It was set up by several successful entrepreneurs and is the first private bank listed in China.
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For SOEs, state influence has changed from mandatory planning to board
representation and the influence has been reduced in business operation. The CEO of
DOHA suggests that the state intervention can be understood as two folds,
On the one hand, to some extent, (listed) SOEs have not grown up and they always want
government subsidises and intervention, but they also complain when the government is
involved too much. On the other hand, the state is the largest shareholder and composition of
the board ofdirectors purely represents the state.
The state's intervention also reflects in preventing listed firms from lying off
excessive employees, which leads to low labour productivity. The investment
director of DOFE points out:
...The company does have freedom to recruit new employees, but there is no good solution to
those (employees) passed on by the (previous) SOE and they can't be laid off(due to the
pressure from the government)...
But the government also intervenes in a positive way. The CEO of BL stresses that:
...Direct state intervention is not obvious but the government provides some preferential
policies towards micro-electronic and software industries in which BL is the beneficiary.
Therefore, the state's influence has been reduced after going public, but the state still
intervenes in employment policies, and provides supportive policies towards certain
industries.
The following section further examines the effect of IPO on corporate management
from three angles: financial management, strategic management and human resource
management.
11.4.3 Changes in Financial Management
Going public is a window of opportunity with a large cash injection into the firms
and raising capital is important for traditional SOEs with only bank-financing and
limited financial management experience. For newly listed firms, the three-fold
meaning of financial management is defined in cash flow statement: cash flow from
financing activities, cash flow from investment activities and cash flow from
operating activities.
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In financing activities, all 16 firms suggest that cash raised from IPO are used for
various purposes and 8 out of 16 firms admit that they have invested in equity
market. As suggested by the board secretary of BS,
The cash raised from IPO issues is used not only for investment, but also for paying back
bank loans, buying government bonds and investing in investment trusts.
Many firms are also trying to issue new shares (rights issues) to increase investment.
The Administrative Procedure of Right Issue of Listed Companies (2001) implicitly
suggests that the condition for right issues is that a listed firm has been profitable for
the consecutive three years after IPO. The Board secretary of CJ points out that,
Ifa firm wishes to issue new shares, it has to meet the above requirements. For a poor-
performing firm, it has to forge its accounting books ...or entrust its cash raisedfrom the
markets to reinvest in the stock markets to make profits...
Therefore in order to qualify for right issues, firms are motivated to speculate in the
stock markets to meet the profitability requirements within three consecutive years.
Almost all listed firms carry certain amount of debt from previous SOEs at the time
of IPO, and 15 out of 16 firms suggest that they prefer equity financing than bank
financing. They indicate that even bank credit is assumed to be cheap, the debt and
interest payments are still a fixed obligation. On the contrary, for equity financing,
the dividend policy is largely at the discretion of the firms even firms might be under
investors' pressure to pay out dividends. If minority shareholders' interests were not
well protected, the dividend payment pressure would in effect not exist. In fact all 16
firms suggest that they tend not to pay dividends or just pay a symbolic small amount
of dividends. As suggested by Shi et al (2002), the prevalent mindset among SOE
managers is that capital raised from the financial markets is free money that can be
squandered with impunity.
In operating activities, cash management is a new concept and firms do regard cash
flow as a good performance benchmark. Half of the firms suggest that cash flow
management in operating activities is mainly short-term focused and the CEO ofMF
admits that:
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... But (cash management is) limited to daily or short-term and there is a gap in long-term
management ofcash efficiency improvement...
In investment activities, most firms can not pay cash dividends because they are not
profitable; or they may be very profitable but would retain the earnings for future
investments, given the fact that minority individual shareholders have no say on
dividend payments. Only three firms have give small dividends consistently for the
last three years. The CEO of DOHA suggests that,
Most listed firms are hungry for investment and they are not willing to give cash back to
investors.
The CEO of MF suggests that,
Various financial products should be developed like those in developed markets and more
options should be available forfree cash flow....
In China, for both firms and individuals, the only available investment instruments
are either bank deposit or shares in the stock market. It is identified in chapter 10 that
the mean (median) value of post-IPO share price return for main sample firms is
28.02% (23.66%). It is also found in chapter 8 that the mean (median) value of post-
IPO return on sales, return on assets and return on equity of main sample firms are
12.87% (14.03%), 5.9% (5.97%) and 5.36% (10.2%) respectively. Therefore firms'
share price return deviates substantially from their profitability, which encourage
firms to speculate in equity markets76.
11.4.4 Changes in Strategic Management
All 16 firms indicate that they experience substantial changes in strategic
management after going public, and these changes are reflected in the following
aspects.
(1) Short-termism
Ten out of 16 firms suggest that their strategic management is short-term oriented.
As pointed out by the CEO of MF,
In order to be profitable, the firm is trying to invest in high-risk funds or high-tech
investments so as to deliver expected performance.... We have to adjust our investment
structures and focus on those could generate short-term return and high growth quickly,
combining some real strategic investments...
76 The bank interest rate is around 5% to 7% between 1996-2003 (Datastream).
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Therefore the firm's investment structures are very fragile and vulnerable to market
changes, and the irrational investment behaviour subsequently contributes towards
firms' disappointing performance.
Therefore, firms in generally are short-term oriented and there is no strategic
planning and management. Meanwhile, the board secretary of DIKA admits that,
Senior managers are judged and valued by current profits instead of long-term performance
and sound strategies, and they are driven to achieve that on the short-term basis, especially
for small firms. We have no written long-term strategic plan and the firm has been managed
on a day-by-day basis ...For a small firm, strategy is an abstract concept. We will do
something in the future, but now we focus on current targeted performance and finding new
product entering into the market...
Therefore how managerial performance is measured has huge impact on strategic
planning. In addition, strategy should not be based on the size of the firm but should
be a common practice for all firms whatever their size.
(2) Diversification
Except one bank, one steel firm and one automobile firm in the sample, all other 13
firms are under various diversification programmes. It is not uncommon that the
priority of many listed firms is expanding the business and diversification is a widely
employed strategy after going public. It is found in chapter 10 that share price
valuation is based on three performance proxies of real sales, short-term liquidity and
sales efficiency (sales to assets turnover). For newly listed firms, if management
wish to meet the expectation of the investors, increasing sales and assets through
empire building is highly possible.
On the other hand, because of the de facto non-existence of takeover market, firms
have to grow not through acquisition but organic development in which self-
development through expanding core business and diversification are the major
strategies. The number one issue many listed firms face is whether the business
should be diversified or be focused on the core businesses. Organic growth through
self-development is time-consuming, while diversification is a much quicker method.
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For example, for a retailing firm CDS, it has invested in banks, cable TV networks,
hotels etc. in recent years. The board secretary states:
...The company has been using trial and error in investment...No matter how many
investments have been carried out, there are always failures without a good strategic plan
and clear understanding of the investment itself...
Without good strategic plans, many diversification activities end up as speculative
investments.
Furthermore, within diversification, firms tend to employ unrelated diversification
without thorough understanding of potential business failure, without sufficient
knowledge of the new businesses, without positioning their own competitive
advantage or disadvantage and future research and development costs they may need.
A good example is CJ, which went public in early 1998 as a trading company with
assets in department stores, real estate, shipping and silk production. CJ invested 3
million pounds in a drug company at the end of 1998, and invested in a digital
product company in 1999 and invested in nano-technology in 2000. The secretary of
the board says that:
Actually these three are very fashionable investment sectors. We mainly provide capital to
buy technology and we are exploring in these areas...
Another example is that DAHE switched from failed chemical business to trading
and then to IT business in computer hardware and software. The board secretary
admits that:
...Large economy ofscale cannot be achieved easily in IT business... and we are in the
situation where we do what we can...
(3) Parent Company
Many listed firms are bound to other firms by some sort of linkage, either formal or
informal. Formal linkages include wholly owned subsidiaries and associated
companies in which another company has a minority shareholding. Informal linkages
include influence from large shareholders, business connection (either positive in
terms of marketing network or negative in terms of transaction) and managerial
personnel. If a listed firm's controlling shareholder is its parent SOE, independence
between the two can hardly be achieved, and in fact 11 out of 16 firms are bound to
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their parent SOEs. Because a listed firm was part of its parent SOE before IPO and
all investment proposals were made by the parent SOE at the time when the listed
firm was not set up yet. The CEO of TIKE states:
. ..Some companies do business with their parent firms or do business that is an extension of
their parent firms. If the investment is new and without any connection with the parent firms,
normally it would not be possible...
A parent firm takes out its high quality assets and employees to form a company and
let it go public, therefore this parent firm has listed and non-listed parts with the
listed part having better resources. The CEO of TIKE describes the consequence as:
... The state-owned parent company will consider its listed part as cash machine and (drain
the listed firm) through profit allocation or related transactions.
Subsequently, listed firms' strategies are strongly influenced by parent firms'
strategies and the businesses of the two are mixed together. The Board secretary of
CJ indicates:
... There is a team in the group (parent) company working for strategies and strategic
planning (of us) is based on the strategy of the group as a whole ...
On the other hand, listed firms deliberately choose to be dependent on parent firms to
do business. For example, BRAY is turning its business from electronics to media,
but because of the risk associated with the media business, support from the largest
shareholder (a state-owned commercial newspaper) is essential. The CEO of BRAY
suggests:
...Switching business from electronic business to media by itself is very risky for the company
without support from the largest shareholder (the parent firm). So projects are either done by
the largest shareholder alone, or jointly by the largest shareholder and the listedfirm. There
is no possibilityfor the listedfirm to do a project by itselfand in many cases, the strategies
are drawn by both the largest shareholder and the listed firm.
Therefore the strategic management in the listed firms reflects a serious abuse of
minority shareholders' rights by the largest shareholders or parent SOEs of listed
firms.
(4) Investment Appraisal Techniques
Investment appraisal is primitive in the sense that many techniques employed in the
West are not even heard by management, such as discounted cash flow (DCF) and
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payback period etc. None of the 16 firms have ever used investment appraisals
mentioned above. Instead, most investments are based on primitive analysis with
strong intuition-orientation.
For example, as an agriculture product firm, DOHA spent £6m to import a green
house facility from Netherlands for orchid and vegetable production. The original
investment decision was based on the estimated market demand from the residence
in Shanghai without any detailed financial analysis. But the orchid can be widely
planted by peasants in the countryside. It is also uneconomic to grow vegetables in
greenhouse in China as agriculture product supply is never in short in Shanghai area.
In addition, as transportation improves drastically, fresh products from countryside
can reach big cities quicker than before. Subsequently, DOHA'S agriculture products
and orchid flowers were out of competition and had to be sold at the prices that could
never cover the investment costs. The investment was a failure and abandoned in
2000. The CEO of DOHA admits that,
We invest in the new products without careful consideration in strategies and investment
appraisals...we never heard investment techniques such as DCF etc.
(5) Research & Development
Except three firms converted from traditional research institutions, private firms and
joint ventures respectively, all other 13 firms under study claim they do not conduct
research and development by themselves or are considering it. The board secretary of
the drug company DIKA suggests that,
No firm in the drug industry can do a large research and development project alone. Large
projects are done in research institutions, while labs in the companies just provide product
improvement and small research development. Cost is one concern, and the other is research
direction in that new drug development takes years and sometimes they are not applicable at
the time to be introduced.
In fact the existing R&D by many research institutions are still funded by the state,
and there is a tendency that the state may cut research subsidies and even convert
research institutions into stock companies. At the end, firms are still facing
conducting their own R&D. The chief legal advisor of DOFA (a garment exporting
company) admits that,
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Due to lack of research in the past, the company still has difficulties in brand building and
keeping the consumer base.
The above analysis shows that the fundamental problems in strategic management
are short-termism, speculative diversification, lacking feasible strategic planning,
lacking investment appraisal techniques and research and development capabilities.
Hence managers tend to maximise short-term profitability through unrelated
diversification or empire building to meet stock market and investors' expectation.
11.4.5 Changes in Human Resource Management
Human Resource management is a people-centred strategy, but it had been long
ignored in the former SOEs. Unlike the universities in the West, Chinese universities
do not have strong ties with industries and research can hardly be commercialised.
Management degrees were introduced little more than 10 years ago and new
graduates can hardly meet the need of a fast growing economy. In addition, the
dynamic economic development also requires regulation changes in various aspects
and professional groups (accountants, auditors etc.) still need time to evolve. For
instance, accounting and auditing professionals have just experienced a painful
process in learning newly introduced accounting regulation based on International
Accounting Standards, leaving their life-time practice in accountancy less relevant.
Most listed firms were transformed from previous SOEs, and top management in
general remains in listed firms and they are traditionally technical-orientated than
financial-orientated as the result of the technical-orientated education systems.
Within the 16 firms, majority senior managers have a strong technical background,
and a financial background within the knowledge structure of senior managers is the
weakest point. The COO of BL indicates that:
It is not necessarily that all management teams should have a financial background but some
presence would help top level decision-makers in making judgements.
The board secretary of DIKA indicates that after going public the human resource is
the major issue for a fast growing firm:
The development speed is so fast and the company lacks human resources to cope with that.
We are in the situation ofover operation, which directly leads to the decline in efficiency.
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In addition, listed firms need not only people to design strategies but also someone to
implement them. The investment director of DOFE admits that,
The firm's joint venture failed because the management teams (we sent) failed to co-operate
with foreign partners...
Therefore the quality of decision-making and implementation is shadowed by low
quality personnel that are in charge.
11.4.6 Private Sector Development
Proper development of new private sector can stimulate to develop an entrepreneurial
culture in China, but Chinese private-owned listed firms do not enjoy the same
treatment as SOEs and some business areas are prohibited for private firms to enter.
Even the government does not intervene in private firms' daily business operation,
private firms are normally been blocked out of the information channel from local
governments. Therefore, private firms still suffer discrimination in terms of business
freedom and business assistance from the state compared to SOEs. Private listed
firms also face the challenge of public mentality. As the CEO of MS Bank suggests:
The public are used to ...trusting state-owned banks and they are afraid that private banks
would take their money and no one would be responsible if the bank goes bankrupt...
This is a reflection of culture of social trust. In China, building trust upon strong law
enforcement has not been culturally accepted. On the other hand, the CEO of MS
also points out that
Private firms are not fully trusted not only by the public but also by their own employee.
Even with a well-built housing scheme, pension scheme and job training scheme etc.,
employees still do not feel secure... developing a trust culture and educating employees to be
loyal to the company are important factors in corporate success.
Therefore private-owned list firms are facing more challenges than state-owned
listed firms to build trust to maintain their credibility within both the public and their
own employees.
11.5 Summary on Corporate Management
Table 11.1 mainly summarises major impact of IPO on corporate management.
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Table 11.1 Summary of Analysis of Corporate Management
This table summarises the results of IPO effect on corporate management in areas of
operational management, financial management, strategic management, human resource
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Table 11.1 summarises the key issues related to the corporate management after IPO.
It is must be emphasised that there might be some firms that may perform
substantially differently in these areas and are exceptional.
The case analysis of the 16 firms suggests that after going public, state influence has
been changed from mandatory planning to board representation. Even state does
intervene in employment policies; it also provides supportive policies towards certain
high-tech industries. In strategic management, short-termism and speculative
diversification emerges after IPO. Proper investment appraisal techniques are not
employed to make investment decisions. Research and development basically has not
been on the listed firms' strategic agenda. In financial management, cash
management is based on the short-term. IPO funds have not been properly used for
new investments, but to payback loans or reinvest in stock markets. Generally
dividends are not paid to investors. In human resource management, the managerial
knowledge structure and employee skills could not cope with business development
after IPO. For private listed firms, they are normally been blocked out of the
information channel from the governments and have less business freedom. In
addition, they are still facing the challenges of gaining social trust from the public.
Therefore the corporate management after IPO also contributes to firms' poor
performance. If good corporate management delivers corporate success, sound
corporate governance mechanisms stimulate that process. The effect of IPO on
corporate governance in the listed firms is further analysed in the next chapter.
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Chapter 12 Analysis of 16 Cases - Evidence from 16 Companies:
The Effect of IPO on Corporate Governance
This chapter presents the evidence of the effect of IPO on corporate governance from
16 listed firms so as to identify the key weaknesses in the current corporate
governance practices in China.
12.1 Why Corporate Governance Matters
The corporate scandals that emerged in mid-2001 promoted Chinese officials and
other state regulatory bodies to put corporate governance at the top of the priorities
for 2002. In January 2002 CSRC issued the Code of Corporate Governance of Listed
Companies in China. Wolfensohn (2002), the president of the World Bank, points
out that the financial crisis in Asia indicates that integration into the global economy
without the proper institutions of governance can create vulnerabilities that can
partially reverse gains in development and poverty alleviation. Thus good corporate
governance institutions are critical for sustainable growth, development and poverty
alleviation in a highly interdependent world.
As the economy grows after the accession of WTO, China has to face new external
realities. For international investors, the criteria for investment are quality of the
firms and quality of the markets. Cha (2001) documents that a recent Mckinsey
survey of 200 international institution investors, 80% of those surveyed say that
when all other factors are equal, they would be willing to pay a premium for a "well-
governed" company; and 75% of those consider corporate governance at least as
important as financial indicators. Therefore as suggested by Davies (2002), good
corporate governance and effective regulation contribute both to the attractiveness of
a country in terms of inward investment and business development, especially for
developing countries.
The dramatic collapse of Enron has cast some doubt on the efficiency and
effectiveness of corporate governance practices in the US. But Davies (2002) points
out that none of the models in the US, UK and Germany etc. is an absolute guarantee
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of good and effective corporate governance in all circumstances. They have all
experienced problems of one kind or another, and continue to do so. As suggested by
Tenev et al (2002), there is no perfect corporate governance model and an effective
corporate governance system should be capable of identifying weaknesses before
they develop into systemic problems, of learning from failures and of taking prompt
corrective actions.
The issues or themes - including legal device, external mechanisms and internal
mechanisms - discussed in this chapter are based on the literature survey on
corporate governance in Chapter 2.
12.2 Legal Device
Since the establishment of stock exchanges in China in the early 1990s, various laws
and regulations have been introduced to guide corporate governance practices,
including Company Law, Securities Law and accounting regulations based on
International Accounting Standard1 etc. In 2001, following several corporate
governance scandals, a great deal of the CSRC's focus has been on eradicating
improper practices prevailing in the market, making 2001 " The Year of
Supervision", in which various regulations, derivatives, notices and guidelines are
taken by regulators to tackle the weaknesses in corporate governance practices.
Apparently, given the weak enforcement and legal systems in China, the positive
effect of IPO on corporate governance might not be expected within a short time in
that good corporate governance depends heavily upon successful reform of state
agencies and legal systems.
77 Others important laws and legislations include: Implementation Rules on Information Disclosure for
Companies Making Public Share Offerings (1993); Standard Contents and Format of Public
Disclosure For Companies Making Public Offerings (1993); Guidelines for Introducing Independent
Directors to the Board of Directors of Listed Companies (2001); Administrative Procedure of Right
Issue for Listed Companies (2001); Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies in China
(2002); Administrative Procedure of Information Disclosure of Shareholding of Shareholders for
Listed Firms (2002)
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12.2.1 General Shareholder Meeting
All 16 firm suggest that that the general shareholder meeting is either simply a
rubber stamp for the wishes of controlling shareholders or just a legal procedure. The
board secretary of DAHE also indicates large shareholders prefer to solve problems
outside the general shareholders' meeting:
...In the case where even large shareholders do have conflicts with each other, they normally
would like to solve the problems under the table, not discuss it in the shareholder meeting...
It is no surprise that the general shareholder meeting does not have real function and
it is more or less an opportunity specifically given to small investors who mainly
raise their concerns about dividends. Generally, small investors do not want to
control the company, but want to see a high return, and they focus on capital gains.
The main purpose for small investors attending shareholder meeting is to collect
information that may affect share prices. The result is that dividend payout, strategies
and long-term investments all become less relevant. Schipani et al (2001) argue that
78shareholders in the US have a right to bring a derivative action against management
while Chinese company law is silent on this issue. But given the weak court system
and profound culture differences between the US and China, derivative action may
not be a solution to discipline management through confrontational means.
Furthermore, individual investors simply do not have either analytic or financial
capabilities to analyse every aspect of firms' businesses, or financial or legal means
to bring civil suits against firms. It is simply uneconomical for individual investors to
monitor the firms and free ride is the ultimate result, regardless of how private
investors are empowered by law, like in the US where small investors have profound
protection and rights.
Article 108 of Company Law states that
A Shareholder may entrust a proxy to attend the shareholders' general meeting on his
behalf. The proxy shall present the shareholders' power of attorney to the company and
exercise voting rights within the scope of authorisation.
Article 9 of Code of Corporate Governance (2002) states that,
78 Shareholders can bring a class action (to sue) against the directors on behalf of all the shareholders;
alternatively they can bring a derivative suit to sue management on behalf of the company.
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The shareholder can either be present at the shareholders' meeting in person or they
may appoint a proxy to vote in their behalf, and both means of voting possess the same
legal effect.
Unfortunately, both Company Law and Code of Corporate Governance provide no
practical suggestions for listed firms to make proxy-voting arrangement. Schipani et
al (2001) propose that detailed provisions should cover issues such as solicitation of
proxies, the validity of voting agreements, and exceptions to the general rule of "one
share, one vote" such as non-voting shares, multiple voting shares, interlocking
shares, corporate self-owned shares etc.
12.2.2 Major Shareholders
Tenev et al (2002) provide detailed study on the board of directors based on the
survey of 257 firms listed at the Shanghai Stock Exchange and they suggest that
most important implication of the dominant role of state ownership in China's listed
firms is the control the government can exert over management appointments and
incentives, and thereby over firms' behaviours.
• Controlling Shareholders
Given the fact that state and legal person shareholders hold majority non-tradable
shares, acquiring all tradable shares in the market will never lead to the de facto
79control of the firm and therefore the takeover market is in practice non-existent .
This concentrated ownership structure in fact undermines all these regulations and
gives the rights to large shareholders to expropriate minority shareholders' interests
in listed firms.
In order to isolate the influence of large or controlling shareholders, Chapter 2 of
Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies in China (2000)80 specifically
defines behaviour rules for controlling shareholders and independence of listed
companies. For instance Article 20 states that,
79 In fact the so-called merger is also strictly monitored by various level of government and "must be
approved by the department authorised by the State Council or by the people's government at the
provincial level" (Article 183 of Company Law).
0 It is termed Corporate Governance Code onwards.
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The controlling shareholders are forbidden to appoint senior management personnel by
circumventing the shareholders' meetings or the board of directors".
Article 22 emphasises that,
A listed company shall be separated from its controlling shareholders in such aspects as
personnel, assets and financial affairs, shall be independent in institution and business,
shall practice independent business accounting, and shall independently bear risks and
obligations.
Except a private bank and a joint venture, 14 out of 16 firms suggest that their
controlling shareholders have very strong influence on them and normally send
representatives as board directors or executives to exercise control of listed firms.
The CEO of MF indicates:
Our ownership structure is 29%, 27%, 27%, and 2.7% for the top four shareholders. The
largest 29% controlling shareholder dominates the rest 71% shareholdings and has 100%
control ofbusiness...
As mentioned earlier, listed firms were normally part of parent SOEs before IPO.
Controlling shareholders are also termed "group" or "parent" by listed firms which
used to be spin-offs of previous larger SOEs, and listed and parent firms are often in
the same business sector and may compete with each other, or have business
transactions and share resources and functions. Therefore this type of
interdependence between listed firms and their parent SOEs creates fertile ground for
agency problems. The parent SOEs can possibly influence the listed firm in terms of
not only directors on boards or executives in charge, but also product and operational
management. The board secretary of SAUTO states:
...The group regards the listedfirm as an important part, and actually the difference between
the two (the group and the listedfirm) is just that they have differentfunctions. The group's
support to listedfirms is also its own success and enlargement...
The board secretary of SAUTO further states:
At the time ofgoing public, SAUTO was a combination of two top-performing firms from the
group company ...There are many daughter companies within the group, they are also clear
that the growth of the listed firm is also the growth of the group company, as well as bringing
more benefits to those daughter companies...
Therefore SAUTO is highly related not only to its parent firm but also to other
daughter companies within the group, and its investment strategies are based on the
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evaluation of the group as a whole instead of its separate business entity. The tie
between the listed firms and the parent SOEs may indicate that selling part of the
SOEs may not improve listed firms' financial performance. Because there is no
radical management change; listed firms' strategies are integral part of parent firms'
strategies; benefits and profits are shared not only by parent firms but also by
subsidiaries or daughter companies within the group.
In many cases, the controlling shareholders control both board chairmen and CEOs.
The extreme case is DOHA. DOHA'S current CEO indicates,
After going public, the board chairman, CEO, and CEO of the largest shareholder was the
same person, which led to misappropriation ofpublic funds. Till 2000, the firm had total
assets of 140 million pounds, in which the largest shareholder borrowed 128 million pounds,
leaving 86% of total assets as non-operational assets and 14% as operational assets. The
management team was replaced later and assets reconstruction was conducted in 2000.
As echoed by the board secretary of DAHE:
... When the parent firm needs money, the simplest way is to borrow from the listedfirm -
a cash machine - because of the listedfirm's capacity to raise capital from the market.
The above evidence suggests that the separation between large shareholders and
listed firms should also be done in terms of organisational structure, finance, and
personnel. The unclear segregation of assets, management and businesses between
the listed firms and their parent firms or controlling shareholders are common
occurrence, with severe conflict of interest to the detriment of the minority
shareholders of the listed firms (Cha 2001). The following is an example of the
expropriation by the controlling shareholders listed in appendix 12.1 (pp307).
Box 12.1 The Expropriation by Controlling Shareholders:
The Case of Sanjiu Pharmaceutical Co.
1 CSRC uncovered Sanjiu's troubles in mid-2001. The listed company, which was
< reportedly China's largest pharmaceutical group, had misappropriated ¥2.5 billion
I ($302 million) on behalf of a few major shareholders and related business partners
without the consent of other shareholders or the public. These diversions amounted to
96 percent of the company's net assets, posing considerable threat to the company's
operations. CSRC reprimanded the senior principals, headed by former military
serviceman Zhao Xinxian, and fined the company ¥150 million ($18.1million).
1 Major shareholders and related business partners had repaid ¥349 million
B ($42.2million) to Sanjiu by March 2002. Zhao remains the company's legal
representative and the company continues to operate, publishing a quarterly report for
the first quarter of 2002.
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Source: Shi, Steven and Drake Weisert (2002), Corporate Governance with Chinese Characteristics,
China Business Review, Volume 29, Number 5, September-October 2002.
Therefore, given the presence of controlling shareholders, information disclosure
must be transparent so as to protect minority shareholders' interests because listed
firms are responsible to all shareholders, not just controlling shareholders.
• State Ownership81
After firms go public, the local office of the Bureau of State Property Management
(BSPM - a central government agency) acts as the largest shareholder of listed firms
if central government or its agencies own SOEs. Xu and Wang (1997) argue that a
series of principal-agent problems may arise from this institutional setting in the
state-controlled listed firms. Firstly, officials of the local BSPM may not have
sufficient incentives to preserve and increase the value of state properties since they
are civil servants and draw income from the state payroll which has nothing to do
with the performance of the listed firm they oversee. Secondly, the BSPM
bureaucrats are not industry experts and they have to overlook hundreds of firms in
which the state has an interest. In addition to above two concerns, the value of state
assets is also difficult to determine. Since share prices in Chinese stock markets are
speculative and it is inaccurate to evaluate state assets based on share prices.
Therefore there is a consensus in the market that state shareholding should be
reduced and private shareholding should be increased so as to improve corporate
governance.
• Legal Person & Foreign Ownership
The role of legal person shareholders is also problematic. Some legal person
shareholders are financial institutions or profit-oriented companies and they desire
the privatised firm to maximise efficiency. Since some legal person shareholders are
effectively controlled by the central or regional government or SOEs, these legal
person shareholders may have objectives that depart from wealth maximisation. The
non-tradable nature of legal person shares indicates that legal person shareholders are
not motivated to improve firm performance.
81 State shares and legal person shares are not tradable at stock exchanges, only public shares hold by
individual shareholders and investment funds are tradable.
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In addition, a few foreign-invested firms are also listed on the stock exchanges. The
experience ofMF suggests that foreign shareholders be discouraged from further
investment due to the non-tradable nature of legal-person shares. The CEO of MF
reveals:
In the 1998's right issue, foreign shareholders were concerned about the non-liquidity of
legal person shares and therefore refuse to inject more cash into the company. After this
right issue, the state became the largest shareholder...In an effort to reduce state
shareholdings, the state once again turned out to be the largest shareholder ofMF after
foreign investors ceasedfurther investment.
Therefore the counterproductive policy of non-tradable legal person shares should be
scrapped if China intend to introduce foreign direct investment into listed firms. In a
free market economy, no investors are willing to hold shares without liquidity.
• Banks & Financial Institutions
Except for a few private banks, all large banks are state-owned in China. Article 133
of Security Law states that
Banks are prohibited from putting funds in the stock market.
Therefore banks are in effect excluded from corporate governance of newly listed
firms. Setting aside banks' role as a potential governance force of listed firms, the
state-owned Chinese banks also face their own governance crisis and their portfolio
82of non-performing loans in many SOEs. Loans made to SOEs in the past were often
more political in nature than commercially motivated. On the other hand, if banks
now reduce their lending in order to clear their non-performing loan, unemployment
and other social consequences will follow. Banks have been functioning as money
deposit and lending bodies for decades without experiencing company fundamental
analysis or investment appraisals. Banking reform has been equally challenging as
corporate governance reform in listed firms.
Financial institutions including securities companies, investment companies and
close-end and open-end funds83 and other investment entities are allowed by
82
Non-performing loans are loans that are not being repaid in form of either interests or principal
payments.
83
By February 2001, there were 33 investment funds, and the first open-end funds were allowed in
September 2001.
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Securities Law to exercise trading in the market place. Article 121 of Securities Law
states that:
A minimum registered capital of £50 million is required for financial institutions...
The above requirement may indicate that most securities companies might be either
fully or partially state-owned because few individuals could provide such large funds
to set up the business. Tenev et al (2002) document that at the end of 1999, of the
30% of tradable shares, individuals held 25% and institutions held 5%84. Therefore
given their small shareholdings, institutional investors are not motivated to improve
or
firm performance. Short discussions with practitioners and fund managers reveal
that most financial institutions hold shares for just over half a year. The financial
institutions do not have an interest in long-term investment for two reasons: they
cannot exercise influence facing controlling shareholders; and their performance is
based on trading profits but not how well they supervise the listed firms.
• Private Ownership
Tradable private shares accounts for only one-third of total shares and are held
largely by individuals, who have few incentives and resources to perform monitoring
function. As argued by Tenev et al (2002), a low free float tends to increase volatility
and therefore to reduce the information content of stock prices. One fund manager in
Shanghai suggest that Chinese private investors typically hold shares for little more
than two months before selling them because they do not find it cost-effective or
feasible to monitor managers of listed firms. Generally, private shareholders are
simply powerless and they find it not cost-effective to supervise management.
• Power Structures & Insider Control
Between shareholders, board of directors and supervisory board, it is unclear which
body prevails in case of conflicts based on current laws and regulations. But article
102 of Company Law states that,
The shareholders' general meeting is the organ of power of a company...
84 See table 9.2 (ppl74).
85 The discussion took place in both Shanghai and Chengdu, but the detailed content cannot be used
for research upon request from the fund managers involved.
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Schipani et al (2001) argue that this institutional arrangement may be reasonable and
feasible for closely held corporations with few shareholders. Because it is time
consuming, expensive, and inflexible for firms to respond to frequent market changes
and other business environments if shareholders are required to meet on every
significant managerial decision. Figure 12.1 and 12.2 demonstrate the power balance
in the US/UK, German and Chinese corporate governance models respectively.
Figure 12.1 Power Balance in US/UK & German Corporate Governance Models
Figure 12.2 shows that the US/UK model empowers the board of directors as the
decision-making organ, whereas in the German model, the supervisory board acts as
the power centre.
Figure 12.2 Power Balance in Chinese Corporate Governance Model
Chinese Model
The Chinese corporate governance model is a combination of both Anglo-American
and German model. It is very understandable that the Chinese system incorporates
supervisory board from the German model in that historically employees (unions)
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actively participated in administration and employee interests were protected. In
addition, collectivism and consensus seeking has been culturally emphasised.
Employee representatives sitting on the supervisory board provide a reflection of
stakeholder principle consideration. In fact article 52 to 58 of Code of Corporate
Governance also require specialised board committees, such as corporate strategy
committee, audit committee, nomination committee, remuneration committee etc.,
therefore these committees could fully replace shareholder meeting and function as
power centre.
In theory, shareholders' meeting is the legal power centre in Chinese listed firms, but
the actual power falls either in hands of the board chairman or the CEOs, depending
on which position is dominated by the representative from the largest shareholder.
Subsequently, because of the de facto control of the largest shareholder, insider
control by management has emerged. As revealed by the board secretary of DAHE:
...except sector monopoly or highly sensitive industries...under state strict control, all state
administrative control does not exist for Chinese firms, but what appears is insider
control... in many cases, for regional government, the officials send their trustedfollowers to
the managerial position of the firm, and their followers become the representatives of
insiders. They do not represent state interests but the interests ofgroups of insiders. Their
control is fundamentally different from the state administrative intervention...
The key message here is that the state control of SOEs has been decreasing, but at the
same time, these listed SOEs are falling in hands of group of insiders who represent
either themselves or some party officials in the ruling party within the various levels
of government. As suggested by Cha (2001), while the state is the largest shareholder
of listed firms, the interest of the state as a shareholder is not always represented.
This often results in the listed firms that being controlled by the management, which
does not always act in the interests of shareholders. In fact Wu Jinglan86 and CSRC
chairman Zhou Xiaochuan also state that a crucial obstacle to successful corporate
86
Jinglian Wu, an economist from China Academy of Social Sciences and chief economist with the
State Council's Development Research Centre (DRC).
250
governance of listed firms is 'insider control' (Shi et al 2002). Therefore Mr Wu has
been proposing that listed firms should drop their state shares.
12.2.3 Financial Reporting & Information Disclosure
Sound accounting reporting and auditing is the basis on which financial management
is built. Wolfensohn (2002) suggest that within the broad framework of corporate
governance, transparency and information disclosures are absolutely central for well-
informed investment decisions and the protection of small investors. Transparency
and adequate disclosure can not, however, become established business practice
without well-trained, competent, and honest accounting professionals. World Bank
87has been associated with the work done by the National Accounting Institute (NAI)
and the Chinese Institute of Certified Public Accountants through the assistance in
the Accounting Reform and Development Project.
Tenev et al (2002) suggest that given the stage of development of Chinese capital
markets, mature users of financial information, such as institutional investors and
analysts are in short supply. As a result, the market is not yet ready to exercise a
supervisory function in relation to auditing and accounting professionals and listed
enterprises' disclosure practices. Since 1992, various items of legislation based on
IAS governing accounting in Chinese firms by the Ministry of Finance are
introduced as the results of accounting reform. Specifically, Accounting Regulations
for Joint-Stock Companies is restricted to joint-stock companies or listed firms and is
further supplemented by the introduction of Detailed Accounting Standards (1997)
by the Ministry of Finance, in which cash-flow Statements are for the first time
applicable to listed firms and other stock companies.
Company Law and Code of Corporate Governance specifically emphasises the
information disclosure and transparency issues of listed firms. But information
transparency still has not been solved. For example, some firms forge their financial
accounts to reach profitability requirements for right issues, given inefficient external
87 NAI was established in 2001, mainly provides high quality training programmes.
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supervision from weak accounting and auditing bodies. Chapter X of Company Law
states the legal liability for the firm of making false report,
...the fine is an amount of not less than five percent but not more than ten percent of the
registered capital falsely reported...
Without mentioning managerial legal responsibility, there is plenty of room for
managers to conduct wrongdoings without being punished personally. Only recently
officials from ministry of finance suggest that: "Accounting firms and their
accountants who are found providing false financial figures will be severely
punished" (China Daily 2001).
Information disclosure of executives and directors' pay is a sensitive issue in
published financial report, and generally not transparent at all. Since 1998 CSRC has
required publication of compensation of senior management, but details of
managerial compensation may not be truly published in most listed firms' financial
reports. Fifteen out of 16 firms did not answer the question of the actual
compensation figures directly during the interviews. The board secretary of CJ
admits:
...The information revealed about annual salaries ofsenior management does not reflect the
truth, and the difference can be very large. In order to avoid income tax, every company
shows the same facts... some firms just publish the total amount and total numbers ofsenior
members without specification for individuals.
Financial institutions, accounting and auditing firms in China do not have their
independence since they are subsidiaries of state agencies not equivalent of their
counterparts in developed markets. For instance, some government departments use
their power to influence the work of professional service companies, which is against
the principles of fairness and objectiveness. Some government departments also set
up professional service companies to use their administrative power to pursue
economic benefits (China Daily 2001). In addition, these newly established financial
service firms tend to lower their standards to meet customers' needs to compete for
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88businesses . Therefore the professionalism of these bodies is challenged in a weak
legal enforcement environment. The board secretary of DOHA suggests that:
... Ifprofessionals cannotfind problems, who else can? The credibility ofa Hong Kong
auditing firm is much higher than a local accounting firm in Shanghai and (it is acceptable)
even if it charges much higher fees and imposes more strict rules...
In recent years, some serious steps have been taken by Chinese government to
improve information transparency. In 2001, the Chinese Ministry of Finance has
revoked the license of Zhongtianqin, a leading accounting firm in Shenzhen City for
negligence during the Guangxia Stock market fraud. The accounting firm was
punished for failing to detect the serious financial problems of the Guangxia
Industrial Co., a firm based in Northwest China's Yinchuan City and listed at the
Shenzhen Stock Exchange, during its auditing process. Appendix 12.1 (pp306-307)
illustrates some high-profile scandals of Chinese listed firms in 2001, including
above-mentioned Guangxia Industrial Co. and Sanjiu Pharmaceutical Co. etc. The
lack of profitability of listed firms and these corruption scandals have created an
untrustworthy setting for long-term investors.
The CSRC believes that the basic principle of corporate governance is to protect
shareholders' rights. Various measures have been taken by CSRC to improve
information disclosures, including annual reports, interim reports and quarterly
reports (from January 2003) and other respective laws and regulations. The quality of
accounting and auditing firm should be improved based on international standards
and enforcement mechanisms should work when problems emerge.
12.3 External Mechanisms
12.3.1 Takeover & Bankruptcy
The market liquidity of shares is important for market efficiency, but merger and
takeover of listed firms is strictly controlled in China. Article 183 of Company Law
states that,
88 In 1999 about 100 large accounting firms were competing to provide services for some 1,000 listed
firms (Tenev et al 2002).
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The merger of division of a joint stock limited company must be approved by the
department authorised by the State Council or by the people's government at the
provincial level.
Article 78 of Securities Law states that,
A listed company may be purchased by offer or by agreement.
The above two rules are in fact contradictory if listed firms should obey both
Company Law and Securities Law. Article 81 of Securities Law states that a investor
who possesses 30% of the shares issued by the listed firm can make a purchase offer
to other shareholders and the following Article 86 further states that:
"By the time the term of a purchasing order has expired and the number of a
purchased company's stock held by purchaser is more than 75% of the total amount of
stocks issued by the company, the listed company shall stop listing its stocks in the stock
exchanges."
As reported in table 9.2 (ppl74), the mean (median) values of state ownership and
legal person ownership are 43.6% (54.3%) and 21.7%(12.2%) respectively, therefore
mean (median) value of non-tradable shares is 65.3% (66.5%) in total, leaving
around 35% private shares traded in the market. Hence mergers and acquisitions in
the free market are practically not possible given the presence of majority non-
tradable shares. Tenev et al (2002) argue that corporate control mechanisms and
shareholder activism can do little to alleviate agency problems under the existing
state-dominated ownership structure. In fact the high degree of ownership
concentration and the nontradibility of more than two-thirds of the shares imply a
low contestability of control. In practice, the so-called merger can be achieved
through "agreement" between state and legal person shareholders under the
admission and supervision of State Council and stock exchanges. What makes
takeover more difficult is that in fact no one prefers the listed firm to be delisted,
whether state, legal person or management. Despite their different motivations, they
may collude to make takeover practically impossible.
As regards bankruptcy, Article 189 to 198 of Company Law states conditions and
procedures for bankruptcy, dissolution and liquidation of companies, but firms are
unlikely forced by banks to repay loans, which is the cause of non-performing loans
of state banks in the first place. If firms do go bankrupt, as argued by Lew (1997),
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bankruptcy often represents a convenient way of handing over debts which then fall
to the responsibility of the banks and the state. In addition, the leverage situation of
listed firms has been improved after IPO, and the bankruptcy pressure is further
reduced subsequently. As reported in table 8.1 (ppl37), both total debt and long term
debt ratios drop dramatically after IPO, from mean (median) values of total debt and
long-term debt of 58.05% (61.15%) and 20.1% (16.24%) respectively before IPO, to
the mean (median) values of those respective leverage ratios of 38.62% (37.64%)
and 8.31% (4.45%) after IPO. In short, the absence of takeover market and
bankruptcy pressure shows the green light to large shareholders or insiders to
expropriate minority shareholders.
12.3.2 Financial Market
Tenev et al (2002) suggest that the lack of a strong institutional investor base in
China is related to the lack of professional stock market analysts whose interactions
with listed firms and market coverage are often superficial. Interview data reveals
89that all 16 firms hold a very negative attitude towards financial institutions and
indicate they have no trust in them because many financial institutions mainly focus
on capital gains and share trading.
The board secretary of DIKA explains:
They (financial analysts) have nothing to do with us. For a listed firm, the share price
fluctuation in the secondary market does not have direct connection with company
performance...
The board secretary of BS suggests that,
Financial analysts lack knowledge of the financial market and do not actually have interests
in company fundamentals, especially when they have less power to manipulate share prices
ofsome large firms.
The CEO of DOFE also criticises the inside trading of some securities companies:
Publicly revealed information is not fully true, therefore there is plenty room for those who
can get inside information such as financial analysts to play with. Securities companies may
make a deal with listed firms to get insider information for trading purposes... we are trying
not to get in touch with them to avoid insider trading...
89
Including financial institutions such as investment funds and investment companies under securities
companies registered to CSRC to trade at stock exchanges.
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On the other hand, both financial institutions and private investors also regard large
firms with monopoly power (such as BS - a steel company) as safe investments. The
board secretary of BS indicates:
... When a company does not perform well, it does not mean that its market (share price)
performance will equally be pushed down...this is reputation effect. Share price might not
reflect the firm's true performance.
Meanwhile, the supervision from regulatory bodies is not tough in the sense that
insider trading is not investigated and prosecuted seriously. For instance, Article 177
states that,
Issuers of securities providing false or misleading information are to pay a fine of more
than £30,000'° but less than £60,000 and persons in charge directly responsible for the
case are to pay a fine of more than £3,000 but less than £30,000.
As shown in table 9.2 (ppl74), mean and median values of share issue size of sample
firms are £34.5 million and £26 million respectively. Merely a 1% fine of £34.5
million of share issue size is almost nothing for a securities company with £50
million minimum capital91, and the fine on individuals in fact is too small to have
any significant effect in correcting behaviours of other practitioners.
As regards insider trading by financial institutions, Article 183 of Securities Law
states that,
"...Their illegal earnings are to be confiscated, and they are to be fined an amount
between one and five times their illegal earnings or an amount not more than the value
of the said securities of the illegal transaction. Those involved in crimes are to be
investigated for their criminal liability according to the law. Workers for securities
regulatory bodies who engage in insider trading are to be given heavy punishment."
Even if securities companies are fined for an amount of five times the illegal
transaction, it is still meaningless given their large capital. The law provides no
practical solutions to punish the individuals involved. Therefore the trust from listed
90 For the simplicity of illustration, the exchange rate between British Stirling and Chinese Yuan is
taken as 1:10 instead of approximate rate of 1:13 in August 2003.
91
According to Article 121of Securities Law, the minimum registered capital to set up a securities
company is £50 million.
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firm towards financial market is very low, the board secretary of SAUTO suggests
that:
... We do not take their analysis seriously. We are the manufacturers and we do not care what
they say about us, it is meaningless...and we just focus on fundamentals...
Therefore it is not uncommon that the securities companies and fund management
keep manipulating share prices. In 2001, it was the first time for the government to
reveal details of a low-profile probe into the fund industry and the investigation
found evidence of abnormal trading in eight of the ten fund management firms.
Box 12.2 Price Manipulation: The Case of Boshi Fund Management
The CSRC probe was investigated after a report on corruption in the
I fund management industry was published by Caijing magazine, which
| has a reputation for aggressive financial report.
Only two of the country's top 10 fund management companies were
found by the CSRC to have been free of involvement in price
| manipulation. The fund managers had typically bought and sold the
| same shares on their own account, inflating the trading volume and
driving up the price by luring other investors into the stock markets.
Thirty executives at China's top fund management companies have
been sacked or disciplined following an investigation by the country's
stock market regulator into share price manipulation. The China
I Securities Regulatory Commission said it was also considering legal
charges against executives in one firm, Boshi Fund Management. The
CSRC had uncovered more than 10,000 "abnormal trades" in Boshi's
records.
Sources: McGregor, Richard (2001), The Financial Times, 26th March 2001.
New regulations have been ruled out to regulate the market continuously by CSRC,
but the chief legal advisor of DOFA suggests:
Most regulations do not coincide with each other and generally lack detailed practical
solutions for implementation.. .without them, behaviours in the market place could not be
well disciplined...
Therefore the legal obligations and responsibilities of wrongdoings such as price
manipulation and inside trading must be prosecuted. Given China's social and
political system, in which juridical, legislative and administrative functions are not
separated as they are in western countries, law enforcement is always challenging.
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12.3.3 Managerial Market
Some of the so-called managers of the listed firms are still politically appointed and
many of them do not have sufficient managerial skills and capabilities in running a
business in a free market economy. The CEO of BRAY indicates that,
Many majority state-owned listedfirms still use official appointment, and private firms tend
to recruit family members, but there is a tendency to recruit professional managers from
outside.
If managers are still appointed by government or its agencies, generally they will be
replaced only when they have done something wrong, as suggested by the board
secretary of CDS:
... The management teams are quite stable. Senior management members have a high sense
ofself-protection and they believe (that it is better in) doing less than making more mistakes.
The dilemma is that there are no sufficient well-trained professional managers
available to serve listed firms. The CEO of MF gives one example:
.. .An online advertisement for positions of technicians attracted 400 applicants while for
position of technical director and sales director attracted only 20 applicants...
Subsequently, there are almost no market evaluation mechanisms for professional
managers. The CEO of DOHA suggests that,
Lack ofmarket evaluation mechanism also reciprocally hinders the growth ofmanagerial
class.
Increasing cash flow or ownership right of managers in terms of stock option92 is a
major incentive instrument that it is assumed to lead to firms' performance
improvement in developed markets. But if managers are incapable of running
business, incentive has little relevance. Therefore a stock-option like mechanism may
not be applicable in China because the managerial market still needs time to develop
and experienced managers need time to grow to a large extent.
12.4 Internal Mechanisms
Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that the essential part of internal mechanisms is the
92 The incentive scheme is further discussed in later section of Internal Mechanisms.
258
separation of decision control and decision management in which an agent can not
exercise exclusive management and control over the same decisions. In China,
managers in general do not hold large shareholdings in the firms they serve and
without effective control procedures, decision managers are more likely to take
actions that deviate substantially from the interests of the shareholders, especially
weak minority shareholders.
12.4.1 Board of Directors & Independent Directors
The board of directors is the critical link between ownership and corporate
governance. Davies (2002) suggests that one lesson of corporate collapses in the US
and in Europe seems to be that no corporate structure can guarantee success if the
individuals within it do not operate with the right degree of independence, with the
right kind of expertise and do not devote the required amount of time to the
important role of non-executive director.
Article 112 of Company Law states that,
A joint stock limited company shall have a board of directors composed of five to nineteen
members.
The board of directors' responsibilities and power are further defined in figure 11.1
(pp225). As shown in table 9.2 (ppl74), the board size in terms of mean and median
values of board numbers are both 11. The board of directors has the power to engage
or dismiss the managers. In 1998, CSRC requires that the board chairman and CEO
should be separated, but in reality the power centres either on the chairman or the
CEO, depending on who is appointed by the largest shareholder.
■ Nomination & Composition
For all 16 firms, shareholder directors account for the largest portion of board of
directors and the CEO normally sits on the board as executive director and there are
one or two independent directors on the board. In general, controlling shareholders
control the board of directors. As indicated by the CEO of MF:
... Whether absolute controlling shareholders or relative controlling shareholders, whoever
has the largest shareholding will control the firm... and would consequently send more
board directors...
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Meanwhile, as revealed by the board secretary of CDS:
Large shareholders nominate executives and some executives also hold positions as
directors, which in effect leads to directors and executives being the same team...
Therefore Chinese board composition reflects the typical insider boards compared
with boards in the US and UK where independent directors play a larger role.
The board secretary of CJ suggests that:
... Most firms emphasise the social reputation of independent directors and many academics
from universities or research institutions with good technical background are invited to sit
on boards. But some of them have no idea aboutfinance, law etc. How can they make good
judgements? Having independent director becomes an on-the-surface need....
The board secretary of SAUTO indicates the urgency to have directors with financial
and other backgrounds on the board:
... We have invited independent directors...and the next step is to have someone who knows
more about finance, law etc...
Section 1 of Guidelines for Introducing Independent Directors to the Board of
Directors of Listed Companies (2001) requires that
At least one of the independent directors should be an accounting professional.
This requirement is highly questionable. Traditionally accountants in China play less
managerial roles and mainly conduct a bookkeeping function. Therefore it is not
known how many available accounting professionals with managerial skill can sit on
boards, not mentioning the impact of the new accounting rules based on International
Accounting Standards on accounting practitioners.
■ Independent Directors
Section 1 of Guidelines for Introducing Independent Directors to the Board of
Directors of Listed Companies (2001) requires that,
"By June 30th 2002, at least two members of the board of directors shall be independent
directors; and by June 30lh 2003, at least one third of board shall be independent
directors".
According to online data published by Shanghai Stock Exchange, most firms had
introduced one to two independent directors by the end of 2001.
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Section 5 of Guidelines for Introducing Independent Directors to the Board of
Directors of Listed Companies requires that,
The role of the independent director in listed companies should be adequately
activated...with power to appoint the outside auditing or consulting organisation
independently...
In fact there is no specific description in either the Code of Corporate Governance or
Company Law regarding voting power of independent directors.
On the other hand, the CEO of DOFE illustrates one simple calculation to support his
view that independent directors may collude with managers:
Ifa public figure were invited to be an independent directorfor 5 companies93, his annual
pay would end up £50,000 in total. Ifhis tenure were three years then the total
compensation would be £150,000 which is an impossible income for a normal employee in
China...therefore ifhis benefits were guaranteed, he wouldfeel happy if the company is just
so-so (on the condition that) there was no serious illegal action involved to risk his
reputation.
Therefore the actual compensation given to independent directors leads to financial
dependence of so-called independent directors and they may try to secure their
positions by giving up supervising managers.
Therefore, independent directors normally fall into two groups: they either cannot be
independent in terms of independent opinions or can be independent with high social
status but without expertise in managing or supervising firms. As suggested by
Forker (1992), raising expectations about the monitoring role of non-executive
directors is likely to impose pressure on non-executive (or independent) directors
who may lack the time or resources or independence to fulfil this function. Since
2001, CSRC has been deliberately providing training for independent directors to
improve their performance and it is not known the effectiveness of such policy.
■ Accountability
The legislation is silent with respect to the accountability of directors and executives,
93 Section 1 of Guidelines for Introducing Independent Directors to the Board of Directors of Listed
Companies states that "independent directors can only hold concurrently the position of independent
directors in five listed companies at maximum".
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in which the legal obligations and responsibilities of wrongdoings of senior
executives and director executives are not specifically quantified or described94. As
suggested by Shi et al (2002), misconduct does not prevent those responsible
managers from being appointed or reallocated by state agencies to serve in other
firms. Shi et al (2002) also argue that in China, enforcement emphasises
administrative and criminal processes rather than derivative civil actions. The CEO
of DOHA points out the difficulty in implementing civil compensation to investors:
... The persons are guilty ofwrongdoings should take their responsibilities for legal and civil
compensation. But directors and executives only have basic incomes from current jobs and
they have no capital for large compensation...
In addition, the regulations mainly stress profitability as the main reason for
delisting. Tenev et al (2000) suggest that a broader list of factors used by
international exchanges may be included, such as the failure to observe good
accounting practices and the creation and perpetuation of conflicts of interests.
■ Board Committees
It is found that all 16 firms hold average 4 board meetings per year, therefore the
effectiveness of the board of directors is in question. As the board secretary of CDS
indicates:
Board members do not have clear division of work, . ..and there is no clear requirement from
company law...
Therefore board committees are essential to ensure that the board functions properly.
The setting of committees was introduced by the Code of Corporate Governance in
early 2001, and article 52 of the Code of Corporate Governance specifies that:
The corporate strategy committee, audit committee, nomination committee, remuneration
and appraisal committee and other special committees that should be set up in accordance
with the resolutions of the shareholders' meetings... The audit committee, the nomination
committee and the remuneration and appraisal committee should be chaired by an
independent director and independent directors shall constitute the majority of the
committees.
94
Only Chapter XI of Securities Law states legal liabilities of security companies in share
underwriting and other transactions with detailed financial punishment description.
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The effectiveness of board committees is not known because whether they can
function meaningfully or not is largely dependent on the presence of the truly
independent directors. The performance of committees cannot be tested in this study.
■ Board Room Dynamics
The boardroom culture partially reflects the Chinese culture in seeking harmony
through balancing and sharing power. It is widely felt in boardrooms of 16 firms that
business should be conducted as far as possible through a smooth problem-solving
process instead of confrontation and fragmentation. The board secretary of CJ
describes how a board meeting is conducted:
...Board meetings are friendly and members (directors) are from the same family... large
shareholders are trying to keep on good terms with each other...
The board secretary of BS also suggests that because of low efficiency of the board
of directors:
Board directors have to communicate with all board members, which leads to complicated
individual relationships ofpeople involved with each other...
Directors of supervisory boards generally attend board meetings, but potential
conflicts between board of directors and the supervisory board are not welcomed.
The board secretary of SAUTO believes that:
If the supen'isory board stood opposite to board ofdirectors, there would be no hope for the
company...
A dynamic boardroom culture normally requires greater will, skill and power backed
by legal means for both independent directors and supervisory boards. The chief
legal adviser of DOFA admits that:
We introduced independent directors long before the requirement from CSRC, but till now
there has been no opposite opinion against other (non-independent) board members... and
there should be more debates in board meetings...
■ Chairman & CEO
The functions and power of the board of directors and CEO are summarised in figure
11.1 (pp225). Article 119 of Company Law also states that,
A joint stock limited company shall have a manager (CEO), who shall be engaged or
dismissed by the board of directors.
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Fifteen out of 16 firms have separate chairmen and CEOs. There is no specific
regulation covering the nomination process of Chairman and CEO in Company Law.
Because the voting right is based on one share one vote, therefore eventually large
shareholders decide the ultimate nomination of both CEO and Chairman. For firms
that went public in the early years (since 1991), CEO and Chairman were always the
same person, but this phenomenon changed since 1998. Fung et al (2001) document
that approximately 32% of board chairmen hold the position of chief executive
officers in 1998, while this ratio reduces to 22% in 1999 and 16% in 200095. Online
data from Shanghai Stock Exchange shows that the majority of firms had already
separated the role of chairman and CEO at the end of 2001. Forker (1992) suggests
that one aspect of corporate governance that has given rise to concern is the
dominant personality phenomenon, such as the dominance of CEOs in US firms,
which is found to be associated with poor disclosure and an apparent lack of interest
in monitoring. In the Chinese context, the dominant personality can be either the
chairman or the CEO, depending on who is appointed by the largest shareholder.
■ Performance Evaluation & Incentive Schemes
Chen et al (2000) suggests that one characteristic of listed firms in China is that top
management often has little or no share ownership. All 16 firms have been working
on combining incentive and restraint schemes in terms of either stock option or other
performance related pay schemes. Generally, as pointed out by the board secretary of
CDS:
We lack a scientific performance evaluation system and the proper performance
benchmark...
The CEO of BL suggests that,
The company in fact has been using a simulated stock option plan to implement incentives,
and real stock option is not on the agenda due to government policies and legal barriers.
In a few cases, firms might use more sophisticated evaluation schemes. For instance,
the management of MS bank may have never heard Economic Value Added (EVA),
but in practice cost and risk are incorporated into the performance evaluation.
95 The reduction in the percentage of the dual roles is the result of an administrative instruction made
by CSRC in 1998 requiring firms to separate the roles of chairman and CEO.
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Fung et al (2001) argue that the lack of executive stock options in China is a missing
ingredient in the design of incentive systems that align the interests of managers and
investors. But their claim that directors and executive are underpaid is based on
executive compensation standards in the developed markets and is obviously
questionable in the Chinese context. Unlike the listed firms in the West, listed firms
in China still have large state residual shareholdings. Granting stock options to
management may be counterproductive in that the stock option may enhance
management control of the listed firms. Therefore, stock option-like incentive
schemes can be possibility introduced when the state residual shareholdings have
been reduced significantly and when a few large minority shareholders can better
supervise such practice. At the current stage, performance-related pay such as bonus
scheme is probably more practical.
Calian (2002) suggests that it is important for the remuneration committee to be
made up of independent directors who can calculate the potential salary of an
executive since shareholders do not have the resources, and there has to be a clear
link between pay and performance. But the research on Chinese listed firms by Stem
& Stewart reveals that listed firms' market value and company fundamentals deviate
from each other severally (Hua 2001), which suggests that incentive schemes such as
stock options cannot align management with shareholders' interests. This finding is
consistent with the findings from the earlier financial data analysis in Chapter 10. As
shown in table 10.2 (pp202), the three years post-IPO mean (median) value of share
price return of listed sample firms is 28.02% (23.66%), while as shown in table 8.1
(ppl37), return on sales, return on assets and return on equity are 12.87% (14.03%),
5.91% (5.97%) and 5.36% (10.2%) respectively. Therefore the stock-option like
incentive scheme is premature in China given its inefficient equity markets and listed
firms need to find new incentive schemes to align management with shareholders'
interests.
12.4.2 The Role of Supervisory Board
The function of the supervisory board is summarised in figure 11.1 (pp225).
Regarding the role of the supervisory board, the Company Law and Code of
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Corporate Governance only use "shall" to describe its rights without quantifying its
power or relationship towards the board of directors and executives it is supposed to
supervise. Article 54 of Company Law states that,
...the supervisory board shall supervise both board of directors and managers
(executives)...(and) shall attend meetings of the board of directors as non-voting
participants.
Article 127 of Company Law suggests that,
The articles of association of the company shall stipulate the method of deliberation and
voting procedures of the supervisory board.
Therefore, in practice, no procedures have been developed to empower the
supervisory board toward the board of directors and it is generally sidelined and just
a token.
■ Composition
Article 124 of Company Law states that:
"The supervisory board shall be composed of shareholders' representatives and an
appropriate proportion of representatives of the staff and workers of the company ..."
In practice the supervisory board is elected by large shareholders through board of
directors and its members come from senior management, shareholders and
employee representatives. Tenev et al (2002) also find that leaders of party
committees tend to assume the positions of chair and vice chair in almost all listed
firms, and they suggest that the lower quality and less professional experience of
supervisors compared with directors and managers has led to supervisors' inability to
actually supervise directors and managers.
■ Independence
All 16 firms suggest that the independence of supervisory board is difficult to
achieve. The board secretary of BS indicates that,
The board ofdirectors is equipped with the best expertise while the supervisory board is
relatively weak in this aspect. If the board ofdirectors cannotfind where the problems lie,
neither can the supervisory board. In addition, the deliberate misconduct of the board of
director may also involve the supervisory board that attend the board meeting and
nominated by the board ofdirectors...
Echoed by the board secretary of DAHE:
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...Shareholder representatives, employee representatives and senior management
representatives do not play their roles. Since the board ofdirectors nominates the
supervisory board directors, it is not possible for the supervision board members to supervise
the board ofdirectors who nominated them in the first place.
In regard to employee involvement in supervisory board, the CEO of DOFE indicates
that,
All supervisory board members are from employees in the company (including executives),
and in theory it is not possible for an employee to track the responsibility ofa senior
manager because the manager may fire him first...
The idea of supervisory board is borrowed from the German corporate governance
model and culturally supervisor board indeed reflects the stakeholder principle in
China where collectivism prevails. But since years of economic reform, trade unions
in fact have been further weakened in dynamic economic transition. Subsequently, it
cannot be expected that employee representatives sitting on board would exercise
supervision of management as those do in Germany. As suggested by Cha (2001),
this system of supervision is not effective since it is often unclear whose interest is
represented by the supervisory board. In many cases, the supervisory board
duplicates the authority of the board itself but without corresponding responsibilities.
The presence of supervisory board may give the illusion of certain checks and
balance in the listed firms when none existed.
12.4.3 Financing
In the past, SOEs were mainly financed by bank loans and banks generally acted as
creditors to collect interest with minimum monitoring function. Table 8.1 (ppl37)
shows that listed firms' leverage declined dramatically after they went public, and
mean (median) values of total debt and long-term debt ratios drop from 58.05%
(61.15%) and 20.1% (16.24%) to 38.62% (37.64%) and 8.31% (4.45%) respectively
after IPO. The CEO of MS suggests that,
On the one hand, state banks are trying to get rid ofnon-performing loan and therefore long-
term lending has been reducing in recent years. On the other hand, firms are simply
unwilling to borrow from banks so as to have less pressure to meet interest obligations.
Even bank loans do offer tax advantage, 10 out of 16 firms still suggest that they
prefer not to borrow from the banks.
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After going public, firms are also allowed to issue corporate bonds, and article 164 of
Company Law states that,
The scale of the company bond issues shall be determined by the State Council.... The
issue of company bonds is examined and approved by the (relevant) departments
determined by the State Council.
Article 172 of Company Law also states that,
...a listed company may issue company bonds which can be converted into shares...The
issue of company (bonds) convertible into shares shall be subjected to the approval of
the department of securities administration under the State Council...
Since listed firms are converted from SOEs, the government has great interest in
their viability and bond issuing has been strictly controlled. Given the disadvantage
of debt financing in terms of interest payments and the practical difficulties in issuing
corporate bonds, firms tend not to issue corporate bonds, leaving debt financing as a
governance mechanism (in terms of bankruptcy pressure) more difficult.
As mentioned earlier, issuing new shares for external financing is a time-consuming
practice because of regulations and the long approval process, all 16 firms indicate
that internal financing from retained earning is much easier and as important as
external financing from issuing new shares. Comparing internal financing from
retained earnings and external financing from issuing new shares, external financing
may impose capital market monitoring and costs of other uncertainties while retained
earning is simply free cash from investors. Therefore firms tend to keep large
retained earnings and pay no dividends to investors96. As suggested by Jensen
(1986), corporate managers are the agents of shareholders, a relationship fraught with
conflicting interests; and payouts to shareholders reduce the resources under
managers' control, thereby reducing managers' power and making no dividend
payout more likely when the firm must obtain new capital.
96 But the share price does not necessarily go down. Due to the speculative stock market, private and
institutional investors are keen on capital gains instead of dividends.
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12.5 Summary on Corporate Governance
The above analysis shows major governance problems in three key aspects - legal
device, external mechanisms and internal mechanisms. Table 12.2 summarises the
main findings of the effect of IPO on corporate governance.
The analysis suggests that IPO brings corporate governance concept and mechanisms
into listed firms. The weaknesses in corporate governance practice are reflected in
almost every aspect of legal device, external and internal mechanisms. In legal
device, the general shareholders meeting is just a rubber stamp of large controlling
shareholders that dominate listed firms in finance, strategy, personnel and operation.
The power structure of a listed firm as defined by law in effect leads to insider
control by controlling shareholders. Large non-tradable shares held by state and legal
persons in effect prevent the existence of a takeover market. Information disclosure
is not transparent and corporate governance scandals hurt investors' confidence
severely. Essentially, minority shareholders' interests are not well protected. In
external mechanisms, the absence of a takeover market, managerial market and
bankruptcy pressure leads to a speculative equity market. Various laws and
regulations have been introduced to improve market transparency and to prevent
insider trading and price manipulation, but enforcement mechanisms are not in place
to force those accountable to take legal obligations and responsibilities of their
wrongdoings. In internal mechanisms, the board of directors is in effect an insider
board with powerless so-called independent directors. The accountability of senior
executives is not well emphasised by law. Independent directors and directors
supervisory board are sidelined with neither power nor independence. Given current
corporate governance practices in Chinese listed firms, the superior financial
performance can not be expected.
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Table 12.1 Summary of Analysis of Corporate Governance
This table summarises the results of IPO effect on corporate governance in terms of legal
device, external mechanisms and internal mechanisms, as well as corporate governance
development in private sector, with each theme presented separately.
Legal Device
1 General Shareholders' Meeting
■ rubber stamp of large
shareholders
■ no proxy voting implementation
2 Controlling Shareholders
■ dominance in organisational
structures, finance, strategy,
personal and operation
■ minority shareholders' interests
are not well-protected
3 State Ownership
■ Inefficient in supervision
4 Legal Person Ownership
■ non-tradable nature reduces
corporate governance
5 Foreign Ownership
■ non-tradable nature discourages
foreign investors
6 Banking Reform
■ no role in corporate governance
of listed firms
■ banks' own governance problems
have not been solved
7 Financial Institutions
■ seeking trading profits, not
governance of listed firms
8 Private Ownership
■ powerless in decision-making
■ not cost-effective to exercise
governance function
■ avoiding confrontation with
management
9 Power Structure & Insider Control
■ power in hands of the largest
shareholder
■ insiders control the firms
10 Financial Reporting & Information
Disclosures
■ insufficient transparency










■ no market evaluation
mechanisms
3. Takeover & Bankruptcy
■ large non-tradable shares leading
to no-existence of takeover
market
■ no bankruptcy pressure towards
listed firms due to lack of
enforcement mechanisms
Internal Mechanisms
1. Board of Directors
■ insider-dominated board,
controlled by large shareholders
■ no independence for independent
directors
■ no voting power for independent
directors
■ no accountability for wrong¬
doings
■ chairman & CEO are controlled
by large shareholders
2. Supervisory Board
■ no power for supervisory board
over board of directors
■ no independence from board of
directors
3. Performance Evaluation & Incentive
■ lack performance evaluation
schemes
■ lack incentive schemes
4. Financing
■ difficult to issue bond due to
application procedures
■ prefer equity to debt financing
due to free of interest obligations
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12.6 Summary on Case Analysis
This chapter is ended with a summary of the effect of IPO on both corporate
management and corporate governance, in the light of the findings and evidence
found in chapter 11 and 12.
The analysis of effect of IPO on corporate management reveals that listed firms
experience severe problems in strategic, financial and human resource management,
which subsequently contribute to firms' poor performance after IPO. The analysis of
effect of IPO on corporate governance suggests that the firms' legal device, external
and internal mechanisms are flawed since the beginning of IPO, which are worsen by
China's weak legal enforcement mechanisms. The poor performance in corporate
management and corporate governance jointly contribute to firms' disappointing
financial performance found early in chapter 8. It is recognised that there is a
possible causal relationship in which firm performance might also affect corporate
governance as corporate governance does on firm performance. For Chinese listed
firms, corporate governance mechanisms are newly introduced at the time of IPO,
hence corporate governance tends to have impact on firm performance after IPO, not
the other way around. Figure 12.3 summarises the determinants in firm performance.
Figure 12.3 Determinants of Financial Performance of Listed Firms in China
The figure demonstrates the determinants of listed firms' performance based on
analysis of corporate management and corporate governance practice in listed firms.
This figure also further confirms the prediction of the relationship between ownership






















As shown in figure 12.3, firms' economic performance is determined by three
factors: corporate governance, corporate management and macro factors, and the
associations between corporate management and corporate governance with
performance improvement are weak. The evidence from 16 firms suggests that as a
result of going public, corporate management and corporate governance in Chinese
has changed substantially, but failed to improve firm performance. Given China's
transition context, the improvement in corporate management and corporate
governance involves further policy reforms, supported by well-functioned legal
systems, if they were to improve firms' performance.
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Chapter 13 Conclusions & Policy Implications
13.1 Overviews
This thesis investigates the impact of partial share issue privatisation or initial public
offering (IPO) on firm performance in China. This thesis consolidates the current
limited privatisation research on China. It also challenges the methodology employed
in current privatisation studies in examining determinants of firms' performance
changes after privatisation, in which ownership structure have been the major
explanatory variables. This thesis also provides evidence of effect of IPO on
corporate management and corporate governance practice in Chinese listed firms so
as to explore their roles in explaining firms' post-IPO financial performance.
A methodology developed by Megginson et al (1994) in their study of global share
issue privatisation through comparing firms' post-privatisation versus pre-
privatisation performance proxies is employed in this thesis. Most privatisation
studies suggest that private ownership is superior to state ownership and should
improve firm performance. Many researchers further advocate full privatisation of
state-owned enterprises in order to achieve performance improvement and partial
privatisation is argued to lead to partial gains in firms' financial performance. This
thesis focuses on Chinese listed firms and tries to identify the effect of IPO on firms'
financial and operating performance; the causes in firms' performance changes; and
the effect of IPO on corporate management and corporate governance that contribute
to firms' performance changes.
13.2 Findings97
13.2.1 Post-IPO versus Pre-lPO Performance Changes
Findings show that newly privatised firms experience significant performance
deterioration in profitability and efficiency, but significant reduction in leverage and
improvement in liquidity and output after going public. The findings of this thesis in
performance changes are not consistent with major empirical studies comparing post-
privatisation versus pre-privatisation performance changes for firms privatised via
97 The result of survey study is summarised in Appendix 13. l(pp308-316) and 13.2 (pp317).
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share issue privatisation, with just some consistency with one recent country study on
China, but not across all performance proxies. In these share issue privatisation
studies, newly privatised firms mainly show improvement in efficiency and
profitability, and reduction in leverage. In this thesis, almost all profitability and
efficiency measures deteriorate after IPO. Real output (or real sales) is found
experiencing significant improvement after going public, which may reflect the
general growth of the economy in China. The deterioration of all profitability and
efficiency performance measures found in this thesis might indicate that share issue
privatisation or IPO does not work properly to improve firm performance in China.
Further analysis finds those main sample firms (IPO firms) and minor sample firms
(non-IPO firms) perform significantly differently in all performance proxies of
profitability, efficiency, leverage and output. Therefore the performance of IPO firms
is not the result of same economy cycle, but the effect of IPO. Furthermore, if IPO
does improve firm performance, IPO firms should perform at least no worse than
non-IPO firms should, especially in profitability and efficiency measures. The results
reveal that given the same economic conditions for both IPO and non-IPO firms,
both IPO firms and non-IPO firms experience deteriorated performance changes
during the same period. Specifically, main sample firms underperform minor sample
firms in three important profitability and efficiency measures - return on assets,
return on equity and sales assets turnover, which suggests that IPO firms perform
worse than non-IPO firms do. Therefore the results confirm that IPO does not work
properly for IPO firms to improve their financial performance.
13.2.2 Determinants of Performance Changes
The regression results suggest that the most important performance drivers are public
ownership, the presence of employee ownership, share issue size, board size and
assets size, and less important explanatory variables include human capital and
Herfindahal ownership concentration etc.
• Private ownership is one of the most important performance drivers and is
significantly positively associated with most profitability and output
improvement. It has a significant positive relationship with return on assets,
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return on equity and sales changes, which may indicate that private investors
does impose pressure on firms externally and subsequently help to improve firms
profitability and output. Meanwhile it is also negatively associated with total
long-term debt change, which might suggest that private investors favour less
borrowing.
• The presence of employee ownership is significantly positively associated with
return on assets and total debt, which might indicate that employee ownership
also impose pressure on firms internally and help to improve profitability. But it
also has significant positive relationship with total debt level, which might
suggest that employee ownership encourage borrowing because equity financing
will dilute their shares.
• Share issue size is another important factor that affects firms' performance
changes. It is negatively associated with return on assets and return on equity
improvement, which might indicate that as more funds are raised from the capital
market, the potential for misuse of IPO funds is higher, and firm performance
deteriorates subsequently. Share issue size is also negatively associated with total
debt, which could be the result of debt payment by share issue proceeds and
subsequently lower total debt level.
• Board size is negatively associated with return on sales improvement, but
positively correlated with real sales improvement, which may indicate that real
sales can be improved through board directors' personal network, but the
profitability of the firms remains poor. Larger board size contributes to higher
total borrowing because of the free ride of responsibility within the board
directors.
• Assets size is negatively correlated with sales, which might indicate that larger
firms perform worse than smaller firms do in sales improvement. But assets size
is also positively associated with return on assets and return on equity
improvement. Given higher total assets and lower sales improvement, larger
firms might be in a better position in controlling costs - either through economies
of scale or their monopoly position - to improve their return on assets
performance. Assets size is also positively associated with return on equity, and
the reason could also be cost control or economies of scale by larger firms.
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13.2.3 Determinants of Share Price Return
Through regressing firms' post-IPO share price return against post-IPO accounting
performance proxies, it is found that investors emphasise short-term liquidity, sales
and sales efficiency in share price valuation instead of profitability measures in terms
of return on sales, return on assets and return on equity. It is also found that investors
generally focus on fundamental performance proxies and ignore supplementary
performance proxies in share valuation. Therefore it can be assumed that the stock
market does not properly reflect firms' accounting performance.
13.2.4 Case Analysis - Evidence from 16 Firms
13.2.4.1 Effect of IPO on Corporate Management
The evidence from 16 firms further reveal that firms' corporate management and
corporate governance practice are problematic after IPO, in which the poor strategic,
financial and human resource management are accompanied by weak legal, internal
and external corporate governance mechanisms. The results suggest that after IPO,
state influence has been changed from mandatory planning to board representation.
The state does intervene in employment policies, but it provides supportive policies
towards certain high-tech industries. In strategic management, short-termism and
speculative diversification emerges after IPO. Proper investment appraisal techniques
are not employed to make investment decisions. Research and development basically
has not been on the listed firms' strategic agenda. In financial management, cash
management is based on the short-term. IPO funds have not been properly used for
new investments, but to payback loans or reinvest in stock markets. Generally
dividends are not paid to investors. In human resource management, the managerial
knowledge structure and employee skills could not cope with business development
after IPO. For private listed firms, they are normally been blocked out of the
information channel from the governments and have less business freedom. In
addition, they are still facing the challenges of gaining social trust from the public.
The evidence suggests that corporate management of the firms has been poor, which
contributes to firms' poor financial performance after IPO.
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13.2.4.2 Effect of IPO on Corporate Governance
There has been considerable confusion over the meaning of corporate governance in
the Chinese context. Some managers and officials regard it as being just a modern
way of organisational management, or a set of structures and procedures for
regulators and owners of an enterprise to supervise managers. Some simply view
corporate governance as one of the "modem" management instruments that could be
applied without reference to the social-economic/regulatory/financial context. The
IPO has brought institutional changes in listed firms, such as corporate governance in
listed firms, but corporate governance has been flawed at the time when firms go
public. The weaknesses in corporate governance in China have been reflected in
almost every aspect of legal device, external and internal mechanisms.
In legal device, the evidence from case studies suggests that the general shareholders
meeting is just a rubber stamp of large controlling shareholders that dominate listed
firms in finance, strategy, personnel and operation. In addition, lack of investor
relations meetings affects investors' confidence in management. The power structure
of a listed firm as defined by law in effect leads to insider control by controlling
shareholders. Large non-tradable shares held by state and legal persons in effect
prevent the existence of a takeover market. Information disclosure is not transparent
and corporate governance scandals hurt investors' confidence severely. Essentially,
minority shareholders' interests are not well protected. In external mechanisms, the
absence of a takeover market, managerial market and bankruptcy pressure leads to a
speculative equity market. Various laws and regulations have been introduced to
improve market transparency and to prevent inside trading and price manipulation,
but enforcement mechanisms are not in place to force those accountable to take legal
obligations and responsibilities of their wrongdoings. In internal mechanisms, the
board of directors is in effect an insider board with powerless so-called independent
directors. The accountability of senior executives is not well emphasised by law.
Independent directors and directors supervisory board are sidelined with neither
power nor independence. Given current corporate governance practices in Chinese
listed firms, the superior financial performance can not be expected. If the
performance of listed firms is determined by a bundle of mechanisms mentioned
277
above, IPO indeed fails to improve firms' performance by simply imposing these
mechanisms on listed firms. Going public or privatisation cannot be expected to
solve all aspects of corporate issues, and it may be difficult to achieve performance
improvement if corporate infrastructures have not been well developed in the first
place.
13.3 Policy Implications
The disappointing performance results after IPO and the corporate management and
corporate governance evidence from 16 listed firms suggest that IPO does not work
well in China. Therefore Chinese SOEs cannot be privatised first and let the self-
regulating power of market forces takes care of all problems 'internal' to the firm.
Privatisation works in many other countries because their successful privatisations
are based on decent legal infrastructures and market environment that support a
complex market economy, otherwise simply privatising SOEs will be rife with
problems. China has a less sophisticated legal system and weak enforcement
mechanism, and courts are less equipped and judges are less experienced to deal with
corporate affairs, leaving the interests of minority shareholders largely been ignored.
The speculative equity market and dynamic product market have set huge barriers for
listed firms to improve financial performance. Therefore privatisation should
primarily be concerned with objectives and direction that will best serve China's
economic and social needs. Given China's current economic development, this thesis
proposes the following policies to solve some urgent issues so as to improve firm
performance in the future.
13.3.1 Legal Reforms
It might simply be politically impossible to get to an ideal state from the existing
98
starting points in China where even civil laws are not well established . But some
legal reforms should be considered.
98 There is no civil law code and only General Rules introduced in 1986. The legislation in civil law is
far behind current circumstances, which leads to failure in solving social and economic issues. Now
commercial law and civil law are combined called Commercial Civil Law.
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13.3.1.1 Legislation on Transparency & Accountability
Information transparency and managerial accountability is crucial to market
integrity. Without them, relationship between listed firms, financial community and
investors can not be improved, which would eventually hinder the development of a
healthy financial market. Currently in China, with dominant controlling shareholders
as a direct result of large state residual shareholdings, minority shareholders are
expropriated by controlling shareholders. China has set up substantive corporate law
and securities regulation, information disclosure standards and corporate governance
code in order to protect minority shareholders' rights and improve corporate
governance. But current laws and regulations are silent on accountability of
individuals such as corporate mangers and accounting professionals. Therefore
legislation in these aspects need to be improved and reinforced through judicial
reform.
13.3.1.2 Enforcement Mechanisms - Tribunals
As suggested by Wolfensohn (2002), rules on the books are not enough because
corporate directors, public accountants and government regulators alike must believe
that rules reflect commonly-shared and socially-reinforced values. The compliance
by private parties with corporate governance rules depends on a country's legal
culture and respect for rule of law. In addition, more effective regulation will require
increased enforcement capability for regulatory bodies. For instance, CSRC lacks
independent enforcement authority. The problem faced by many judicial systems -
such as quality of judges, weak enforcement of judgements, government interference
and corruption - can stand in the way of stronger market regulation. Therefore
judicial reforms might be important on the future agenda of lawmakers, in which
building enforcement mechanisms is the key to prevent wrongdoings.
Given the fact that it is simply not feasible to convert a country's weak civil law
system (such as in China) to common law system, one alternative is to set up a
specialised tribunal. This is particularly important since judiciary, legislative and
administrative functions are not separated in China, which leads to low efficiency
and an ambiguous role of the court in the judiciary system. Furthermore, as civil law
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code was newly introduced, it is very difficult for less experienced Chinese judges to
deal with emerging new corporate affairs in a fast changing transitional economy. A
tribunal with involvement of professional bodies and enforcement power from
highest judiciary institutions may fulfil the role of courts in the contemporary
business environment. In addition, human capital development in experienced
regulators and prosecutors in China takes some time and is crucial to the success of
judicial reform.
13.3.2 Ownership Structure Reforms
Because many listed firms were part of larger SOEs, affiliated business groups
between listed firms and parent firms become the norm after IPO, and intrafirm
transactions used to expropriate wealth from minority investors cannot be easily
avoided. Because of the presence of controlling shareholders, managers are often
forced to maximise large shareholders' value, which may not necessarily maximise
minority shareholders' returns. In pyramidal structures minority owners can be
expropriated though intragroup transfers by controlling shareholders. Therefore listed
firms' assets could be hollowed out through various transactions such as borrowing
funds, entering into production contracts or assets collateral. Corporate law and the
previously mentioned tribunal may be used to deal with assets stripping by providing
independent judgement and enforcement.
As suggested by Demsetz et al (1985), firms in markets characterised by stable
prices, stable technology, and stable market shares can be monitored at relatively low
cost. In less predictable environments, managerial behaviour becomes more difficult
to monitor. Given the dynamic economic environment in China, monitoring
managers requires a concentrated ownership structure. As small shareholders are
incapable of or less willing to monitor, ownership concentration is indeed essential.
But the question is how ownership should be concentrated - in the hands of the state,
legal person, banks, financial institutions, private entrepreneurs, foreign investors or
other potential candidates?
■ State and legal persons can hardly be effective shareholders and their presence
has led to insider control by their representatives. Therefore, the state residual
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shareholding should be reduced to activate takeover market as a corporate
governance mechanism to discipline listed firms.
■ Stated-owned banks provide most of the loans to SOEs. Banks should also be
subject to the same corporate governance mechanisms as listed firms, but in fact
their own corporate governance represents typical practice in SOEs' and in effect
the corporate governance mechanisms are absent. In addition, Chinese banks are
inexperienced in governing SOEs and their role has been channelling domestic
savings to SOEs as bank loans. Banks' lending practice is not supported by credit
rating and they have not been involved in investment activities in a free market
due to legislation, including investment in overseas money market". Given
banks' weak expertise, experience and lack of monitoring power by law, banks
cannot act as major corporate governance force. In the future, the development of
an effective system for the governance of banks has become a critical issue.
■ The behaviour pattern of securities companies, investment companies and
investment funds has largely followed their counterparts in the developed
markets. Because of the nature of financial institutions as sole equity holders and
their small shareholdings in tradable shares in the market, they are not motivated
to improve corporate governance of the listed firms. Therefore an institutional
shareholder base needs to develop to improve corporate governance of listed
firms.
■ Private entrepreneurs can form a driving force in corporate governance, but most
of them mainly have experience in running family businesses with less
knowledge and understanding in running public companies. Even private
entrepreneurs may be amateur to be the dominant force in corporate governance,
they may play a very active role in monitoring listed firms if their interests are
bound with them. In addition, they can also stimulate corporate governance
improvement in the private sector where governance issues have not been well
recognised.
■ Foreign investors have long been excluded from the A-share market in China
with limited foreign investors as legal person shareholders holding non-tradable
legal person shares similar to state shares. Foreign investors may help to
99
Except Bank of China acts as the Chinese government's representative around the world.
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discipline management within China's primitive legal and regulatory
environment.
• Klipper (1998) suggests that one of the best models of corporate governance that
transition economies can use is the leveraged buyout (LBO)100 and venture
capital fund operating in the West. One advantage is that institutions can act right
away if something goes wrong and the LBO firm goes public again as soon as
debt has been paid off sufficiently and improvements in operating performance
have been demonstrated. LBO may work well in developed markets, but may be
less practical in the Chinese transitional context. First of all, it cannot be assumed
that those private investors or venture capitalists could have proper incentives
given weak legal systems in China. Secondly, there might not be western-style
venture capital and venture capitalists out there in the market to construct
leveraged buyout firms. Domestic parties involved in listed firms - the state,
legal person, financial institutions - are incapable in performing functions as
venture capitalists because their own corporate governance is problematic,
leaving only foreign investors or domestic private entrepreneurs to play such a
role if LBO is feasible.
As suggested by Shi et al (2002), without a credible threat of failure in the form of
loss of market share, bankruptcy, delisting, or hostile takeover, the effectiveness of
most instruments of corporate governance will be limited. Without threat of failure,
stock market participants will not have the incentives to base their investment
behaviour on information on company fundamentals, including corporate governance
practice. As a result, share prices will not be able to serve as useful market signals in
designing compensation contracts, assessing managerial performance and guiding
takeover activities.
In order to promote wider share ownership, in September 2000, the Chinese
government unveiled a plan to reduce the proportion of state-owned shares from 68%
to 30% in two stages. The plan specified several ways to reduce the amount of state-
100
In a leveraged buyout, a large fraction of the purchase is debt-financed by venture capitalists. The
LBO's shares are held by a partnership of institutions and the high debt in the LBO is not intended to
be permanent but designed to be paid down and force improvements in operating efficiency.
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owned shares: share replacement, share repurchase, negotiated transfer, auctioning,
and debt-equity transfers (Shi et al 2002). Shi et al (2000) suggest that the most
appealing way of reducing state shares is through institutional investors. In mass
media, reducing state shares through gradual sales has been widely debated, but no
consensus has been reached on how to reduce state shareholdings. The following
section further discusses reducing state residual shares through direct sales on the
open market and through promoting institutional investors, especially foreign
strategic investors.
13.3.2.1 Reducing State Residual Shareholdings through Open
Sales
There is no consensus on how to reduce state shares in China. The proposal to reduce
state residual shares gradually through selling state non-tradable shares at market
price has led to huge national debate and has not been welcomed by investors and
listed firms and the fairness of the state has been questioned. In fact the fundamental
problem is that state residual shares are non-tradable and they are not incorporated in
firms' share price valuation and market capitalisation. If the state would sell its
residual shares at the current market price, the investors would suffer loss on share
dilution. Two options are proposed here.
Option One: If state residual shares are sold through right issue.
The proceeds of residual shares sold at equity market should be distributed within
three parties involved: the state, listed firms and private shareholders. Alternatively,
equity could be granted to existing private shareholders if no proceeds will be
distributed to them.
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Option Two: If state residual shares are reduced through share buyback by listed
firms.
Listed firm then can use cash to buyback shares from state and private shareholder
could be granted with equities. In both scenarios, private shareholders should receive
either cash or new shares.
In addition, there are two related issues that need to be solved: firstly, even non-
tradable shares including state shares and legal person shares can be transferred, in
reality most of these non-tradable shares are very static and have been occasionally
transferred between them. If the state is eligible to sell its non-tradable shares, the
legal person shareholders may require equal treatment to get their shares traded
freely, but this has not been on government's agenda. Secondly, the tradable share
prices are much higher than those of the non-tradable share in the transfer market are
(share transfers within state and legal person shareholders). Therefore it is not
practical for the government to sell non-tradable shares at the current market price.
13.3.2.2 Promoting Foreign Strategic Investors
Listed firms cannot purely depend on themselves to improve corporate governance,
and foreign strategic investors are indeed essential to act as a catalyst in this aspect.
Fung et al (2001) document the association between CEO pay and firm performance
in terms of return on assets and share price return, and the association is quite strong
when investors (such as foreign shareholders) exert pressure. They argue that one
policy implication is that strong and active investors are needed to monitor executive
compensation and to insist on performance related pay, and in particular restrictions
on firms selling shares to foreign investors should be removed. If introducing foreign
investors is indeed feasible, three issues must be resolved: what kind of foreign
strategic investors should be introduced, how do they enter into Chinese equity
market, and how to encourage them to voice or monitor firms. The major task is not
so much introducing foreign investors itself, but to encouraging foreign investors to
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voice instead of exit when firms are in trouble. The following three proposals may be
applicable in the Chinese context.
(1) What Kind of Foreign Investors?
Tenev et al (2002) suggest that regulations that make it easier for private and foreign-
invested firms to list domestically are likely to improve over time the overall quality
of listed firms. If foreign strategic investors were allowed to invest in A-share
market, three types of foreign investors might be considered: foreign portfolio
investors, foreign direct investment investors and foreign commercial banks.
• Foreign Portfolio Investors
China has announced plans to allow so-called Qualified Foreign Institutional
Investors (QFII) to buy A-shares under strict regulations. Foreign portfolio investors
allowed to invest in equity market can be investment funds, such as mutual funds, or
other assets management companies. As discussed earlier, financial institutions in
developed markets generally free ride in seeking short-term trading profits and
therefore introducing foreign institutional investors on a large scale may well not suit
Chinese government's intention to improve poor corporate governance and financial
performance of listed firms.
• Foreign Direct Investment Investors
Foreign direct investment investors can also be allowed to take controlling
shareholding of the listed firms, and the shares hold by foreign investors should be
tradable. The advantages of bring foreign direct investment in listed firms include not
only their technology advance but also expertise in corporate governance.
Meanwhile, Chinese firms' corporate management can be improved and managers
can learn more about investment evaluation and strategic planning.
• Foreign Commercial Banks
Foreign commercial banks are well experienced in corporate governance, and allow
them to hold controlling shares and promote their role in corporate governance of
listed firms would eventually improve firm performance. For example, foreign
commercial banks are well experienced in monitoring public companies and have
resources to conduct research and are capable in investment evaluation. On the other
hand, it is beneficial for Chinese banks to set up joint ventures with foreign banks
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and to become involved in the equity market. Therefore foreign commercial banks
can act as an intermediary for Chinese banks to learn advanced practices in lending,
conducting investment evaluation, handling non-performing loans, designing
financial instruments as well as corporate governance practice in modern commercial
banks. China is beginning to accept foreign direct investment in small Chinese
banking institutions101.
(2) How Foreign Investors Enter into Equity Market?
As discussed earlier, reducing state residual shares has been debated for a long time
but there has been no consensus on how to distribute sales proceeds and how to deal
with share dilution. As mentioned in financial data analysis, government residual
shareholdings account for an average of more than 60% of total shares and one off
sale or staged sales can reduce them. It is possible that residual shares can be sold to
both domestic and foreign investors at a re-evaluated price or through tender offer.
Individual investors should be granted a certain amount of shares through right issue
and buy those shares at discounted price paid by institutional investors. The
government should receive the full proceeds and listed firms could get potential
benefits in governance from foreign investors and further debt financing if foreign
investors become controlling shareholders beyond certain threshold of shareholding,
which will be discussed in the following section. Therefore, all parties involved
could become beneficiaries and a good starting point for corporate governance can
be set up.
(3) How to Encourage Foreign Investors to Voice?
There should be a mechanism to direct foreign investors as both equity holders and
debt holders and encourage them to voice when problems emerge. As mean and
median values of long-term leverage ratio of listed firms have declined dramatically
to 8.31% and 4.45% after going public, introducing debt financing as a governance
mechanism to provide restraints to institutional shareholders is highly desirable. The
proposed mechanism could be like this: When the state sells residual shareholdings,
foreign investors, such as foreign direct investment investors, foreign portfolio
101 See appendix 13.3 (pp318).
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investors or foreign commercial banks, can buy those shares at a re-evaluated price.
If an investor shareholding crosses certain threshold, say 15% or 20%, these large
shareholders are obliged to provide a certain amount of debt financing either in the
form of long-term loans or corporate bonds. At the time the state sells its residual
shareholding, corporate bonds can also be issued and the equity-debt structure should
be based on the needs of a specific firm. The 15%, 20% or other threshold is one way
to reduce the possibility of one large controlling shareholder because debt obligation
increases as equity shareholding increases. This mechanism in fact encourages the
presence of several large minority shareholders instead of one large majority
shareholder in a firm. The checks and balances within these large minority
shareholders could lead to improved governance practice in Chinese listed firms.
In short, as suggested by Shi et al (2002), the larger the size the more difficult exit
becomes and the stronger the incentives to assume an active role in corporate
governance. Therefore institutional investors are key to developing a Chinese capital
market that rewards companies with good corporate governance practices.
13.3.4 Rethinking Supervisory Board
As mentioned earlier, the supervisory board is powerless given current legislation.
Schipani et al (2001) suggest that the supervisory board should become a corporate
body between the shareholders and the board of directors in the corporate hierarchy,
and should hold the power to appoint and dismiss directors. In addition, it should
hold statutory decision-making powers with respect to fundamental investment
decisions or transaction plans as well as financial and accounting activities. Finally,
it should have authority to take legal action against directors or executives on behalf
of the corporation. Their proposal in fact suggests that the supervisory board should
take over power from board of directors and exercise their functions and can launch
litigation against management. If that is the case, then what is the role for board of
directors? In fact neither the board of directors nor the supervisory board has the
power to supervise the CEO and executives when they are the representatives of
controlling shareholders. The current two-board system seems irrational and
excessive. If committees within the board of directors serve similar functions to the
supervisory board, there would be no need for such a two-tier board system in which
three hierarchical structures (supervisory board, board of directors and CEO) might
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be counterproductive by producing more bureaucracy instead of delivering higher
efficiency, improved governance and better performance. Board committees can be
granted enough power to make independent decisions and restrain both executive
directors and CEO through a mechanism of one-share-veto by independent directors,
especially when independent directors do not take the majority of seats on the board.
Furthermore, without the supervisory board, a special board committee incorporating
employee representatives can be set up to reflect the stakeholder principle and
improve supervision of management by employees.
In short, this thesis recommends that designing and building sound corporate
governance mechanisms, reforming legal systems, and promoting institutional
investors through various proposed means, such as specifying governance
mechanisms, setting up tribunals and introducing strategic foreign investors etc. are
prerequisites to firms' performance improvement.
13.4 Limitations & Issues for Further Study
There are some limitations in this thesis and improvement can be made. Firstly, the
sample size is not particular large in this thesis in which the listing years under study
comprise only two years (firms that went public in 1997 and 1998) and subsequently
the window of performance changes examined includes only three post-IPO years
and three pre-IPO years. In performance change analysis, some pre-IPO performance
proxies cannot be measured due to lack of data, such as employee and cash flow
related performance proxies, and more performance benchmarks can be incorporated
when data are available. In developing regression models, some potential
explanatory variables cannot be examined at the current stage, for instance, the role
of executive compensation or incentives. In addition, due to the nature of the data,
the ourliers dropped in each model are not the same, which is one of the drawback in
this study. It is recognised that some other approaches might be used. For instance,
some practitioners would drop the same observations in all equations in model
developing.
In regard to future studies, firstly, more effort could be put on the role of corporate
governance in examining financial performance of newly privatised firms, especially
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in a single country study. Most privatisation studies mainly employ ownership
structures and country factors (such as GDP - especially in cross-country studies) to
explore the determinants in firms' financial performance changes after privatisation,
and corporate governance variables have been largely ignored. In other words,
corporate governance has not been regarded as a key factor in financial performance
of newly privatised firms. As a country study on China, this thesis employs current
available corporate governance variables in examining firm performance. It is
recognised that as the capital markets further develop and more transparent data are
available, more corporate governance variables could be employed to improve the
model developing. In future studies, corporate governance variables should be
incorporated into the analysis of performance of newly privatised firms, in studies on
both developed and transitional economies. Secondly, various quantitative and
qualitative methods such as survey and case study methods could be employed in
exploring the broad issues in corporate governance within a large number of firms.
Most privatisation studies mainly focus on financial data analysis and have not put
focus on the importance of survey and case studies in examining firm performance.
In this thesis, both survey and case study methods are used. Even survey study is a
failure, it does provide vital information on the role of corporate governance in firm
performance, which are further examined by detailed case studies analysis. In future
studies, these two quantitative and qualitative methods should be given more
emphasis, regardless of privatisation studies in developed or transitional economies.
Finally, in regard to country study on China, as the new private sector further
develops and more private firms emerge, studies between SOEs and comparable
private firms could be possible. If Chinese government decides to reduce its residual
shareholdings and open its domestic markets to foreign strategic investors, the
financial performance and corporate governance of both newly privatised and listed




Typically, one would consider that improvements in firm performance would be reflected by such
factors as increased profitability, efficiency improvements, and possibly increased output, whilst
restructuring would be reflected by such factors as investment spending on fixed capital and/or assets.
Therefore, profitability may be defined as in equation (1) below:
II = p1x- [rK+ wL+p°M] (1)
Where: K- Capital
L - Labour
M - Material Inputs
r - Cost of Capital
w - Wage Rate
p° - Price of Material Input
p1 - Sales Price
x - Output
Then Output ( x ) is defined by the general production function:
x = A . / ( K, L, M ) (2)
The correlation between profitability and efficiency may be illustrated by the fact that the general
formulation in Equation (2) above included a multiple efficiency term, which reflect total factor
productivity:
x
TFP = — = A (3)
/ ( K, L, M )
And hence increases in total factor productivity will result in reduced unit costs of production and
increasing profits.
Source: Bevati, A. A., Estrin, S. and Schaffer, M. E. (1999), Determinants ofEnterprise Performance
during Transition, CERT Working Paper, Heriot-Watt University, Edinburgh
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Appendix 2.2
Definition of Different Types of Shares
This table presents the definition of types of shares in Chinese listed firms. Firms in A-Share
market generally have state shares, legal person shares, tradable A shares (private share) and
employee shares. Similarly, the types of shares in firms in B-Share market are similar to
those in A-Share market, except private shares are tradable B-shares. Firm in both A-Share
and B-Share markets can issue shares overseas, such as H share in Hong Kong and N-Share
in New York.
State Share (Non-tradable)
Held by central government, local governments, or solely government-owned enterprises.
It is recently declared that the ultimate owner of state shares is the State Council of China.
State shares are not allowed for trading at the stock exchanges, but transferable to domestic
institutions, upon approval of CSRC.
Legal Person Share (Non-tradable)
Owned by domestic institutions or a few foreign institutions or companies. A legal person
in China is defined as a non-individual legal entity or institution. Domestic institutions
include stock companies, non-bank financial institutions and SOEs not wholly owned by
state. Securities firms, trust and investment companies, finance companies and mutual
funds are major non-bank financial institutions. Legal person shares are not tradable at
stock exchanges, but can be transferred to domestic institutions upon approval of the
CSRC.
Employee Share (Non-tradable)
Offered to workers and managers of listed companies, usually at a substantial discount.
These shares are designed more like a benefit to employees than as an incentive scheme.
Employee shares are registered (as individuals) under the title of the labour union of the
company, which represents shareholding employees to exercise their rights. After a holding
period of 6 to 12 months, the company may file with CSRC for allowing its employees sell
the shares in the open market.
A-Share (Tradable at A-Share Market)
Held and traded mostly by individuals and some by domestic institutions. There is no
restriction on the number of shares traded, or on holding periods. It is required that tradable
A-share should account for no less than 25% of total outstanding when a company goes
public. These shares are the only types of equity that are traded among domestic investors
at stock exchanges.
B-Share (Tradable at B-Share Market)
Restricted to foreigners and some authorised domestic securities firms before 2002 and
they are denominated in US dollars at the Shanghai Stock Exchange and Hong Kong
dollars at the Shenzhen Stock Exchange. A-shares and B-shares issued by the same
company carry equal rights and are comparable in all respects except for who can own
them and the trading currency. Foreign B-share shareholders tend to be financial
institutions based in Europe, Hong Kong, Japan and North America. B share market was
open to Chinese domestic investors in November 2001.
H-Share. N-Share etc. (Tradable Overseas)
H-shares are issued and traded at the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. N-shares are listed on
the New York Stock Exchange, either through IPOs or as ADRs.
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Appendix 5.1 Survey Covering Letter










Dear (Board) Mr Chairman/Ms Chairman:
I am a doctoral researcher from Department of Business Studies at the University of
Edinburgh. Please forgive any inconvenience for addressing this letter to you
directly.
China's economic development and achievement of listed firms has gained great
academic research interests worldwide. Here I attach a "Survey Questionnaire for
Chinese Listed Firms", in total 2 pages with 13 questions in regards to basic firm
level information, and no commercial sensitive questions are asked. The purpose of
this survey is to get basic understanding of Chinese listed firms. It is highly
appreciated if you could fill in this survey within your tight schedule and mail back
with enclosed stamped-envelope.
This survey will be used only for academic research, your firm's identity and detailed
survey answers are highly confidential and any organisation and individuals are not
allowed to gain access to information your provided.
I will report you in written form of general results of this survey study, and would
like to hear any of your thoughts and comments.








Department of Business Studies
University of Edinburgh
Survey Questionnaire for Listed Firms in China
Part One: Open-ended Questions
1. Why did your firm go public?
2. What are the long-term objectives of your firm, and what are the short-term ones?
3. What is the major state influence on your firm, and has there been a change in
state influence after going public?
4. What are the main changes resulting from going public?





Please tick (V) or specify.
1. To what extent is the industry in which your firm operates regulated by the
government:
-Very high ( )
-Relative high ( )
-Moderate ( )
-Relative low ( )
-Low ( )
-Others (please specify)
2. Did your firm have assets restructuring (including disposal or acquisition) before
going public?
-Yes ( )
-No ( ) -^ifno, please go to question 4..
3. If yes, how long (approximately) after finishing the assets restructuring did your
firm go pubic?
4. Did your firm have debt restructuring before going public?
-Yes ( )
- No ( ) ->ifno, please go to question 6.
5. If yes, how long (approximately) after finishing the debt restructuring did your
firm go public?
6. Is the board chairman also the chief executive officer in your firm?
-Yes ( )
- No ( )
7. Please estimate the average executive turnover per year (percentage of executives
replaced) in the last three years.






Appendix 5.3 Interview Covering Letter










TO: XXXX Limited Co.
RE; Interview
Dear Chairman/Chief Executive Officer,
I am a doctoral researcher from Department of Business Studies at the University of
Edinburgh.
In order to get better understanding of your firm's experience in business
management and corporate governance, it is highly appreciated if you can offer me a
chance to conduct a short interview with you or any other senior executives at certain
time before 31st September.
The interview time will be no more than one hour, and content includes: major
changes after going public; experience and lessons; and your opinions in regards to
corporate management and governance. Please also see attached detailed list of
interview questions.










Appendix 5.4 Semi-structured Interview Questions









Interview questions cover three main topics: the impact of going public, corporate
management and corporate governance issues.
Coins Public
1. What are the main changes resulting from going public?
2. What is the major state influence on your firm, and has there been a change in
state influence after going public?
Corporate Management
3. What are the major challenges in improving financial performance? Any
solution?
4. Has firm's assets quality improved? Any good experience or lesson?
5. Has firm's cash management improved? Any good experience or lesson?
6. How does firm conduct strategic management, investment and market research?
Corporate Governance
7. Does current corporate governance system work? Any solution?
8. How do you evaluate the roles of independent supervisors and independent
directors?
9. How do you describe the relationship between board of directors and
shareholders?
10. How do you evaluate performance-related pay and its design? Is there any
practice in the firm?
11. How do you communicate with financial analyst and investors (especially small
and medium investors)?
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Appendix 7.1 Summary of China's Consumer Price Indexes (1994-2001)
This table summarises the actual and rebased consumer price indexes from 1994 to 2001.
Rebased indexes are rebased on 1997 and 1998 consumer price index respectively.
Actual Rebased Rebased
Year (Previous Year Index Index
= 100) 1997=100 1998=100
1994 124.10 120.72 125.10
1995 117.10 113.91 118.04
1996 108.30 105.35 109.17
1997 102.80 100.00 103.63
1998 99.20 96.50 100.00
1999 98.60 95.91 99.40
2000 100.40 97.67 101.21
2001 100.70 97.96 101.51
Data Source: Datastream-Economics Data Series.
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Appendix 7.2 Statistics of Performance Proxies Over Seven Years
The following Panel A to Panel I present summary statistics of all performance proxies
of 127 main sample firms over pre-IPO and post-IPO years. Mean, median, standard
deviation, minimum and maximum values of each performance proxy are presented in
separate panels. Year 0 represents the year of going public, and the years before and
after year 0 under study are denoted as negative and positive numbers accordingly.
Panel A: Return on Sales (ROS)
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3
Mean 0.198 0.202 0.193 0.200 0.181 0.119 0.086
Median 0.141 0.139 0.143 0.169 0.173 0.132 0.103
Std. D 0.196 0.196 0.169 0.179 0.266 0.369 0.308
Minimum 0.006 0.012 0.012 -0.733 -2.101 -3.486 -2.306
Maximum 1.177 1.204 0.988 0.939 0.838 0.848 0.634
Panel B: Return on Assets (ROA)
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3
Mean 0.139 0.143 0.127 0.081 0.078 0.057 0.043
Median 0.116 0.120 0.113 0.079 0.074 0.058 0.045
Std. D 0.111 0.110 0.068 0.034 0.051 0.042 0.040
Minimum 0.002 0.025 0.014 -0.104 -0.215 -0.143 -0.135
Maximum0.811 0.896 0.456 0.199 0.230 0.194 0.121
Panel C: Return on Equity (ROE)
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3
Mean 0.406 0.366 0.288 0.123 0.101 0.056 0.003
Median 0.320 0.327 0.276 0.117 0.118 0.096 0.081
Std. D 0.585 0.212 0.112 0.050 0.245 0.417 0.573
Minimum 0.005 0.100 0.078 -0.274 -2.219 -4.538 -5.742
Maximum6.555 1.397 0.618 0.318 0.379 0.228 0.207
Panel D: Real Sales (SALES - m)
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3
Mean 38.06 52.09 62.40 77 77 85.48 100.71 123.64
Median 16.85 23.01 30.17 36.48 42.82 53.03 56.00
Std. D 65.10 94.55 111.74 1.26.53 135.68 157.55 200.76
Minimum 0.69 1.31 3.16 5.74 7.73 5.84 2.79
Maximum502.69 632.01 821.50 869.74 857.51 1077.40 1215.44
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Panel E: Sales Assets Turnover (SAT)
-3 -2-10123
Mean 0.941 1.000 0.940 0.571 0.574 0.542 0.540
Median 0.797 0.809 0.772 0.450 0.447 0.449 0.421
Std. D 0.615 0.753 0.818 0.464 0.453 0.456 0.462
Minimum 0.085 0.118 0.156 0.113 0.102 0.041 0.029
Maximum4.150 4.801 6.064 2.804 2.691 3.151 2.886
Panel F: Quick Ratio (QR)
-3 -2-10123
Mean 1.121 0.918 0.945 2.270 1.755 1.539 1.439
Median 0.731 0.766 0.822 1.847 1.377 1.245 1.237
Std. D 2.271 0.850 0.560 1.661 1.408 0.943 0.860
Minimum 0.034 0.191 0.098 0.262 0.304 0.153 0.133
Maximum23.256 9.158 3.725 9.636 10.105 5.224 4.540
Panel G: Net Working Capital to Total Assets (NWCTA)
-3 -2-10123
Mean 0.101 0.101 0.113 0.320 0.238 0.220 0.193
Median 0.088 0.098 0.111 0.351 0.247 0.217 0.233
Std. D 0.176 0.159 0.148 0.194 0.166 0.182 0.211
Minimum-0.531 -0.474 -0.499 -0.189 -0.234 -0.654 -0.743
Maximum0.609 0.503 0.456 0.722 0.728 0.670 0.581
Panel H: Total Debt (LEVI)
-3 -2-10123
Mean 0.607 0.589 0.546 0.339 0.372 0.383 0.404
Median 0.627 0.624 0.581 0.335 0.391 0.382 0.388
Std. D 0.167 0.151 0.150 0.151 0.167 0.163 0.162
Minimum 0.043 0.034 0.078 0.036 0.038 0.035 0.115
Maximum 1.000 0.897 0.868 0.733 0.935 0.968 0.979
Panel I: Long-term Debt (LEV2)
-3 -2-10123
Mean 0.228 0.201 0.174 0.084 0.091 0.086 0.072
Median 0.208 0.175 0.138 0.037 0.039 0.030 0.041
Std. D 0.209 0.190 0.172 0.119 0.135 0.136 0.260
Minimum 0.000 -0.035 -0.001 -0.004 -0.190 -0.394 -2.446
Maximum0.874 0.878 0.830 0.665 0.696 0.684 0.768
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Appendix 7.3 Statistics of Post-IPO versus Pre-lPO Changes in
Performance Proxies
The following Panel A to Panel I present summary statistics of changes of post-IPO
versus pre-IPO in performance proxies of 127 main sample firms. Mean, median,
standard deviation, minimum and maximum values of average three years pre-IPO,
average three years post-IPO, and changes between post-IPO versus per-IPO
performance proxies are presented in respective panels.
Panel A: Changes in Return on Sales (AROS)
ROSb ROSa AROS
(Pre-IPO) (Post-IPO) (Changes)
Mean 0.198 0.129 -0.069
Median 0.146 0.140 -0.019
Std. Deviation 0.183 0.294 0.297
Minimum 0.012 -2.493 -2.591
Maximum 1.123 0.773 0.187
Panel B: Changes in Return on Assets (AROA)
ROAb ROAa AROA
(Pre-IPO) (Post-IPO) (Changes)
Mean 0.136 0.059 -0.077
Median 0.116 0.060 -0.066
Std. Deviation 0.090 0.038 0.083
Minimum 0.022 -0.137 -0.548
Maximum 0.694 0.165 0.038
Panel C: Changes in Return on Equity (AROE)
ROEb ROEa AROE
(Pre-IPO) (Post-IPO) (Changes)
Mean 0.353 0.054 -0.300
Median 0.321 0.102 -0.223
Std. Deviation 0.237 0.326 0.389
Minimum 0.100 -2.757 -2.897
Maximum 2.387 0.198 0.034
Panel D: Changes in Real Sales (ASALES)
SALESb SALESa ASALES
(Pre-IPO) (Post-IPO) (Changes)
Mean 0.715 1.604 0.889
Median 0.716 1.373 0.703
Std. Deviation 0.272 0.803 0.886
Minimum 0.128 0.320 -1.942
Maximum 2.262 5.169 4.826
300
Appendix 7.3 Cont'd
Panel E: Changes in Sales to Assets Turnover (ASAT)
SATb SATa ASAT
(Pre-IPO) (Post-IPO) (Changes)
Mean 0.960 0.552 -0.408
Median 0.808 0.452 -0.357
Std. Deviation 0.671 0.442 0.423
Minimum 0.120 0.057 -3.047
Maximum 4.756 2.733 0.324
Panel F: Changes in Quick Ratio (AQR)
QRb QRa AQR
(Pre-IPO) (Post-IPO) (Changes)
Mean 0.995 1.578 0.583
Median 0.811 1.359 0.483
Std. Deviation 1.000 0.935 1.238
Minimum 0.145 0.199 -6.681
Maximum 8.933 6.332 5.706
Panel G: Changes in Net Working Capital to Total Assets (ANWCTA)
NWCTAb NWCTAa ANWCTA
(Pre-IPO) (Post-IPO) (Changes)
Mean 0.105 0.217 0.112
Median 0.109 0.236 0.106
Std. Deviation 0.142 0.171 0.175
Minimum -0.475 -0.524 -0.553
Maximum 0.494 0.640 0.844
Panel H: Changes in Total Debt (ALEV1)
LEVlb LEVla ALEV1
(Pre-IPO) (Post-IPO) (Changes)
Mean 0.581 0.386 -0.194
Median 0.611 0.376 -0.196
Std. Deviation 0.142 0.154 0.160
Minimum 0.057 0.095 -0.621
Maximum 0.866 0.922 0.243
Panel I: Changes in Long-term Debt (ALEV2)
LEVlb LEV2a ALEV2
(Pre-IPO) (Post-IPO) (Changes)
Mean 0.201 0.083 -0.118
Median 0.162 0.045 -0.095
Std. Deviation 0.172 0.156 0.182
Minimum 0.000 -1.010 -1.158
Maximum 0.846 0.687 0.282
Appendix 9.1 Efficiency & Liquidity Models in Performance Change Regression
Analysis
1. Efficiency Model - ASAT Model
ASAT = 0.077 - 0.851 PLC - 0.635 CON - 0.004ST - 0.073EMP - 0.058HMC
(0.559) (-2.343) (-3.847) (-0.038) (-0.689) (-0.661)
- 0.141SSIZE + 0.105BOD + 0.077CRS + 0.063ASIZE - 0.046YR - 0.102IND
(-1.552) (1.223) (0.890) (0.597) (-0.522) (-1.177)
R2 =0.115 Observations: 124
Adjusted R2 =0.10 F = 7.853 Sig. = 0.000
(Equation A)
In developing the model, cases 6, 46 and 110 are outliers and are eliminated in the
regression model because their presence violates the assumption of constant variance
across predicted ASAT. These outliers have large standardised residuals of -9.707,
-4.727 and -6.727 respectively. Further investigation confirms that these three firms
are in retailing, chemical and construction businesses. In addition to their superior
performance during the pre-IPO years, their performance decline dramatically more
than average firms do, which leads to the extreme deterioration in sales to assets
turnover compared with their pre-IPO years.
The scatterplots between model error variance and predicted values of change in
sales assets turnover (ASAT) and between model error variance and explanatory
variables reveal that model error variances have been constant at all levels of
predicted value of ASAT. The following is the scatterplots between model error
variance and predicted value of ASAT.
Figure A. Scatterplots between Model Error Variance and Predicted
Value of Change in Sales Assets Turnover (ASAT)
This figure demonstrates that the assumption of homoscadasticity is met since model error
variances are constant across predicted values. Cases labelled as 6, 110 and 46 are three
omitted cases with large standardised residuals.
-6 -5 -4 ..3 -.2 -.1 00
PREDICTED VALUE OF CHANGE IN SAT (Unstandardized)
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The three omitted cases with large standardised residuals are labelled in figure A. As
the result of omission of these outliers, the model error variances are constant as
predicted values of ASAT increase and the assumption of homoscadasticity is met.
The model suggests that both Herfindahal concentration index and private ownership
are negatively associated with sales assets turnover change, where 1% increase in
ownership concentration index leads to 0.635% decrease in sales assets turnover
change, and 1% increase in private ownership leads to 0.851% decline in sales assets
turnover change. But due to the low adjusted R2 of 10%, the interpretation of the
model should be in caution.
2. Liquidity Models - ANWCTA & AQR Models
(1) AQR Model -Change in Quick Ratio Model
AQR = 2.36 - 0.049BOD - 0.453 ASIZE + 0.060ST + 0.008PLC - 0.148EMP
(4.456) (-1.851) (-2.550) (0.655) (0.076) (-1.638)
+ 0.114CON - 0.017HMC + 0.159SSIZE - 0.015CRS + 0.073YR + 0.059IND
(1.202) (-0.189) (1.497) (-0.175) (0.813) (0.676)
R2 = 0.085 Observations: 123
Adjusted R2 =0.070 F = 5.579 Sig. = 0.000
(Equation B)
In developing the model, cases 63, 82, 90 and 111 are outliers and are eliminated in
the regression model because their presence violates the assumption of constant
variance across predicted AQR. These outliers have large standardised residuals of
-7.217, -9.614, 6.561 and 4.666 respectively. Further investigation confirms that
these firms are in steel, travel, electronic equipment and chemical businesses. Cases
63 and 82 experience a dramatic decrease in quick ratio, cases 90 and 111 experience
large increase in quick ratio during post-IPO years, which leads to extreme
deterioration or improvement in quick ratio compared to their pre-IPO performance.
The scatterplots between model error variance and predicted values of change in
quick ratio (AQR) and between model error variance and explanatory variables
reveal that model error variances have been constant at all levels of predicted value
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of AQR. The following is the scatterplots between model error variance and
predicted value of AQR.
Figure B. Scatterplots between Model Error Variance and Predicted
Value of Change in Real Sales (AQR)
This figure demonstrates that the assumption of homoscadasticity is met since model error
variances are constant across predicted values. Cases labelled as 82, 63, 90 and 111 are four
omitted cases with large standardised residuals.
i
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The three omitted cases with large standardised residuals are labelled in figure B. As
a result of omission of these outliers, the model error variances are constant as
predicted values of AQR increase, and the assumption of homoscadasticity is met.
The AQR model suggests that board size is negatively associated with change in
liquidity, and increasing one board director contributes to 0.049 decrease in liquidity
change, but the significance is only at 10% level. The model also reveals that assets
size is negatively associated with quick ratio, and 1% increase in assets size
contributes to 0.453% decrease in quick ratio. But due to the low adjusted R2 of 7%,
the interpretation of the model should be in caution.
(2) ANWCTA Model -Change in Net Working Capital to Total Assets Model
ANWCTA = 0.120 - 0.009 BOD + 0.063YR + 0.072 IND - 0.122ST + 0.103PLC
(1.896) (-1.748) (2.397) (2.714) (-1.404) (1.181)
- 0.031EMP - 0.029CON - 0.012HMC - 0.001SSIZE - 0.051CRS - 0.096ASIZE
(-0.338) (-0.328) (-0.144) (-0.009) (-0.593) (-1.084)
R2 = 0.115 Observations: 124
Adjusted R2 =0.093 F = 5.180 Sig. = 0.000
(Equation C)
In developing the model, cases 33, 61 and 111 are outliers and are eliminated in the
regression model because their presence violates the assumption of constant variance
across predicted ANWCTA. These outliers have large standardised residuals of
111
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-5.224, 4.955 and 3.020 respectively. Further investigation confirms that all three
cases are in electronic equipment business. Case 33 performs extremely badly during
its post-IPO years, while case 61 and 111 perform well above average in net working
capital to total assets during their post-IPO years, which leads to their extreme
performance changes
The scatterplots between model error variance and predicted values of change in
quick ratio (ANWCTA) and between model error variance and explanatory variables
reveal that model error variances have been constant at all levels of predicted value
of ANWCTA. The following is the scatterplots between model error variance and
predicted value of ANWCTA.
Figure C. Scatterplots between Model Error Variance and Predicted Value
of Change in Net Working Capital to Total Assets (ANWCTA)
This figure demonstrates that the assumption of homoscadasticity is met since model error
variances are constant across predicted values. Cases labeled as 33, 61 and 111 are three




The three omitted cases with large standardised residuals are labelled in the figure C.
As the result of omission of these outliers, the model error variances are constant as
predicted values of ANWCTA increase, and the assumption of homoscadasticity is
met.
The model suggests that board size is negatively associated with change in liquidity,
and increasing one board director contributes to 0.009 decrease in networking capital
to total assets. Firms that went public in 1997 perform better than those firms that
went public in 1998 by 0.063 in net working capital to total assets. Firms from
industrial sector outperform firms from other sectors by 0.027 in networking capital
to total assets. But due to the low adjusted R2 of 9.3%, the interpretation of the model
should be in caution.
PREDICTED VALUE OF CHANGE IN NWCTA(Unstandardized)
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Appendix 12.1 China's Enrons
Since late July 2001, the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) has
reprimanded a number of listed companies for violating provisions relating to
financial reporting and management. A few of the highest-profile cases include:
■■■■■■
Zhengzhou Baiwen Co., Ltd.
Henan-based Baiwen, a state-owned
retail firm, listed on the Shanghai
Stock Exchange in April 1996. Exactly
three years later it became one of the
first companies that CSRC temporarily
delisted, after it reported losses of
¥957 ($116 million) in 1999—the
largest one-year loss by a listed PRC
company. CSRC later found that the
company had inflated profits by ¥19
million ($2.3 million) before its listing
and by ¥144 million ($17.4 million) in
the three years that it was listed. The
company was reportedly found guilty
of insider trading and publishing
misleading annual reports. CSRC also
fined Baiwen's accountants for
falsifying audits. In mid-2002, leather
products firm Sanlian Group finalized
a purchase of 50 percent of the
company.
Guangxia (Yinchuan) Industry Co.,
Ltd.
Guangxia, a listed pharmaceutical
company, falsified profits for several
years to present itself as a fast-growing
entity with sophisticated, state-of-the-art
technologies. The company fabricated
sales contracts and export figures and
exaggerated its financial statements,
reportedly inflating net profits by ¥745
million ($90 million). CSRC initiated an
extensive probe of the company in
August 2001, and the Ministry of
Finance eventually stripped the
accounting license of its longstanding
auditor, leading observers to nickname
Guangxia the "Chinese Enron."
Most China share indices fell after state media reported regulator probing longtime
stock darling biochemical firm Guangxia.
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Appendix 12.1 China's Enrons Cont'd
Sanjiu Pharmaceutical Co.
CSRC uncovered Sanjiu's troubles in
mid-2001. The listed company, which
was reportedly China's largest
pharmaceutical group, had
misappropriated ¥2.5 billion ($302
million) on behalf of a few major
shareholders and related business
partners without the consent of other
shareholders or the public. These
diversions amounted to 96 percent of the
company's net assets, posing
considerable threat to the company's
operations. CSRC reprimanded the
senior principals, headed by former
military serviceman Zhao Xinxian, and
fined the company ¥150 million
($18.1 million). Major shareholders and
related business partners had repaid
¥349 million ($42.2million) to Sanjiu by
March 2002. Zhao remains the
company's legal representative and the
company continues to operate,




Lantian listed on the Shanghai stock
exchange in 1996 and was hailed as the
first publicly listed Chinese ecological
agricultural company. Immediately after
the IPO, however, investors grew
suspicious of the company's soaring share
price and incredibly strong profit growth
because its business lines, lake fisheries
and lotus processing, were unlikely to
generate profits at that level. In 2000, the
company had reported ¥1.84 billion ($222
million) in sales income but only ¥8.5
million ($1 million) in accounts
receivable—an impossible gap for a
legitimate company. Lantian said that it
had settled most of its transactions with
cash. Analysts have estimated that the
company fabricated 2000 net profits of up
to ¥500 million ($60 million).
Poor corporate governance in China begins before a company is approved for listing.
Firms such as Lantian and Baiwen Co. Ltd. were in effect phoney entities even
before their IPOs, which is partially the result caused by the governments in selecting
firms for listing.
Source: Shi, Steven and Drake Weisert (2002), Corporate Governance with Chinese Characteristics,
China Business Review, Volume 29, Number 5, September-October 2002.
Appendix 13.1 Survey Study Analysis
Because of the transitional context in China, it is expected that survey study may
encounter difficulties due to the following reasons:
■ Information disclosure is not a standard practice but a new phenomenon, not only
at government level, but also at firm level;
■ Survey, as a research methodology is not widely employed not only in academic
research but also in industry.
Therefore on the one hand, firms may be not willing to disclose information to
outsiders; on the other hand, firms may not be familiar with such research strategy
and tend to turn it down. After consulting one Beijing-based domestic research
company, it was discovered that normally it takes a long time to get a response and
the company's previous experience shows that companies tend to turn down
questionnaires and response rate normally is around 5%, whether small or large
samples.
1. Pilot Study
The pilot survey was conducted to improve survey questions and get some basic
understanding of how firms would react to questionnaires. Questions asked are
designed not to be too sensitive to answer, or too ambiguous to draw the line and
define. With a pilot study, any difficulties in questions can be detected and quality
can be improved.
In June 2001, 28 questionnaires were sent out to 28 randomly chosen firms listed at
the Shanghai Stock Exchange. From those 28 questionnaires, only 4 firms responded.
Originally, the compensation of CEO and senior management was asked, no
respondent would like to answer this question. Personal income is a highly sensitive
issue, which may not only involve individual income tax issue, but may also suppose
to leak "inside" information on executive compensation to private shareholders. One
fact is that firms may not publish these informations honestly in their annual
financial reports, but keep actual payment figures as inside information.
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Therefore, in the later formal survey study, the original question of:
Can you give senior managers' annual compensation package (including
base salary, bonus and stock options)?
was modified to:
Is there performance-related Incentive pay scheme in yourfirm?
Obviously, the modified question is very ambiguous and the measurement is not
precise, but it is a more approachable question given the reasons mentioned above.
The final questionnaire questions after modification are shown in appendix 5.2
(pp293-294). The low response rate in the pilot study was disappointing and although
it was not a success, it still could provide some limited information about listed
firms.
2. Survey Study
After the pilot study, a further 243 questionnaires, including all 138 firms that went
public in 1997 and 1998 (main sample firms) were sent out in early July 2001,
together with stamped return envelopes. The results of the survey study were
disappointing. From July 2001 to March 2002, 19 questionnaires were sent back, and
one survey was conducted by telephone at the firm's request. Therefore 20 out of 243
questionnaires were answered and the response rate was around 9%. Therefore, the
survey is a failure; nevertheless, a general description of results is presented in the
following section.
3. Data Analysis
If the response rate is only 9%, survey results obviously do not represent majority-
listed firms, and can only be used to get some understanding of corporate
management and governance issues in listed firms. It is recognised that reasonably
successful firms tend to respond and hence survey results would be potentially biased
towards relatively successful firms and should be interpreted with caution. This
section will analyse open-ended questions and close-ended questions separately.
(1) Open-ended Question Analysis
Question One: Why did your firm qo public?
In general, survey firms normally have two purposes for going public, which are far
beyond traditional motivation of financing in developed markets. As shown in
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appendix 13.2 (pp317), the purposes of going public for listed firms are divergent.
Ten out of 20 firms regard financing is the most important purpose, eight firms
expect corporate governance can be improved and six firms hope sound modern
corporation system with diversified ownership structure can be set up after going
public. Five firms expect listing would help to boost market share, promote firm
awareness and new business opportunities. Three firms expect that the financial
market would help their managers to improve managerial skill. Two firms expect that
they can be more innovative after going public and two firms simply state that
becoming listed itself is important.
Instead of financing, going public has a very different meaning in China. Even
Chinese listed firms do recognise the importance of corporate governance, they
expect the financial market to do more good for them than financing, such as
building modern corporation system or developing managerial skills that have been
well-established before firms go public in the West. The starting point for listed firms
before they went public was fairly low, with absence of basic corporate governance
mechanisms of a modem corporation and insufficient managerial skills which are
essential in public companies in the West.
Question Two: What are the long-term objectives of your firm, and what are
the short-term ones?
Only four firms give both long-term and short-term objectives, seven firms state only
long-term objectives, seven firms state only short-term objectives, one firm gives an
irrelevant answer and one firm did not answer at all. Those seven firms which state
only long-term objectives seem do not have clear long-term strategies but mainly
plan statement, such as "best in sector", "most competitive company" etc. It is not
clear whether they have well-defined short-term strategies or not. Seven firms that
only state short-term strategies demonstrate similar patterns in their short-term
strategic moves. Two firms stress high competition and pressures on long-term
investment activities and but fail to find solutions. Five firms directly or indirectly
indicate their intention either to change their core businesses or launch
diversification. For instance, one firm would abandon its import and export as core
businesses; one firm would diversify from service industry to drug industry; two
manufacturing companies are interested to be investment companies; one firm would
diversify from energy business to nano-technology business. In fact these perceived
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short-term strategies by the firms are long-term strategies in the sense that some
diversification can only be achieved in the long-term, such as changing core
businesses. The pattern reveals that due to competition and dynamic of business
environment, firms tend to go for diversification if they cannot find good business
solution and deliver performance in the short term. In regard to those four firms that
state both long-term and short-term strategies, one computer firm and one bank stick
to their core businesses without mentioning diversification, the other two firms
specifically emphasise their plan for unrelated diversification in the bio-tech business
and related diversification in high-tech business.
The above analysis shows there are four significant characteristics in firms' long-
term and short-term strategies:
■ Some firms do not have clearly defined short-term and long-term strategies;
■ Some firms do not distinguish short-term and long-term strategies;
■ Changing core business is a common strategy when firms face competition or
investment pressures;
■ Diversifying into high-tech business is a very popular investment strategy.
Question Three: What is the major state influence on your firm? Has there
been a change in state influence after going public?
Strong government influence reflects in macro level in terms of industry policies, and
at the micro level in terms of organisational structures and recruitment policies etc.
Eight out of twenty firms state strong government influence in industry policies, such
as price control in utilities and drug industry, but relaxed and privileged policies
towards high-tech industry and research institutions, such as tax exemption. These
eight firms are generally in highly regulated industries, such as the utility sector of
water, energy, electricity, public transport, as well as banking and drug industries.
Research-intensive firms receive privileged policy at both the central and regional
government levels. For instance, one research-intensive firm states that it enjoys five
years tax exemption after going public. Three firms state strong government
influence in organisational structure, management appointments and compensation
policies of the firm. Six firms state moderate influence from government, and they
are heavy-loss firms, privately owned firms and firms with less strategic importance
to the government. Three firms suggest there is no influence from government and
they are located in less developed central or northern parts of China, and they are
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either in traditional manufacturing (not involving in high-tech business) or trading
business.
Therefore from the point view of these listed firms, government influence could have
double effects - advantageous or disadvantageous. If firms are in regulated
industries, industry policies are strongly influenced by government, as well as firms'
organisational structure, management appointment and compensation policies.
Meanwhile, government has less interest in firms with less strategic importance or in
loss.
Question Four: What are the main changes resulting from going public?
As shown in Panel B of appendix 13.2 (pp317), there are various changes occurred
after going public. Eleven firms claim improvements in corporate governance
practices, ten firms suggest improved financing for investment, six firms claim
improvements in their investment and operational management, five firms indicate
improvement in building modern corporation systems, three firms claim improved
market share and one firm states that employees are more motivated as a result of
going public. Re-examining Panel A of purpose of going public, the top two purposes
of going public coincide with the top two changes in Panel B, which may indicate
that going public does serve firms' major purposes in financing and corporate
governance to some extent. But unfortunately, the purpose to improve managerial
skills and technical innovation mentioned in Panel A of purpose of going public
appear unimproved as they are missing in Panel B of changes after going public,
which may indicate that managerial skills might not be improved automatically after
IPO.
Question Five: How do your describe your firm's relation or communication
with financial analysts and investors?
One firm did not answer this question. With nineteen valid answers, three firms only
discuss investor relations, nine firms discuss communication with financial analysts,
the remaining seven firms discuss both their communication and relation with
financial analysts and investors. As shown in Panel C of appendix 13.2 (pp317), only
four firms could describe their communication with financial analysts as good, and
three firms claim they have good communication with investors. The remaining
firms' relationship with either financial analysts or investors is basic and limited. The
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distant relationship between listed firm and investors and the financial market may
indicate that short-termism of capital market and lack of investment mentality from
both financial community and investors prevents listed firms from relationship
building.
(2) Close-ended Question Analysis
The close-ended questions are reorganised as relevant topics and results are
presented accordingly.
Topic One: To what extent is the industry in which your firm operates
regulated by the government, with very high, relative high, moderate, relative
low, low or others.
Government influence is measured from very low to very high, in which six firms
and seven firms indicate relative low and moderate influence respectively, and four
firms suggest it is very high. Those firms with high government influence are either
in utility or drug industry and manufacturing firms receive much lower influence.
Topic Two: Did your firm have asset restructuring (including disposal or
acguisition) before going public? If yes, how long (approximately) after
finishing the assets restructuring did your firm go pubic?
Nine out of twenty firms conducted asset restructuring before going public, and the
other eleven firms did not. After finishing restructuring, it took firms from a few
months to two years to finally go public, and the average waiting period was one and
half years. If firms went public immediately after asset restructuring, new financing
from the market and potential improved corporate management and corporate
governance may well have stimulated the effects of asset restructuring on firm
performance. Since firms wait for a long time to go public after asset restructuring,
the potential effect of restructuring on performance may diminish in the pre-IPO
period. The results may indicate that firms could not take advantages of pre-IPO
asset restructuring to improve financial performance after going public.
Topic Three: Did your firm have debt restructuring before going public? If yes,
how long (approximately) after finishing the debt restructuring did your firm
go public?
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Four out of seventeen1 firms conducted debt restructuring and majority firms did not,
which may indicate that firms that perform well are chosen to be listed. For those
firms that conducted debt restructuring, it took them around half to two years to go
public and the average is one year. Similar to asset restructuring, if firms went public
immediately after debt restructuring, the effect of debt restructuring on firm
performance may have been well stimulated by potential improved corporate
management and corporate governance and subsequently reflected in post-IPO
performance. If firms went public long time after debt restructuring, the potential
effect of debt restructuring on performance may diminish in the pre-IPO period. The
results may indicate that firms could not take advantages of pre-IPO debt
restructuring to improve financial performance after going public.
Topic Four: Is the board chairman also the chief executive officer in your
firm?
Sixteen out of twenty firms have separated the role of chief executive officer and
board chairman, which indicates that firms have been following the requirement
from China Security Regulatory Commission (CSRC).
Topic Five: Please estimate the average executive turnover per year
(percentage of executives replaced) in the last three years.
Executive turnover per year can be as low as zero and as high as 60%, and fifteen out
of eighteen firms have executive turnover lower than 30%, including managerial
appointments from state agencies. The results may suggest that executive teams have
been stable and furthermore, outside managers can hardly be introduced into listed
firms.
Topic Six: Is there any performance-related incentive pay scheme in your
firm?
Sixteen out of twenty firms state they have an ambiguous performance-related pay
scheme, but not stock option like incentive scheme.
' There are three missing values.
2 Three are two missing values.
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Discussion:
It is difficult to draw any conclusion from the data because of the low response rate,
but one interesting pattern can be found in these 20 cases. Using government
influence as category, the mean value of executive turnover and mode value of
combine role of chief executive officer and board chairman are summarized in figure
A3.
Figure A Executive Turnover & its Connection with Government Influence
relative low relative high
Governemnt Influence
Figure A shows that with higher government influence, mean value of executive
turnover turns to be higher and relative high government influence is associated with
highest mean value of executive turnover. In addition, mode value of combined role
of chief executive officer and board chairman is also associated with relative high
government influence. The possible explanation is that when government influence is
relatively strong, but not very strong, firms tend to have high executive turnover and
combined role of CEO and Chairman as a result of government intervention in
management appointments and organizational structures. Consistent with results
from earlier discussion, firms in regulated industries are more strongly affected by
government industry policies as well as government influence in organisational
structure, management appointment and compensation policies.
4. Summary
Survey results show that firms have divergent purposes for going public, ranging
from conventional financing, corporate governance, and organisational changes to
managerial skills etc. Besides financing and corporate governance, the financial
3 Executive turnover is a continuous variable, and therefore mean value is used; combined role of
chief executive officer and board chairman is a dummy variable and therefore mode value is used.
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market is expected to solve all problems at every aspect of corporate sector and
obviously some of them cannot be achieved simply through exposure to the financial
market. For instance, managerial skills need support from the existence of
managerial market, quality of national education system, development of business
culture and private sector entrepreneurship together with other government policies.
After going public, many firms indicate some extent of improved corporate
governance, and government's influence is mainly on firms in regulated industries or
others with strategic importance. Changing core business and diversification are
common investment strategies, which are partially by-products of either government
industry policies - privileged policies in high tech or strict policy control in several
highly regulated industries. Diversification seems to be an optimal strategy to get out
of either old businesses or government control, and enter into a more investment
policy-friendly business regime. Due to pressure on competition and investment
opportunities, highly speculative stock market, weak firm-financial community and
weak firm-investor relations, firms have difficulties to identify or distinguish their
long-term and short-term strategies. As a result of that, diversification towards high¬
tech business is the solution.
Results also reveal that asset and debt restructuring activities do not prevail, and a
possible explanation could be that profitable firms or profitable parts of larger group
companies are chosen for listing. On the other hand, firms cannot take advantage of
asset and debt restructuring to enhance their post-IPO performance because they
have to wait for more than one year to finally go public. Most firms also have
separated the roles of chief executive officer and board chairman, and performance-
related pay has been designed, but details are too sensitive to be given. Executive
turnover is stable and outside managers can hardly be introduced into the firms. It
seems that higher government influence is associated with higher executive turnover
and combined role of chief executive officer and board chairman, which confirms
government's strong influence on organisational structure, executive appointment
and compensation policy in some regulated industries.
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Appendix 13.2 Summary of Survey Results
This table summarises survey results based on the order of questions in the questionnaire.
Panel A Purpose of Going Public
Rank No. of Firms Purposes
1 10 financing
2 8 corporate governance
3 6 modern corporation system with
diversified ownership structure
4 5 business & development
5 3 managerial skills
6 2 technical innovation
7 2 just become listed (awareness)
Panel B Major Changes after IPO
Rank No. of Firms Changes (improvement)
1 11 corporate governance
2 10 financing
3 6 investment & operation
4 5 modern corporation system with
diversified ownership structure
5 3 awareness & marketing
6 1 employee motivation
Panel C Communication/Relation with Financial Analysts & Investors
Communication/Relation with Financial Analysts
No. of firms Communication / Reasons
Relation
3 basic, distant market speculation;
focusing on capital gains
ignore company fundamentals
focusing on short-term profits
focusing on insider information
3 very limited n/a
4 moderate consulting role
4 good consulting role
Communication / Relation with Investors
No. of firms Communication / Reasons
Relation
4 basic, market speculation focusing on capital gains;
short-term relationship lacking investment mentality
3 good n/a
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Hang Seng Bank (HK)
Sources: Howson, Nicholas C. and Lester Ross (2003), Foreign Minority Equity Investments in
Chinese Commercial Banks, The China Business Review, July-August, 2003.
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